Chris v. Tenet

• Decision Date: 28 July 1999
• Docket Number: No. Civ.A. 99-494-A.,Civ.A. 99-494-A.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia
• Parties: Kelly Jean CHRIS, Plaintiff, v. George J. TENET, Director Central Intelligence Agency, Defendant.

57 F.Supp.2d 330

Kelly Jean CHRIS, Plaintiff, v. George J. TENET, Director Central Intelligence Agency, Defendant.

No. Civ.A. 99-494-A.

United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Alexandria Division.

July 28, 1999.

Pamela B. Stuart, Washington, DC, for plaintiff.

Helen F. Fahey, United States Attorney, Rachel C. Ballow, Assistant United States Attorney, Alexandria, VA, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ELLIS, District Judge.

This action for attorney's fees presents a threshold jurisdictional question — unresolved in this circuit — whether a Title VII¹ claimant who settles her discrimination claims during the administrative process, but who disputes the amount of the EEOC fee award, may bring a federal action under Title VII solely for attorney's fees.² For the reasons that follow, federal courts have no jurisdiction under Title VII to hear such an action.

I.³

Plaintiff Kelly Jean Chris⁴ ("Chris") brought this action against her employer, the Central Intelligence Agency (the "Agency") pursuant to §§ 706(k), 717(c) and 717(d) of Title VII,⁵ for the sole purpose of recovering attorney's fees and costs she incurred in pursuing her gender employment discrimination claim against the Agency in proceedings before the EEOC. The pertinent facts begin on September 8, 1993, when Chris, represented by counsel, filed a claim for sex discrimination with the Agency's Equal Employment Opportunity Office (the "Agency's Office"). Specifically, she alleged discrimination occurred when she was denied an overseas assignment because she was "too attractive" and when she was issued a written warning regarding her relationship with a foreign national. Such a warning, she claimed, would not have been issued to a similarly situated male employee. Reasonable attorney's fees and costs were part of the relief she requested.

The Agency's Office investigated her allegations and issued a report on March 30, 1994. Chris alleges that following the issuance of this report, the Agency began retaliating against her by commencing a criminal investigation of her relationship with the foreign national. Accordingly, in July 1994, she filed a second complaint with the Agency's Office, alleging both sex discrimination and retaliation. As a result, the Agency's Office conducted a second investigation and issued a final report in March 1995.

On May 2, 1994, after the Agency issued its first report, but prior to the submission of her second Agency complaint, Chris filed a charge with the EEOC alleging a violation of Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimination. Following discovery, the parties entered into a confidential settlement agreement, in June 1995, which, inter alia, provided that in the event the parties did not reach agreement on the amount of the fees and costs due Chris, the Agency would pay her reasonable fees and costs in accordance with 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e). This regulation provides simply that where the parties cannot agree on fees and costs, the Agency will determine these amounts, which the claimant, if dissatisfied, may appeal to the EEOC.⁶

In the event, the parties did not reach agreement on fees and costs. Thus, as the "prevailing party" in her action, on July 15, 1995, Chris filed a petition with the Agency claiming a total of $79,484 in fees based on 256.4 hours of attorney work at $310 per hour,⁷ and $1,920.84 in costs.⁸ The Agency balked at Chris' claimed hourly rate and offered $225 per hour instead. When Chris rejected this offer, the Agency issued its final fee award based on a $250 hourly rate. Eventually, the Agency paid Chris attorney's fees in the amount of $48,350, representing a fee award for 193.4 hours of attorney work at $250 per hour, and costs of $1,237.32. Dissatisfied with the Agency's final award, Chris nonetheless retained the $48,350, but sought additional fees by pursuing her administrative remedies in an appeal to the EEOC. She fared better at the EEOC, which issued a decision on July 19, 1996 awarding her attorney's fees in the amount of $59,510. based on a $275 hourly rate, and costs of $1,534.26. In justifying an hourly rate lower than Chris' requested rate, the EEOC determined that her counsel's experience in employment discrimination law was insufficient to warrant the requested $310 per hour. Both Chris and the Agency filed requests for reconsideration with the EEOC, which by decision issued on January 7, 1998, lowered its previous fee award to a total of $56,593 because some of the claimed hours were not compensable, but increased its costs award to $1,582.26. The order on reconsideration, however, did not depart from the EEOC's original determination that the rate of $275 per hour was reasonable for Chris' attorney.

In its order on reconsideration, the EEOC advised Chris that the "decision [was] final, and there [was] no further right of administrative appeal from the [EEOC's] decision," and that she "[had] the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court." See Granting of Requests to Reconsider in Chris v. Central Intelligence Agency, EEOC Request No. 05960785 (Jan. 7, 1998). The order further advised Chris that if the Agency failed to comply with the EEOC's decision she could (1) petition the EEOC for enforcement of the order; (2) "file a civil action to enforce compliance with the [EEOC's] order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement"; or, (3) "file a civil action on the underlying complaint" subject to statutory deadlines for such an action.⁹ Id. (emphasis added).¹⁰ Chris did not elect any of these options, but instead filed an action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia solely to collect the disputed attorney's fees and costs, namely the difference between the $275 hourly rate awarded by the EEOC and the $310 hourly rate she claimed. This District of Columbia action was subsequently transferred to the Eastern District of Virginia. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Thus, here Chris seeks "full" compensation for work performed prior to the appeal of the Agency's final decision on her fee petition, allegedly $32,262, reasonable attorney's fees, costs and interest for the time spent appealing the Agency's final decision to the EEOC, and fees and costs incurred in the instant action. The Agency, citing lack of subject matter jurisdiction, has moved to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1).¹¹

II.

Chris claims reimbursement for fees and costs by virtue of § 2000e-(k) of Title VII, which states that "[i]n any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee (including expert fees) as part of the costs ...." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (emphasis added).¹² More specifically, she claims she was the "prevailing party" in the EEOC proceeding, which she further claims, was an "action or proceeding" under Title VII. At the threshold, it is important to note that there is no dispute that Chris is a "prevailing party" under § 2000e-5(k). Nor is there any dispute that this is so notwithstanding that her discrimination claim never reached the courts, but was settled instead in the course of the administrative process.¹³ Rather, the sole question presented here is whether Congress' jurisdictional grant to federal courts under Title VII encompasses an action solely for attorney's fees following a settlement of the claim in the administrative proceeding. This is a question of statutory construction given that under Title VII, the general provision conferring jurisdiction on federal courts states that "[e]ach United States district court and each United States court of a place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under this subchapter." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (emphasis added).¹⁴ Thus, the crux of the issue is whether this action solely for attorney's fees constitutes an "action[] under this subchapter" thereby conferring jurisdiction on federal courts.

Because this question is one of statutory construction, analysis must begin with the plain language of the statute. See United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981). And, where a statute's plain language is unambiguous the judicial interpretive task is at an end; further judicial efforts to construe or interpret the statute are unnecessary and inappropriate, as the statute must then be applied in accordance with its plain meaning. See Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 835, 110 S.Ct. 1570, 108 L.Ed.2d 842 (1990); Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 101 S.Ct. 698, 66 L.Ed.2d 633 (1981); Patten v. United States, 116 F.3d 1029, 1035 (4th Cir.1997). When ambiguity infects a statute,¹⁵ it is appropriate to resolve the issue through various settled rules of statutory construction and interpretation. See United States v. Jackson, 759 F.2d 342, 344 (4th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 924, 106 S.Ct. 259, 88 L.Ed.2d 265 (1985).

Given these principles, analysis properly begins with a consideration of whether the key statutory phrase "actions brought under this subchapter" has a plain and unambiguous meaning. A persuasive case can be made that it has. When analyzing statutory language, "words are given their common usage." Murphy, 35 F.3d at 145. In this regard, "actions" indisputably refers to legal proceedings instituted to vindicate a claim or claims,¹⁶ and the phrase "under this subchapter" defines the nature of the claims to be vindicated. So, the plain and unambiguous meaning of the entire phrase "actions under this subchapter" is legal proceedings to enforce the substantive rights guaranteed by the subchapter, which in this instance are the rights to be free from employment discrimination and retaliation based on race, color, religion, sex, or...