Christensen v. Mikell, 24494

Decision Date20 February 1996
Docket NumberNo. 24494,24494
Citation476 S.E.2d 692,324 S.C. 70
CourtSouth Carolina Supreme Court
PartiesNeils CHRISTENSEN, III, Appellant, v. J. Thomas MIKELL and Chicago Title Insurance Company, Respondents. . Heard

James Lee Murphy, of Hilton Head Island, for appellant.

Susan Taylor Wall and Kelley M. Braithwaite, Holmes & Thomson, LLP, Charleston, for respondent Mikell.

Kevin F. McDonald, Callison, Tighe, Robinson & Anastasion, Columbia, for respondent Chicago Title Insurance Company.

FINNEY, Chief Justice.

Appellant Christensen brought this action against respondents alleging attorney malpractice and breach of contract. The appealed order granted summary judgment on the grounds that appellant's action was barred by the applicable statute of limitations and the breach of contract claim failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. We affirm.

Appellant's partnership, C & C Investment (C & C), purchased three parcels of land in 1977. Respondent Mikell represented C & C at the closing in the purchase of two of the parcels, the 98 acre and 28 acre tracts, but was not the closing attorney on the 14 acre tract which is the subject of this action. Mikell issued a Chicago Title Insurance policy which described the 98 acre and 28 acre tracts. The deed to the 14 acre tract was prepared by appellant and witnessed by someone other than Mikell.

In 1986 Frank Flood filed a lawsuit against C & C partnership alleging there was a fraudulent conveyance because of a prior forgery in the chain of title of the 14 acre tract. Flood sought to have the land revert back to the previous owner. Appellant hired Mikell to defend this action. C & C was ultimately unsuccessful in the lawsuit and the court awarded the 14 acres to Flood. C & C then purchased the land from Flood. On April 14, 1993, appellant commenced this action alleging Mikell was negligent in failing to obtain title insurance on the 14 acre parcel and in pursuing a claim against the title insurance company. Appellant filed an amended complaint on February 16, 1994, naming Chicago Title as an additional defendant. Appellant claimed Chicago Title breached the contract by denying coverage under the title insurance policy.

Summary judgment is appropriate where it is clear there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Kreutner v. David, 320 S.C. 283, 465 S.E.2d 88 (1995). A negligence cause of action arising or accruing prior to April 5, 1988, must be commenced within six years after the person knew or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known that he had a cause of action. S.C.Code Ann. §§ 15-3-530, -535 (Supp.1995).

The judge found appellant knew as early as March 1986 he did not have title insurance on the 14 acres, despite his expectation that he had coverage since 1977. Accordingly, he was on inquiry notice by March 1986 that he may have a potential claim against Mikell. The statutory limitations period begins to run when a person could or should have known, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, that a cause of action might exist in his or her favor, rather than when a full-blown theory of recovery is developed. Snell v. Columbia Gun Exchange, Inc., 276 S.C. 301, 278 S.E.2d 333 (1981). Even if appellant did not know the exact nature of the wrong or the extent of the damages in 1986, he should have known that his expectation of title insurance coverage had not been met by Mikell. The record demonstrates there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding when appellant...

To continue reading

Request your trial
32 cases
  • Parker v. Shecut
    • United States
    • South Carolina Court of Appeals
    • May 22, 2000
    ...not enough for a party seeking disqualification to simply allege bias. The party must show some evidence of bias. Christensen v. Mikell, 324 S.C. 70, 476 S.E.2d 692 (1996); Mallett v. Mallett, 323 S.C. 141, 473 S.E.2d 804 (Ct.App.1996). Furthermore, the alleged bias must be personal, as dis......
  • Holy Loch Distributors v. Hitchcock
    • United States
    • South Carolina Court of Appeals
    • June 29, 1998
    ...a cause of action might exist in his or her favor, rather than when a full-blown theory of recovery is developed. Christensen v. Mikell, 324 S.C. 70, 476 S.E.2d 692 (1996); Snell v. Columbia Gun Exchange, 276 S.C. 301, 278 S.E.2d 333 (1981). The discovery rule for tort actions is specifical......
  • State v. Cheatham, 3453.
    • United States
    • South Carolina Court of Appeals
    • February 25, 2002
    ...not enough for a party seeking disqualification to simply allege bias. The party must show some evidence of bias. Christensen v. Mikell, 324 S.C. 70, 476 S.E.2d 692 (1996); Mallett v. Mallett, 323 S.C. 141, 473 S.E.2d 804 (Ct.App.1996). Furthermore, the alleged bias must be personal, as dis......
  • Republic Contracting Corp. v. SCDHPT
    • United States
    • South Carolina Court of Appeals
    • June 29, 1998
    ...know of a potential claim against another party, not when the plaintiff develops a full-blown theory of recovery. Christensen v. Mikell, 324 S.C. 70, 476 S.E.2d 692 (1996). See also Berry v. McLeod, 328 S.C. at 445, 492 S.E.2d at 799 (stating that in applying the discovery rule to a fraud c......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT