Christensen v. Kingston School Committee

• Decision Date: 08 March 2005
• Docket Number: No. CIV.A.04-11773-WGY.,CIV.A.04-11773-WGY.
• Citation: 360 F.Supp.2d 212
• Parties: Lynne CHRISTENSEN, Plaintiff, v. KINGSTON SCHOOL COMMITTEE; Gordon L. Noseworthy, In His Professional Capacity as Superintendent of Kingston Schools, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

360 F.Supp.2d 212

Lynne CHRISTENSEN, Plaintiff, v. KINGSTON SCHOOL COMMITTEE; Gordon L. Noseworthy, In His Professional Capacity as Superintendent of Kingston Schools, Defendants.

No. CIV.A.04-11773-WGY.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

March 8, 2005.

Fernand J. Dupere, Jr., Southampton, MA, Jennifer L. Markowski, Peabody & Arnold LLP, Boston, MA, for Defendants.

Rebecca J. Wilson, Peabody & Arnold LLP, Boston, for Kingston School Committee, Gordon Noseworthy, Defendants.

Terence P. Noonan, Law Office of Kathryn M. Noonan, Newton, MA, for Plaintiff.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

YOUNG, Chief Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

The plaintiff Lynne Christensen ("Christensen") filed a complaint on August 13, 2004, against the defendants Kingston School Committee ("the Committee") and Gordon L. Noseworthy ("Noseworthy"), in his Professional Capacity as the Superintendent of the Kingston Schools (the Committee and Noseworthy, together, "Kingston"). Christensen is seeking damages and equitable, declaratory, and injunctive relief for violations of (1) her federal procedural and substantive due process rights, (2) her state procedural and substantive due process rights, and (3) 42 U.S.C. section 1983, as well as for breaches of (4) contract and (5) the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Kingston moved to dismiss. The Court heard the parties' oral arguments on November 16, 2004, and took the matter under advisement.

II. Facts

There are no real factual disputes in this case. In August 2002, Christensen and Kingston entered into a three-year contract, signed by Noseworthy on behalf of the Committee, that employed Christensen as a school principal. Compl. of Lynne Christensen [Doc. No. 1] ("Pl.'s Compl.") at 1, 3. The term of the contract ran from August 12, 2002, through June 30, 2005. Pl.'s Compl. at 1, 3 ¶ 10. The contract provided that Christensen would receive a salary of $77,000 for the first year, $80,080 for the second year, and $83,283 for the third and final year of the contract. Pl.'s Compl. at 3 ¶ 11. She was also entitled other benefits, namely "health insurance, life insurance, sick leave, bereavement leave, personal business, workers compensation coverage, course reimbursement, vacation, and retirement benefits." Pl.'s Compl. at 3 ¶ 12. The precise terms of the contract's termination provisions are not clear on the record before this Court on this motion to dismiss.

Christensen was informed, both verbally and in a letter dated May 14, 2004, that Noseworthy had eliminated her principal position, one of two existing principal positions in the district, and that, as a result, she would be terminated effective June 30, 2004. Pl.'s Compl. at 1, 3 ¶¶ 14-15, 4 ¶ 18; Defs.' Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss [Doc. No. 7] ("Defs.' Mem.") at 2 ¶ 5. Noseworthy stated that the elimination of the position was "due to fiscal constraints and reorganization of administration of the elementary schools in Kingston." Pl.'s Compl. at 3 ¶ 16. Christensen has not challenged Noseworthy's reasons for terminating the position and dismissing her. Kingston correctly indicates that "Ms. Christensen's Complaint does not allege that her position was eliminated for any reason other than what was stated in the May 14, 2004, letter" nor does she "allege that she requested a hearing to address the elimination of her position." Defs.' Mem. at 2 ¶¶ 7-8. Christensen accepts these reasons for her termination, it appears, when she states in her complaint that her contract did not allow Kingston to terminate her due to "fiscal constraints and reorganization of administration of the elementary schools in Kingston." Pl.'s Compl. at 3 ¶ 16, 4 ¶¶ 20-21.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

1. Motion to Dismiss

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to the United States Constitution, 42 U.S.C. section 1983, and 28 U.S.C. sections 1331, 1343, and 1367. This Court assumes all factual allegations in Christensen's Complaint to be true and grants all inferences to Christensen when considering Kingston's Motion to Dismiss. Coyne v. City of Somerville, 770 F.Supp. 740, 743 (D.Mass.1991) (Cohen, M.J.), aff'd 972 F.2d 440 (1st Cir.1992) ("The averments of the complaint, as well as the proper inferences arising from them, [are] liberally construed in favor of the plaintiff."). "[A] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that [Christensen] can prove no set of facts in support of [her] claim which would entitle [her] to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) (original alterations omitted) (alterations added); Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Christensen must put forth "factual allegations, either direct or inferential, respecting each material element necessary to sustain recovery under some actionable legal theory." Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 515 (1st Cir.1988).

2. Inclusion of Exhibit to the Motion to Dismiss

Kingston defends its inclusion of the notice of termination as an exhibit to its motion to dismiss and contends that this Court, in making its decision, may consider "an undisputedly authentic document that [Kingston] attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if [Christensen's] claims are based on the document." Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir.1993). Kingston contends that the dismissal letter attached to the motion may be considered by this Court "without converting the instant motion into one for summary judgment" because the letter is "authentic" and Christensen specifically relies on statements from the letter in her complaint. Defs.' Mem. at 3-4.

This Court agrees. In re Computervision Corp. Sec. Litig., 869 F.Supp. 56, 59-60 (D.Mass.1994) (quoting Romani v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 929 F.2d 875, 879 n. 3 (1st Cir.1991) ("Although plaintiff did not attach a copy of the offering materials to his complaint, defendants submitted the documents with their motion[ ] to dismiss. This step was proper and did not convert the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.")); Fudge v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 840 F.2d 1012, 1015 (1st Cir.1988) (stating that "when [a] plaintiff fails to introduce a pertinent document as part of his pleading, [a] defendant may introduce the exhibit as part of his motion attacking the pleading.") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); LoCicero v. Leslie, 948 F.Supp. 10, 12 (D.Mass.1996) (explaining, when considering the inclusion of a public transcript, that "[d]espite the parties' arguments, it is not necessary for this Court to convert the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment"); Branch v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 825 F.Supp. 384, 398 n. 8 (D.Mass.1993) (explaining that "it is well established that a district court may take judicial notice of ... indisputably authentic documents on a 12(b) motion without converting even a 12(b)(6) motion into one for summary judgment.").

B. Christensen's Federal and State Due Process¹ and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims

1. Does Christensen have a Protectable Property Interest such as would Warrant Constitutional Due Process Protections and Rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983?

"[A] plaintiff must demonstrate a violation of an identified liberty or property interest protected by the due process clause" to find a violation of due process. Coyne, 770 F.Supp. at 746 n. 13 (emphasis added). See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985) (noting that a "federal constitutional claim" depended on the existence of "a property right in continued employment"); Pittsley v. Warish, 927 F.2d 3, 6 (1st Cir.1991) (summarizing the two theories of due process in a case involving section 1983 and due process claims against police officer for events transpiring during an arrest). In order for Christensen's due process claims and, in turn, her section 1983 claim to survive, this Court must determine that she had the requisite "protectable property interest."

"For an interest in a statutorily created benefit to become a protected property interest under the Fourteenth Amendment, a person `must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.' "Coyne v. City of Somerville, 972 F.2d 440, 443 (1st Cir.1992) (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972)); Hoffman v. City of Warwick, 909 F.2d 608, 619 (1st Cir.1990) (same); Smith v. Commissioner of Mental Retardation, 409 Mass. 545, 548-49, 567 N.E.2d 924 (1991) (quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at 576-77, 92 S.Ct. 2701, and noting that "a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire" for rights to arise).

The First Circuit did state in Coyne that the decisions of the circuit do "not rule out the possibility of a regulatory scheme creating a `legitimate claim of entitlement'" to, in that case, a promotion. Coyne, 972 F.2d at 443. Comparably, Christensen argues that she "had a reasonable expectation that her employment with her public employer would continue throughout the contractually agreed to term" and concludes "she had a protected property interest in her continued employment with her public employer." Pl.'s Opp'n to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss [Doc. No. 9] ("Pl.'s Opp'n") at 4. Christensen also relies on the decision of the Supreme Court in Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 105 S.Ct. 1487 (1985), where the Supreme Court, quoting its decision in Roth, 408 U.S. at 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, again explained that property interests "are created... by existing rules that stem from an independent source such as state law." 470 U.S. at 538, 105 S.Ct. 1487.

The Supreme Court in Loudermill emphasized important, august truths which unquestionably resonate with this Court: "the significance of the private interest in retaining employment cannot be gainsaid," 470 U.S. at 543, 105 S.Ct. 1487, "depriving a person of the means of...