CHRIS N. v. BURNSVILLE, MINN.

• Decision Date: 13 May 1986
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 4-85-1423.
• Citation: 634 F. Supp. 1402
• Parties: CHRIS N., Plaintiff, v. BURNSVILLE, MINNESOTA, a political subdivision, and John Does 1-10, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota

634 F. Supp. 1402

CHRIS N., Plaintiff, v. BURNSVILLE, MINNESOTA, a political subdivision, and John Does 1-10, Defendants.

Civ. No. 4-85-1423.

United States District Court, D. Minnesota, Fourth Division.

May 13, 1986.

Charles S. Zimmerman and Barry G. Reed, Zimmerman, Caplan & Reed, Minneapolis, Minn., for plaintiff.

Kirk A. Stubbee and John T. Chapman, Arthur, Chapman, Michelson & McDonough, Minneapolis, Minn., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MacLAUGHLIN, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on defendants' motion to dismiss. Defendants' motion will be denied.

FACTS

Before the Court is defendants' motion to dismiss in one of the so-called "strip search" cases. Plaintiff was detained by city of Burnsville police July 2, 1982. Plaintiff, dressed only in shorts and a tee shirt, gave a ride on his motorcycle to an acquaintance. The destination was the passenger's automobile. Upon reaching the automobile plaintiff was confronted by several Burnsville city police officers with weapons drawn. The police arrested plaintiff's passenger for suspected theft. Although the police concededly had no reason to suspect plaintiff of wrongdoing, plaintiff was also arrested, detained, and subjected to a full strip search. The search allegedly included a visual body cavity search. Plaintiff thereafter brought this suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging deprivation of his rights under the fourth, fifth, eighth, ninth, and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution, and seeking actual damages of $50,000, punitive damages of $100,000, costs and fees.

Defendants now bring this motion to dismiss, on the ground that plaintiff's cause of action is time-barred. Resolution of this issue turns on whether the Supreme Court's recent decision in Wilson v. Garcia, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985), is to be applied retroactively in the circumstances presented by the case at bar.¹

DISCUSSION

A. Statute of Limitations in a § 1983 Action

1. The Wilson Decision

The Federal Civil Rights Act, like many federal statutes, contains no specific statute of limitations. Smith v. City of Pittsburgh, 764 F.2d 188, 192 (3d Cir.1985). Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which governs several procedural aspects under those acts, the courts are authorized to borrow the forum state's appropriate statute of limitations, if that choice "is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States." 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Prior to the 1985 decision of the United States Supreme Court in Wilson v. Garcia, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985), the judicial task of selecting an appropriate state limitations period to apply in section 1983 actions had proven a fertile source of litigation, as the courts struggled with the task of selecting the "most analogous" state statute of limitations.² In Wilson the Supreme Court attempted to do away with this source of confusion by mandating that, in all future section 1983 actions, the courts are to uniformly apply the forum state's limitations period for personal injury actions. In so ruling, the Court rejected the use of other arguably analogous statutes of limitations, such as those for breach of contract actions, tort claims for damage to property, tortious acts committed by public officers or the states' catch all period of limitations. Mulligan v. Hazard, 777 F.2d 340, 343 (6th Cir.1985). The policy rationale underscoring Justice Stevens' Wilson opinion is threefold:

(1) a "simple, broad characterization" of all section 1983 claims as personal injury analogues best fits the "statute's remedial purpose" by eliminating the uncertainty which "inevitably breeds ... time-consuming litigation that is foreign to the central purposes of § 1983";³

(2) the Court found that "Congress intended the identification of the appropriate statute of limitations to be an uncomplicated task for judges, lawyers and litigants, rather than a source of uncertainty, and unproductive and ever increasing litigation";⁴

(3) the Court further found that "uniformity within each State is entirely consistent with the borrowing principle contained in § 1988."⁵

Accordingly, the Court directed the federal courts of each state to "select, in each State, the one most appropriate statute of limitations for all § 1983 claims." Wilson, 105 S.Ct. at 1947.

Subsequently, the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, in the

case of Cook v. City of Minneapolis, 617 F.Supp. 461 (D.Minn.1985), responded to the Supreme Court's directive by specifying the two-year limitations period of Minn. Stat. § 541.07(1) as the applicable statutory limitations period in all section 1983 actions filed in Minnesota district court. In Cook Chief Judge Alsop recognized that the task of selecting the "state statute of limitations applicable to personal injury actions" is complicated by the fact that "in ... Minnesota ... more than one statute of limitations govern personal injury actions." Cook, 617 F.Supp. at 463. Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(5) (1984) specifies a six-year statute "for any other injury to the person or rights of another, not arising on contract, and not hereinafter enumerated ...," while Minn.Stat. § 541.07(1) (1984) specifies a two-year statute "for libel, slander, assault, battery, false imprisonment, or other tort resulting in personal injury...." Cook, 617 F.Supp. at 464. Following an extensive discussion,⁶ Judge Alsop concluded that:

a § 1983 claim should be characterized as a personal injury action along the lines of an intentional tort for statute of limitations purposes. Accordingly, for § 1983 claims brought in Minnesota, this court will borrow the two-year limitations period of Minn.Stat. § 541.07(1).

Cook, 617 F.Supp. at 464-65. Accordingly, in this district it is settled law that the two-year limitations period of Minn.Stat. § 541.07(1) applies to plaintiff's section 1983 claim. See also Jane Does 1-100 v. Omodt, CIV. 3-83-468 (D.Minn. Jan. 30, 1986) (Magnuson, J.); Arvidson v. City of Mankato, CIV. 4-85-877 (D.Minn. Apr. 8, 1986) (Murphy, J.). Consequently, plaintiff's cause of action, which accrued more than two years before filing, will be time-barred if Wilson is applied retroactively.

B. Retroactive Application of Wilson

The courts are bound to apply the law in effect at the time a decision is rendered. Zemonick v. Consolidation Coal Co., 762 F.2d 381, 391 (4th Cir.1985). Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that "a legal system based on precedent has a built-in presumption of retroactivity," Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 104 S.Ct. 1338, 1341, 79 L.Ed.2d 579 (1984), although retroactive application of judicial decisions is not constitutionally compelled. Id. Consistent with this principle it has been repeatedly recognized that "the retroactive applicability of judicial decisions ... is the rule, not the exception," Simpson v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 681 F.2d 81, 84 (1st Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1127, 103 S.Ct. 762, 74 L.Ed.2d 977 (1983), and that the party opposing retroactivity bears the burden of demonstrating that the decision should be given prospective effect. Zemonick, 762 F.2d at 391; Moore v. Floro, 614 F.Supp. 328, 331 (N.D. Ill.1985).

The test of whether a decision is to be applied retroactively is well established. In Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 92 S.Ct. 349, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971), the Supreme Court articulated a three-part test:

First, did the new principle under consideration overrule "clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied" or "decide an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed,"

second, in light of its "purpose and effect," will retroactive application of the rule in question "further or retard its operation,"

third, could retroactive application of the principle in question "produce substantial inequitable results" in individual cases....

See Wycoff v. Menke, 773 F.2d 983, 986 (8th Cir.1985), quoting Chevron Oil, 404 U.S. at 107, 92 S.Ct. at 355. See also Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 102 S.Ct. 2858, 73 L.Ed.2d 598 (1982); Occhino v. United States, 686 F.2d 1302, 1307 (8th Cir.1982).

1. First Prong Analysis

In the case at bar, defendants argue⁷ that application of the tripartite Chevron test to plaintiff's claim is foreclosed by recent decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Wycoff v. Menke, 773 F.2d at 986-87, Bolton v. Foreman, 782 F.2d 1047 (8th Cir.1985), and Farmer v. Cook, 782 F.2d 780 (8th Cir. 1986). In all three decisions the Eighth Circuit gave Wilson retroactive application. Defendants argue that district court resort to the Chevron test is precluded by the "law of the circuit" laid down in Wycoff, Bolton, and Farmer. The Court finds this unconvincing. The Court concludes that rather than establishing a blanket rule of retroactivity applicable to all cases throughout the Eighth Circuit, Wycoff and progeny establish a more limited precedent applicable to a specific category of cases. The Court derives support for this conclusion from the following factors.

First, Wycoff and its progeny are not controlling for the simple reason that the key facts in those cases are distinguishable from the facts in the case before the Court. In each of those cases the party seeking to avoid retroactive application of Wilson was unable to meet the threshold requirement of Chevron—justifiable reliance on clear past precedent. In applying this first prong of the Chevron test the Court must determine whether Wilson "established a new principle of law ... by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied." Wycoff, 773 F.2d at 986, quoting Chevron, 404 U.S. at 106, 92 S.Ct. at 355. In considering the reliance factor, the courts have looked "primarily to whether litigants have justifiably relied on a prior rule of law ... different from that announced by...