Christensen v. Oregon Short Line R. Co.

• Decision Date: 13 January 1909
• Docket Number: 1965
• Citation: 99 P. 676,35 Utah 137
• Court: Utah Supreme Court
• Parties: ANTON CHRISTENSEN, Guardian ad litem of Martha Christensen, Respondent, v. OREGON SHORT LINE RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellant

99 P. 676

35 Utah 137

ANTON CHRISTENSEN, Guardian ad litem of Martha Christensen, Respondent, v. OREGON SHORT LINE RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellant

No. 1965

Supreme Court of Utah

January 13, 1909

APPEAL from District Court, Second District. Hon. J. A. Howell Judge.

Personal injury action by Anton Christensen, Martha Christensen's guardian ad litem, against the Oregon Short Line Railroad Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.

REVERSED, and new trial directed.

P. L Williams, Geo. H. Smith, John G. Willis and C. R Hollingsworth for appellant.

Messrs. Maginnis & Corn for respondent.

FRICK, J. STRAUP, C. J., and McCARTY, J., concur.

OPINION

FRICK, J.

This is an action for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of appellant. The action was prosecuted by respondent as guardian ad litem for the benefit of his daughter, a minor. After alleging the corporate capacity of appellant, and that the appellant on the 15th day of September, 1907, did receive the minor aforesaid as a passenger for hire, the complaint states the following as constituting negligence on the part of appellant, namely: "That the said defendant company so managed, constructed, and operated its passenger car in which the said Martha Christensen was riding that the door thereof would stand open, and was permitted to swing upon its hinges, and that when the said Martha Christensen undertook to alight from said train at Bountiful, and while waiting for other passengers to alight, standing in the aisle, by a sudden jerk of said train she was thrown against the said door, and the same closed upon her fingers, catching the three first fingers of the left hand between the door and the jamb thereof, crushing the same." It is further alleged: "That said accident was caused by reason of the said door not being held firmly in its place, and also by reason of the careless and negligent causing of said train to jerk whilst the passengers were alighting therefrom." It will be observed that no negligence is directly charged except to "jerk" the train. No defect is alleged in any appliance or instrumentality, nor is it alleged that the door was left open negligently, or that the appellant was negligent because the door was "not being held firmly in its place." The negligence, therefore, if any, must be inferred from the facts stated, except that the appellant was negligent in causing the train to "jerk," as stated above.

The evidence upon the part of the respondent to establish the foregoing allegations is, in substance as follows: Martha Christensen, the injured minor, as appears from the printed abstract, testified: "My name is Martha Christensen, and I am thirteen years old. About the middle of last September, I went with my father from Ogden to Woods Cross. Father bought a ticket for me. I put my left hand on the door frame, and the door came shut on it. I was going out of the car. Father went out of the car ahead of me, and was out on the platform. The car had stopped before I got up to go out. I came out and was outside on the platform of the car. I just came out and then put my hand on the door frame. I was on the platform outside. I don't know what I put my hand on the door frame for. I can't describe just what I was doing, and how I happened to put my hand on the door frame. I was going out and then I just put my hand on the door frame, and then the door slammed shut on it." On cross-examination she said: "I noticed the door was slamming when I was sitting in the car, and that was before I got up to go out. It was just about soon after I got on the train that I noticed the door. . . . That was soon after I got on the train at Ogden, and it continued to slam backwards and forwards."

The father, after stating that he and Martha on September 15, 1907, were passengers in appellant's train, in part testified: "The accident happened through the door shutting on her fingers as she was getting off. The first I knew of it (I was already down on the platform of the station at Woods Cross) was when she came down crying and holding her hand. When I got off the rain, it had stopped. . . . I noticed the door on the train. It was on the swing, and every little while when the train slacked up it would go shut with a crash. I have no knowledge as to what caused it to go shut at the time it crushed her hand. I didn't see that. I have frequently observed passenger cars and the doors to them, most of them which I have seen have a catch. When the train is stopped at a station and the passengers are getting off the car, the door is fastened back with a catch. . . . I do not know just what kind of a catch it is. It is a clasp that goes back. A clasp comes back to that hook to hold it, with a spring on it. . . . It is automatic, and you just push it back and it catches. It is for the purpose of holding it open." On cross-examination the witness said: "The door was open back when I got off. I couldn't tell particularly when was the last time I saw it swing to with the noise. It was before I got to Woods Cross, but I couldn't tell you just where it was."

The conductor testified: "I first learned of it [the accident] when she stepped off the station platform down on the ground. I made an examination of the door of the car. It was O. S. L. 151, I think. I made an examination of the fastenings provided for holding the door open. They were in perfect condition. The door held when it was pushed back. I simply looked to see what was the cause of the door slamming. I got up to see after the train started. . . . The fastening was all right on the door." He further said, on cross-examination, that he made the examination after the train had left the station; that he could not say whether the door was clamped back at the time the girl got off the train; that both doors of the car were open all the way from Ogden to Salt Lake City; that they were open because the weather was warm.

The foregoing substantially is all the evidence adduced at the trial. At the close of the evidence, the appellant requested the court to direct the jury to find for it. The court refused the request, and submitted the case to the jury upon the evidence. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of respondent, upon which the court entered judgment, and hence this appeal.

The appellant excepted to the refusal of the court to direct a verdict, and now urges that the court erred in submitting the case to the jury upon the evidence adduced at the trial. There certainly is no evidence whatever to sustain the allegation of negligence with regard to the moving or jerking of the train. This, therefore, is eliminated from the case. Is there any evidence of negligence in any other respect? It certainly cannot be contended that there is any direct evidence that any appliance or instrumentality in use by appellant was defective, or that the injury was caused by any such defect. Is there any indirect or circumstantial evidence from which such negligence may be inferred, or are the facts and circumstances, as disclosed by the evidence, such as bring the case within the maxim of res ipsa loquitur? In other words, are the circumstances surrounding the accident in question such that negligence upon the part of appellant may be assumed or inferred from the mere happening of the accident? Appellant contends that there is no evidence of negligence, either direct or circumstantial, and that the undisputed facts, as they appear from the evidence, do not bring the case within the maxim aforesaid. Upon the other hand, respondent insists that the facts and circumstances are such as bring the case within the maxim, and that all that was incumbent upon him to prove to entitle him to a verdict at the hands of the jury was proved at the trial. We have very recently had occasion to discuss and apply the maxim of res ipsa loquitur as between carrier and passenger in the cases of Dearden v. San Pedro R. Co., 33 Utah 147, 93 P. 271, and Paul v. Salt Lake City R. Co., 34 Utah 1, 95 P. 363. The maxim "res ipsa loquitur" is merely a rule of evidence applicable in a certain class of cases, and is generally applied in cases of injuries to passengers.

The maxim, when applicable to the facts and circumstances of a particular case, is not intended to, and does not, dispense with establishing negligence. In all cases when negligence is the gist of the action, the negligence must be proved, but in case of an injury to a passenger he is only required to prove that the injury was occasioned by a collision derailing or upsetting of coaches, breaking of machinery or appliances, or things of that character, or through some act or acts of the servants operating the machinery or appliances, or in the management of the instrumentalities or the means used in the business over which the carrier has control, and for the conduct and management of which he is responsible. Paul v. Railroad Co., 30 Utah 41, 83 P. 563. The law imposes the duty upon the carrier of exercising the utmost care to protect his passengers against accidents; and, in case an accident occurs, the inference arises that the carrier has not exercised that high degree of care which the law imposes. If such care had been exercised, the inference is that the accident would have been avoided; that is, if the degree of care which the law imposes had been exercised in the construction and maintenance of the track and in the selection and inspection of machinery, instrumentalities, and appliances of all kinds, and in handling them, by the servants, then it may be inferred that the accident would not have occurred. But this inference in its last analysis amounts simply to one way of proving or establishing negligence. It means, too, just what the maxim implies. "The thing...