Christensen v. Board of Review of Industrial Commission
| Decision Date | 04 May 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 15115,15115 |
| Citation | 579 P.2d 335 |
| Parties | William H. CHRISTENSEN, Plaintiff, v. The BOARD OF REVIEW OF the INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of Utah, Defendant. |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
Bruce Plenk of Utah Legal Services, Inc., Ogden, for plaintiff.
Robert B. Hansen, Atty. Gen., Floyd G. Astin, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for defendant.
Review of a decision of the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission, sustaining the order of an Appeals Referee, of a 52-week disqualification period for entitlement to unemployment compensation, under the provisions of Title 35-4-5(e), U.C.A.1953, in this case particularly having to do with failure to report "away from home" travel to comply with eligibility provisions for compensation.
In order to perpetuate rights to compensation, while unemployed and entitled thereto, one must file a weekly report about any employment in which he may have been engaged, what he received, etc., including a report requiring a "yes" or "no" answer to the following:
I traveled away from home. (If "yes," show the date and time left, destination, date and time returned and purpose of trip. If looking for work, list employers you contacted. ( ) Yes ( ) No.
This was a requirement adjunct to another required written commitment to the effect that a claimant, to obtain benefits, must state that during the week for which weekly reports are required "I was able, available, and willing to accept full-time work."
Christensen was 1) "away from home" during the week in question, and 2) he was not "able, available and willing to accept full-time work," because on Tuesday, September 28, 1976, he drove to Price, Utah, 120 miles away, to go elk hunting. Between the 28th and Thursday, the 30th, he had sprained his ankle, was treated at the Price Hospital, returning to Salt Lake City on Friday, October 1, 1976. Thereafter he certified in writing that during the week ending October 2, 1976, he was "able, available and willing to accept full-time work" and that he had not "traveled away from home," as he understood the terms. His only explanation was that he thought "away from home" meant "outside of Utah," which seems to discredit his claim that he had not received a handbook that stated just such condition, which apparently added up, in the mind of the Appeals Referee, the Board of Review and the Industrial Commission only a convenient "Yes, I read it, but yes, I didn't read it" gratuity, that likewise does not appeal to this Court, which affirms the decision as modified, with no costs on appeal assessed.
But in doing so add some comments.
There is a reasonable basis in the evidence to support the Commission's finding that the plaintiff was not available for work, during a week in which he applied for and accepted compensation, under a representation that he was available for work. According to the standard rules of review, that finding is not subject to reversal by this Court. There is therefore no doubt that the $88 should be refunded.
Concerning the disqualification for 52 weeks, I view the matter somewhat differently. I conceive it to be my duty to recognize that the decisional law of our state is as stated by the majority in our recent case of Diprizio v. Industrial Commission, Utah, 572 P.2d 679. Because no majority of this Court is willing to accept what I believe to be the correct view of the law as expressed in the dissent therein, adherence to the law as expressed by the majority impels me to agree that the decision of the Commission conformed thereto in applying the statute.
Nevertheless, I take occasion to point out that this case, wherein because of a four-day diversion from the monotonies of life on an elk hunt, the Commission was under compulsion to apply the 52-week disqualification, is a good example of the unreasonableness and injustice that can result from the holding that the statute is absolute and mandatory. I refer to and reaffirm my views expressed in the Diprizio case, supra: that in those aspects of its statutory responsibilities wherein the Commission is authorized and required to exercise judicial powers, that should necessarily include the judicial prerogative of exercising reason and good conscience in imposing its judgments, to the end that it could adequately discharge its duties and administer justice.
It should also be observed that while a legislative change in this particular statute might provide a means for correcting the evil in its unreasoning and mandatory application, that would not provide what I believe to be a sound and necessary foundation for administrative tribunals generally: the authority to exercise judicial discretion in performing responsibilities which are judicial in nature.
For the following reasons, I dissent. All statutory references are to U.C.A. 1953.
The statutory penalty of a 51-week period of disqualification, for unemployment compensation benefits was invoked against claimant because of fraud. This forfeiture is predicated on claimant's responses to a questionnaire sent weekly to claimants.
The Board of Review affirmed the determination of the appeals referee on the ground the claimant knowingly withheld material information to obtain benefits which he was not entitled to receive.
The undisputed facts are that claimant went to Price, Utah, on September 28, 1976, and returned to his home in Salt Lake City on October 1, 1976. Claimant went with his friends to go elk hunting, and he failed to report this activity on his claim card. He asserted he didn't know it was necessary to report this excursion.
While hiking, claimant sprained his ankle on September 30, 1976; he received treatment at the Price Hospital. He admitted his mobility was impaired, and he probably could not have worked until October 6, 1976. Claimant could not recall receiving a claim's handbook, and no finding to the contrary was made.
On his weekly claim card, claimant certified he was able, available, and willing to accept full time work. Claimant further responded in the negative to the following question:
10. I traveled away from home.
Claimant testified at the hearing his understanding of question 10 was that only out of state travel need be reported.
The referee found:
In regard to the claimant's failure to report travel away from home on his claim for the week ended October 2, 1976, it must also be held that the claimant's actions in this regard were committed knowingly. His statement that he considered he had not traveled away from home because he had not left the State of Utah cannot be considered a...
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...be much more readily available, as a practical matter, than one in the High Uintas Wilderness area. Cf. Christensen v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm'n, 579 P.2d 335, 336 (Utah 1978) (upholding a finding of unavailability due to a four-day elk hunting excursion and related hospital stay). ¶......
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...not available for work as required to receive unemployment benefits. See Martinez, 576 P.2d at 1296;see also Christensen v. Board of Review, 579 P.2d 335, 336 (Utah 1978) (injury and hospitalization during an unreported hunting trip). A claimant is also deemed to know the amount of and when......
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...a “[m]isrepresentation or a false statement ... does not require the intent to deceive.” (Citing Christensen v. Board of Review, 579 P.2d 335, 338 (Utah 1978) (Maughan, J., dissenting).) ¶ 12 When reviewing an agency decision,[t]he appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of......
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Article a Primer on Pleading Fraud Claims in Utah
...mere naked falsehood or misrepresentation is not enough” to properly plead a fraud claim. Christensen v. Bd. of Review of Indus. Comm’n, 579 P.2d 335, 338 (Utah 1978) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The claimant must therefore include allegations pertaining to the represent......