Christensen v Harris County
| Decision Date | 01 May 2000 |
| Docket Number | 981167 |
| Citation | 120 S.Ct. 1655,146 L.Ed.2d 621,529 U.S. 576 |
| Parties | Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES CHRISTENSEN et al. v. HARRIS COUNTY et al. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
CHRISTENSEN et al.
v.
HARRIS COUNTY et al.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Argued February 23, 2000
Decided May 1, 2000
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 201(o), permits States and their political subdivisions to compensate their employees for overtime work by granting them compensatory time in lieu of cash payment. If the employees do not use their accumulated compensatory time, the employer must pay cash compensation under certain circumstances. §§207(o)(3)_(4). Fearing the consequences of having to pay for accrued compensatory time, Harris County adopted a policy requiring its employees to schedule time off in order to reduce the amount of accrued time. Petitioners, county deputy sheriffs, sued, claiming that the FLSA does not permit an employer to compel an employee to use compensatory time in the absence of an agreement permitting the employer to do so. The District Court granted petitioners summary judgment and entered a declaratory judgment that the policy violated the FLSA. The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the FLSA did not speak to the issue and thus did not prohibit the county from implementing its policy.
Held: Nothing in the FLSA or its implementing regulations prohibits a public employer from compelling the use of compensatory time. Petitioners' claim that §207(o)(5) implicitly prohibits compelled use of compensatory time in the absence of an agreement is unpersuasive. The proposition that when a statute limits a thing to be done in a particular mode, it includes a negative of any other mode, Raleigh & Gaston R. Co. v. Reid, 13 Wall. 269, 270, does not resolve this case in petitioners' favor. Section 207(o)(5) provides that an employee who requests to use compensatory time must be permitted to do so unless the employer's operations would be unduly disrupted. The negative inference to be drawn is only that an employer may not deny a request for a reason other than that provided in §207(o)(5). Section 207(o)(5) simply ensures that an employee receive some timely benefit for overtime work. The FLSA's nearby provisions reflect a similar concern. At bottom, the best reading of the FLSA is that it ensures liquidation of compensatory time; it says nothing about restricting an employer's efforts to require employees to use the time. Because the statute is silent on this issue and because the county's policy is entirely compatible with §207(o)(5), petitioners cannot, as §216(b) requires, prove that the county has violated §207. Two other features of the FLSA support this interpretation: Employers are permitted to decrease the number of hours that employees work, and employers also may cash out accumulated compensatory time by paying the employee his regular hourly wage for each hour accrued. The county's policy merely involves doing both of these steps at once. A Department of Labor opinion letter taking the position that an employer may compel the use of compensatory time only if the employee has agreed in advance to such a practice is not entitled to deference under Chevron U.S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837. Interpretations such as those in opinion letters-like interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of law-do not warrant Chevron-style deference. They are "entitled to respect," but only to the extent that they are persuasive, Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140, which is not the case here. Chevron deference does apply to an agency interpretation contained in a regulation, but nothing in the Department of Labor's regulation even arguably requires that an employer's compelled use policy must be included in an agreement. And deference to an agency's interpretation of its regulation is warranted under Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461, only when the regulation's language is ambiguous, which is not the case here. Pp. 5_12.
158 F.3d 241, affirmed.
Souter, J., filed a concurring opinion. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., joined. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg, J., joined.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 98_1167
EDWARD CHRISTENSEN, et al., PETITIONERS
v.
HARRIS COUNTY et al.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
[May 1, 2000]
Under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 52 Stat. 1060, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (1994 ed. and Supp. III), States and their political subdivisions may compensate their employees for overtime by granting them compensatory time or "comp time," which entitles them to take time off work with full pay. §207(o). If the employees do not use their accumulated compensatory time, the employer is obligated to pay cash compensation under certain circumstances. §§207(o)(3)_(4). Fearing the fiscal consequences of having to pay for accrued compensatory time, Harris County adopted a policy requiring its employees to schedule time off in order to reduce the amount of accrued compensatory time. Employees of the Harris County Sheriff's Department sued, claiming that the FLSA prohibits such a policy. The Court of Appeals rejected their claim. Finding that nothing in the FLSA or its implementing regulations prohibits an employer from compelling the use of compensatory time, we affirm.
The FLSA generally provides that hourly employees who work in excess of 40 hours per week must be compensated for the excess hours at a rate not less than 1 times their regular hourly wage. §207(a)(1). Although this requirement did not initially apply to public-sector employers, Congress amended the FLSA to subject States and their political subdivisions to its constraints, at first on a limited basis, see Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. 89_601, §102(b), 80 Stat. 831 (), and then more broadly, see Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. 93_259, §§6(a)(1)_(2), 88 Stat. 58_59 (extending the FLSA to all state and local employees, save elected officials and their staffs). States and their political subdivisions, however, did not feel the full force of this latter extension until our decision in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), which overruled our holding in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), that the FLSA could not constitutionally restrain traditional governmental functions.
In the months following Garcia, Congress acted to mitigate the effects of applying the FLSA to States and their political subdivisions, passing the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1985, Pub. L. 99_150, 99 Stat. 787. See generally Moreau v. Klevenhagen, 508 U.S. 22, 26 (1993). Those amendments permit States and their political subdivisions to compensate employees for overtime by granting them compensatory time at a rate of 1 hours for every hour worked. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(o)(1). To provide this form of compensation, the employer must arrive at an agreement or understanding with employees that compensatory time will be granted instead of cash compensation.1 §207(o)(2); 29 CFR § 553.23 (1999).
The FLSA expressly regulates some aspects of accrual and preservation of compensatory time. For example, the FLSA provides that an employer must honor an employee's request to use compensatory time within a "reasonable period" of time following the request, so long as the use of the compensatory time would not "unduly disrupt" the employer's operations. §207(o)(5); 29 CFR § 553.25 (1999). The FLSA also caps the number of compensatory time hours that an employee may accrue. After an employee reaches that maximum, the employer must pay cash compensation for additional overtime hours worked. §207(o)(3)(A). In addition, the FLSA permits the employer at any time to cancel or "cash out" accrued compensatory time hours by paying the employee cash compensation for unused compensatory time. §207(o)(3)(B); 29 CFR § 553.26(a) (1999). And the FLSA entitles the employee to cash payment for any accrued compensatory time remaining upon the termination of employment. §207(o)(4).
Petitioners are 127 deputy sheriffs employed by respondents Harris County, Texas, and its sheriff, Tommy B. Thomas (collectively, Harris County). It is undisputed that each of the petitioners individually agreed to accept compensatory time, in lieu of cash, as compensation for overtime.
As petitioners accumulated compensatory time, Harris County became concerned that it lacked the resources to pay monetary compensation to employees who worked overtime after reaching the statutory cap on compensatory time accrual and to employees who left...
To continue reading
Request your trial
- Marshall v. Amsted Rail Co.
- Forestwatch v. Lint, Civil Action No.: 8:12–CV–3455–BHH
- Gonzalez v. City Nat'l Bank
-
State Farm Bank, F.S.B. v. Burke
... ... at 461, 117 S.Ct. 905). 8 Defendant cites Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 120 S.Ct. 1655, 146 L.Ed.2d 621 (2000), for the proposition that ... ...
-
The EEOC Opens The Door To Title VII Protection For Transgender Employees
...to respect" to the extent such interpretation has the "power to persuade" a court construing it. See Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 13 See Smith, 378 F.3d at 572 (6th Cir. 2004); Barnes v. Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 737......
-
Ninth Circuit Weighs In On Copyrightability Of Hookah
...level of deference was "only to the extent that those interpretations have the 'power to persuade,'" quoting Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576 (2000). The Copyright Office's determination that "whether an item's shape is distinctive does not affect separability" was "persuasive" bec......
-
Financial Services Alert
...so that it may be considered "determinative authority" (based on an analysis of HUD's interpretations under Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000) and Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 FRB Issues Letter Concerning its Consideration in the Application Process of an Applica......
-
Seventh Circuit Holds Pharmaceutical Reps Exempt Under Administrative Exemption
...addresses the appropriate deference owed to the Secretary's interpretation of an ambiguous regulation. Cf. Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000) (declining to defer to an agency's interpretation, contained in an opinion letter, of an unambiguous regulation); Auer v. Robbins,......
-
Administering the National Environmental Policy Act
...(“[W]e are not inal because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are inal.”). 33. In Christensen v. Harris Cnty. , 529 U.S. 576 (2000), and Mead , 533 U.S. 218, the Court separated the two questions of interpretive authority and the authority to make law in contemporary ......
-
Wages, Hours, and Overtime
...set amount does not violate the FLSA. Moreau v. Harris County, 158 F.3d 241 (5th Cir. 1998), aff’d sub nom., Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 Section 207(o) says nothing one way or the other about compensatory time for private employees. See and compare Talbert, 405 Fed. Appx. at ......
-
2011 Ninth Circuit environmental review.
...2008) (noting that the court will not consider a preamble unless the regulation itself is ambiguous (citing Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000))). Generally, an agency's non-binding interpretation of its own regulation is entitled to deference only when it is persuasive, a......
-
When 30 Years of Practice Goes Against You: Patent Venue Ruling 'Ignores' Supreme Court Precedent
...(D.C. Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015). 41. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000). 42. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 43. 44 U.S.C. § 3507(a). 44. Id. § 3512. 45. OMB Control Number History , Office......