Christensen v. MOUNTAIN WEST FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INS. CO.

Decision Date28 December 2000
Docket NumberNo. 00-134.,00-134.
Citation2000 MT 378,303 Mont. 493,22 P.3d 624
PartiesChris CHRISTENSEN and Angie Christensen, individually and as guardians and conservators for LiAshley Christensen and her estate, Petitioners and Appellants, v. MOUNTAIN WEST FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondent and Respondent.
CourtMontana Supreme Court

Robert T. Bell and Richard A. Reep, Reep, Spoon & Gordon, Missoula, MT, For Appellants (Ashley Christensen).

Lon J. Dale and G. Patrick Hagstad, Milodragovich, Dale, Steinbrenner & Binney, P.C., Missoula, MT, For Respondent.

Justice TERRY N. TRIEWEILER delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 The Petitioners, Chris Christensen and Angie Christensen, petitioned the District Court for the Fourth Judicial District in Missoula County for declaratory judgment pursuant to § 27-8-101, et seq., on behalf of themselves and their daughter LiAshley Christensen. They sought a determination that liability insurance coverage was provided to Addi Brewer pursuant to a policy issued by the Respondent, Mountain West Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The District Court denied Christensen's motion and granted Mountain West's motion. The Christensens appeal from the District Court's order. We reverse the order and judgment of the District Court.

¶ 2 We conclude that the following issues are dispositive of Christensens' appeal:

¶ 3 1. Did the District Court err when it concluded that the vehicle in which Ashley L. Christensen was injured was not an insured vehicle pursuant to the "after acquired vehicle" provision in the policy issued by Mountain West to Rosemary Fitzpatrick?

¶ 4 2. If the vehicle in which Ashley Christensen was injured is insured by two policies issued by Mountain West, can the policies be "stacked" to provide the maximum coverage available under each policy?

DISCUSSION

¶ 5 On February 28, 1998, Addi Brewer, was operating a 1992 Ford Escort owned by her and her grandmother, Rosemary Fitzpatrick, when she lost control of the vehicle, left the roadway, and collided with a tree. At the time of the collision, seven-year-old Ashley Christensen was a passenger sitting in the rear seat of the vehicle next to that door which impacted the tree. Her petition for declaratory relief alleges that as a result of the collision, she suffered severe brain injury, a ruptured spleen, a shattered jaw, and damage to her face which required 100 stitches to repair, and will result in permanent scarring. At the time of her parents' petition for declaratory relief, her medical expenses exceeded $51,000 and more expenses were expected in the future.

¶ 6 The vehicle that Addi Brewer was operating, had been purchased on December 4, 1997. Both Brewer and Fitzpatrick were listed as owners on the title to the vehicle.

¶ 7 Prior to her purchase of the Escort, Fitzpatrick had a liability insurance policy in effect with Mountain West which provided for liability coverage in the amount of $500,000 per occurrence and identified three other vehicles on the declarations page as insured vehicles. That policy provided in Coverage N, that Mountain West would pay damages up to the liability limit if an insured is legally liable for damages resulting from an occurrence involving an "insured vehicle." Insured, in that policy, included Rosemary Fitzpatrick as well as anyone using an insured vehicle with her permission. "Insured vehicle" was defined to include:

2. Under Coverages N ... any licensed private passenger automobile ... ownership of which is acquired by you during the policy period.
....
The vehicles in 2 and 3 above are not insured vehicles unless you ask us to insure the newly acquired vehicle during the policy period or within thirty (30) days of its acquisition, whichever is shorter. You must pay any additional premium required to insure the newly acquired vehicle.

(Emphasis added.)

¶ 8 It is undisputed that the 1992 Ford Escort was purchased by Fitzpatrick during the time that this policy (Policy No. 1) was in effect. Furthermore, it is undisputed that Fitzpatrick notified Mountain West that she had purchased the vehicle and requested that it be insured. However, she requested that it be insured by a separate policy (Policy No. 2) in which the Escort alone was listed on the declarations page and which provided total liability coverage of $100,000 per occurrence. Both Fitzpatrick and Brewer were named insureds on Policy No. 2. Both policies were in effect on February 28, 1998 the date of Brewer's accident in which Christensen was injured.

¶ 9 On May 20, 1998, Mountain West filed an interpleader action in the District Court for the Fourth Judicial District in which it named Brewer, Ashley Christensen, two other vehicle passengers, and numerous healthcare providers as Defendants. It set forth the circumstances of Brewer's accident, the fact that $100,000 of coverage was available, and tendered the $100,000 policy limits pursuant to Policy No. 2 so that the court could pay healthcare providers and the various claimants in proportion to their damages. As a result of the interpleader action, the healthcare providers were paid, claims of the other two passengers were settled, and whatever balance remained from the coverage provided by Policy No. 2 was distributed to Christensens.

¶ 10 Christensens then brought this declaratory action and asked the District Court to conclude that additional coverage was available pursuant to the "after acquired vehicle provision" in Mountain West Policy No. 1. Christensens contended that the Escort was insured pursuant to that policy as an "after acquired vehicle" and that Brewer was insured as a permissive user of a vehicle owned by the named insured-Fitzpatrick. Christensens also alleged other bases for coverage which are irrelevant to our resolution of this appeal. Finally, they claimed that coverage from both policies should be "stacked" to provide a total amount of $600,000 of coverage.

¶ 11 Mountain West admitted that Fitzpatrick owned the Escort and that Brewer drove it with her permission, but denied that the Escort was insured pursuant to the language in Policy No. 1. It also claimed that pursuant to § 33-23-203, MCA, coverage provided by more than one policy from the same company cannot be "stacked."

¶ 12 Both parties moved for summary judgment. Christensens relied on the plain language of Policy No. 1 and Montana case law honoring an insured's reasonable expectations and narrowly construing limitations on insurance coverage. They contended that "after acquired" vehicle coverage was provided pursuant to Policy No. 1 because Mountain West had been informed of its purchase and an additional premium had been paid for coverage. (Although the record is not clear, presumably Christensens refer to the premium paid for coverage pursuant to Policy No. 2). They contended that Montana's antistacking statute was inapplicable because the policy included its own antistacking clause and that clause did not preclude stacking where coverage is provided by more than one policy.

¶ 13 Mountain West opposed Christensens' motion for summary judgment, based on its contention that as a matter of law "after acquired vehicle coverage" is not intended by the parties when a separate policy of insurance is purchased to insure a vehicle acquired during the first policy period. Mountain West supported its argument with authorities from other jurisdictions. Christensens provided authorities to the contrary. The District Court found Mountain West's authorities more persuasive. It, therefore, denied Christensens' motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment to Mountain West. The District Court, in its decision, did not discuss whether the Ford Escort would otherwise have satisfied the definition of an "after acquired vehicle" in Policy No. 1.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 14 This is an appeal from the District Court's order granting summary judgment. Summary judgment is proper when no genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P. Furthermore, the District Court's order was based on its interpretation of an automobile insurance policy which presents a question of law. Leibrand v. National Farmers Union Property & Cas. Co. (1995), 272 Mont. 1, 6, 898 P.2d 1220, 1223. We therefore review a district court's conclusion of law as well as orders granting summary judgment to determine whether they are correctly decided. State v. Sullivan (1994), 266 Mont. 313, 318, 880 P.2d 829, 832.

ISSUE 1

¶ 15 Did the District Court err when it concluded that the vehicle in which Ashley L. Christensen was injured was not an insured vehicle pursuant to the "after acquired vehicle" provision in the policy issued by Mountain West to Rosemary Fitzpatrick?

¶ 16 Mountain West contends that "after acquired vehicle" coverage is not intended to insure a vehicle acquired during the policy period for which a separate policy of insurance is purchased. It relies on and the District Court found persuasive, Bramlett v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (1970), 205 Kan. 128, 468 P.2d 157.

¶ 17 In Bramlett the plaintiff received medical payment coverage pursuant to a policy that insured a vehicle in which she was riding while she was injured and then sought additional payment pursuant to a previous policy with the same company in which she was named as an insured and which provided "after acquired vehicle" coverage. The insurer in that case denied coverage based on its contention that the purpose of the "after acquired vehicle coverage" was to provide the insured with 30 days' interim protection until insurance coverage on a new car is acquired, but that once coverage is acquired, the automatic coverage provision is no longer applicable.

¶ 18 The Kansas court noted that other courts were not uniform in their resolution of this issue, but...

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