Chrisman v. Hay

Decision Date07 October 1890
Citation43 F. 552
PartiesCHRISMAN et al. v. HAY et al.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa

Flickinger Bros., for complainants.

Stone &amp Sims, Wright & Baldwin, and Sapp & Pusey, for defendants.

SHIRAS J.

In the spring of 1887 the complainants, James S. Chrisman and George W. Robards, were the owners of a certain realty in Pottawattamie county, Iowa, known as 'Manawa Park,' and in May of that year they sold the same to Hattie A. Hay. To secure the payment of $25,000 of the purchase price, said Hattie A. Hay executed six promissory notes; three thereof, aggregating $8,333.33, being payable to the order of George W. Robards and three, aggregating $16,666.67, being payable to the order of James S. Chrisman, and coming due in one, two, and three years, with interest at the rate of 7 per cent. To secure these notes the said Hattie A. Hay and her husband executed a mortgage upon blocks 1 to 32, inclusive, 'of the lots contained in Manawa park as per plat thereof,' which contained the following stipulation:

'And it is hereby agreed and part of this contract that, upon the payment of $32.80 per lot and accrued interest, said James S. Chrisman and Geo. W. Robards agree to release any five or more lots, at any time hereafter when called upon to do so, at expense of 2nd party.'

The mortgage also contained a stipulation to the effect that, upon a failure to pay any part of the principal or interest, then the whole of the sum secured should become due and payable. August 10, 1889, the present bill was filed for the foreclosure of the mortgage in question; the notes maturing in April, 1887, and 1888, being unpaid. It is also averred in the bill that the premises in the mortgage described, to-wit, the 32 blocks therein named, do not include all the property sold by complainants to said Hattie A. Hay; that the mortgage should have included the same, but that, through the misrepresentation of Hattie A. Hay and her husband, complainants accepted the same in the belief that the mortgage covered the entire property; and it is therefore prayed that complainants may be decreed to have a vendor's lien upon that part of the premises not covered by the mortgage.

It appears from the evidence that the portion of the premises on which the lien is sought to be established, was conveyed by the vendee before this suit was brought, and therefore, under the provisions of section 1940 of the Code of Iowa, the lien is defeated. That section provides that--

'No vendor's lien for unpaid purchase money shall be recognized or enforced in any court of law or equity after a conveyance by the vendee, unless such lien is reserved by conveyance, mortgage, or other instrument, duly acknowledged and recorded, or unless such conveyance by the vendee is made after suit brought by the vendee, his executor or assign, to enforce such lien.'

On behalf of complainants, it is urged that the premises sought to be subjected to the lien was conveyed by a mere quitclaim deed, and that the party holding under the same cannot assert any right thereunder as against complainants. It is true that a party holding under a mere quitclaim deed cannot be heard to assert that he is an innocent purchaser for value. Oliver v. Piatt, 3 How. 410; May v. Le Claire, 11 Wall. 217. The statute just cited changes the usual rule applied to equitable liens for the unpaid purchase price of property sold. In the absence of a statute, it is held that the vendor's lien affects all purchasers from the original vendee who had notice of the existence of the lien when they bought the premises; and hence one holding under a quitclaim deed would be held to be charged with notice of the lien. The statute of Iowa declares that, unless reserved in some written recorded instrument, a vendor's lien cannot be enforced after a conveyance of the property. The question of notice is eliminated from the case. The difference in the language used in this section and that found in the section in regard to...

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15 cases
  • Eldridge v. Burns
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • January 3, 1978
    ...suit: Vawter v. Crafts, 41 Minn. 14, 42 N.W. 483; Gammell v. Goode, 103 Iowa 301, 72 N.W. 531; Nims v. Vaughn, 40 Mich. 356; Chrisman v. Hay (Iowa), 43 F. 552. . . . [p] It will be observed that the release clause with which we are directly concerned contains no provision specifying a parti......
  • Simonson v. Z Cranbury Associates, Ltd. Partnership
    • United States
    • New Jersey Supreme Court
    • June 4, 1997
    ...proceedings have begun, although the original mortgagor does not. See Bitter Root Valley Irr., supra, 251 F. at 323; Chrisman v. Hay, 43 F. 552, 554-55 (C.C.S.D.Iowa 1890). Somewhat analogous are cases involving joint mortgagors where the mortgage agreement provided that specified individua......
  • Leisure Campground and Country Club Ltd. Partnership v. Leisure Estates
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • May 2, 1977
    ...under different factual situations from the case before us, to the institution of foreclosure proceedings, see Chrisman v. Hay, 43 F. 552, 555 (C.C.S.D.Iowa 1890), and St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Chicot County C.-A. Farm Co., 127 Ark. 577, 193 S.W. 69, 70 (1917).3 Of course, should a mortg......
  • Harris County Houston Ship C. Nav. Dist. v. Williams, 10130.
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • November 1, 1935
    ...Jones on Mortgages (7thEd.) par. 79; Vawter v. Crafts, 41 Minn. 14, 42 N.W. 483; Gammel v. Goode, 103 Iowa, 301, 72 N.W. 531; Chrisman v. Hay (C.C.) 43 F. 552; Kerschensteiner v. Northern Michigan Land Co., 244 Mich. 403, 221 N.W. 322; Rosenberg v. General Realty Service, 231 App.Div. 259, ......
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