Christensen v. Titan Distribution, Inc.

Decision Date10 April 2007
Docket NumberNo. 06-2760.,06-2760.
Citation481 F.3d 1085
PartiesVernon E. CHRISTENSEN, Appellee, v. TITAN DISTRIBUTION, INC., Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Gene Raymond La Suer, argued, Des Moines, IA (Sharon K. Malheiro, on the brief), for appellant.

Roger J. Kuhle, argued, Indianola, IA (John O. Haraldson, on the brief), for appellee.

Before COLLOTON, BRIGHT and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.

A jury found that Titan Distribution, Incorporated ("Titan") discriminated against Vernon Christensen based on Christensen's disability and age when it refused to hire him. The jury awarded back pay, punitive damages and emotional distress damages. The district court1 then denied Titan's post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law and, in the alternative, a new trial, reduced the jury's award of back pay and punitive damages and awarded Christensen liquidated damages, front pay and attorneys' fees and costs. Titan appeals. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Titan hired Quintak, Incorporated to operate its warehouse and distribution center. Christensen worked for Quintak as a third-shift warehouse supervisor at Titan. In June 2002, Christensen was 58-1/2 years old and went on short-term disability leave to have knee replacement surgery. Craig Warren, Christensen's manager and a Quintak employee who had daily contact with Titan management, considered Christensen his most qualified and experienced supervisor and told Christensen that he would have his job when he returned from the disability leave. When Christensen went on leave, Coy Elswick, a 25-year-old lead man supervised by Christensen, performed Christensen's duties.

In July 2002, while Christensen was still on disability leave, Titan decided to cut costs by terminating Quintak and hiring its own employees to perform the duties the Quintak employees previously performed. William Campbell, president of Titan, announced that Titan would be hiring some of Quintak's employees and met with Warren to inform him of the reorganization. All Quintak employees who wanted to work at Titan were required to submit applications, interview for the desired positions and undergo qualifying physicals. Nadis Barucic and Cheryl Luthin oversaw the application process. Campbell continued to meet with Warren, who assumed the position of warehouse manager at Titan, during the transition stage.

Warren and Elswick informed Christensen of this development. Warren told Christensen that while everyone was required to fill out an application, Christensen was on his list of people who were needed to run the operation. Christensen submitted an application while he was still on disability leave and kept in contact with Warren. He told Warren that he applied for the third-shift supervisor position and that his doctor would not release him to work until August 28, 2002. Warren assured Christensen that he would have his job as third-shift supervisor whenever the doctor allowed him to return to work.

At the beginning of August, Christensen contacted Warren to check on the status of his application. Warren first told Christensen to call Barucic, who told Christensen that he was not conducting any more interviews and that Christensen needed to have Warren schedule him for an interview with Luthin. Christensen contacted Warren two additional times before Warren contacted Luthin. After Warren contacted Luthin, he received an e-mail from Luthin stating that Titan would not be hiring Christensen. Christensen asked Luthin about this decision on September 4, 2002, and Luthin "promptly told [him] that Titan Distribution was not hiring." Titan did not interview or hire Christensen, and no one at Titan provided a reason to Christensen for this decision.

Christensen then filed a charge of disability and age discrimination with the Iowa Civil Rights Commission ("Commission"). When asked by the Commission for its reason for not hiring Christensen, Titan responded that it did not hire all applicants. Titan did not immediately fill Christensen's third-shift supervisor position, but it did hire Elswick to fill the lead man position. Elswick testified that his job duties as a Titan employee were the same as those he performed as a Quintak employee while filling in for Christensen when he was on disability leave. One year after Titan hired Elswick, it promoted him to the third-shift supervisor position. Elswick testified that Christensen was more experienced and more qualified than Elswick for the warehouse supervisor position and that both men had the same physical abilities.

When Christensen was not hired by Titan, he spent the next ten months searching for a job similar to his Quintak supervisor position. He utilized career service counselors and sent resumes to potential employers. He received job interviews but no offers. In July 2003, Christensen's brother-in-law hired him to handle purchasing and sales at a lumberyard he managed. Christensen accepted this job even though it had less responsibility and lower compensation than his prior supervisor position.

Christensen filed suit against Titan for disability and age discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., respectively, and the parallel provisions of the Iowa Civil Rights Act, Iowa Code § 216 et seq. Titan filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that it did not hire Christensen because it decided to eliminate the third-shift supervisor position for economic reasons. The district court denied Titan's motion for summary judgment.

At trial, Titan employees provided conflicting evidence as to who made the decision not to hire Christensen. Campbell testified that he decided to eliminate the third-shift supervisor position by July 2002, but he also claimed that Warren made the decision not to hire Christensen. Warren, however, testified that no one told him that the third-shift supervisor position had been eliminated. Warren claimed that he wanted to hire Christensen and did not know that Titan did not intend to hire him until receiving an e-mail from Luthin on August 16, 2002. Luthin and Barucic, however, both testified that they did not make the decision not to hire Christensen.

The jury also heard testimony concerning Christensen's physical capabilities. During August 2002, Christensen's doctor told him that he had the following permanent restrictions: no prolonged walking, frequent bending, or stooping with the knee, no jumping from heights of over one foot, and no standing more than two hours at a time. A vocational expert testified that Christensen's restrictions prevented him from performing positions that accounted for 50 percent of the job market but that Christensen could perform his job as supervisor at Quintak and the same job he applied for with Titan.

Christensen and his wife testified about the emotional distress he experienced after Titan refused to hire him. He was upset and distraught over Titan's decision and continued to be withdrawn and feel stress during his long job search. He also cried and was upset because he was not the breadwinner of the family. He continued to be withdrawn even after he began working at the lumberyard because this job did not provide the same fulfillment as his third-shift supervisor position.

The jury returned a verdict in favor of Christensen on both the disability and age discrimination claims. The jury was instructed to determine both whether Christensen had a physical impairment and whether Christensen was regarded as having an impairment. The instructions, however, did not clearly inform the jury that these two definitions, "actually disabled" and "regarded as disabled," were mutually exclusive and that a finding of disability under both definitions would be inconsistent.2 Therefore, on a special verdict form, the jury found both that Christensen was actually disabled and that Titan regarded him as disabled. The jury also found that Titan willfully violated the ADEA. Based on these findings, the jury awarded Christensen $130,000 in back pay, $195,000 in punitive damages and $65,000 in emotional distress damages. Titan moved for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, a new trial. Christensen requested liquidated damages for the ADEA claim, front pay and attorneys' fees and costs.

In response to these motions, the district court denied Titan's requests for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial, holding that the jury's finding that Titan regarded Christensen as disabled was supported by substantial evidence. The district court addressed the jury's finding that Titan regarded Christensen as disabled first because it believed that the evidence supporting the "regarded as disabled" finding was stronger than that for the "actually disabled" finding. Once the district court found that the evidence was sufficient to support the "regarded as" finding, it concluded that it was unnecessary to address the jury's finding of Christensen's actual disability and vacated that finding.

Due to its decision to vacate the actual disability finding and assuming that the jury's punitive damages award applied equally to both findings, the district court reduced the punitive damages award by half to $97,500. The district court also considered the jury's back pay award and reduced it to $78,209 because the jury considered the possibility of Christensen receiving overtime pay which was not supported by the evidence. The district court then found that there was sufficient evidence supporting the jury's emotional distress damages award. Next, the district court awarded Christensen $78,209 in liquidated damages, finding the evidence sufficient to support the jury's finding that Titan's violation of the ADEA was willful. Finally, the district court awarded Christensen $47,525 in...

To continue reading

Request your trial
62 cases
  • Roberts v. Uscc Payroll Corp., C07-3071-MWB.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa
    • July 17, 2009
    ...claims under the ADEA and the ICRA," the court need not discuss plaintiff's claims under ICRA); Christensen v. Titan Distribution, Inc., 481 F.3d 1085, 1095 n. 4 (8th Cir.2007) (same); Fisher v. Pharmacia & Upjohn, 225 F.3d 915, 919 n. 2 (8th Cir.2000) ("The ICRA is interpreted to mirror fe......
  • Dollar v. Smithway Motor Xpress Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa
    • April 13, 2011
    ...of Emporia, 948 F.2d 1529 (10th Cir.1991)). The purpose of front pay is also to make the plaintiff whole. See Christensen v. Titan Dist., Inc., 481 F.3d 1085, 1098 (8th Cir.2007); Cowan, 140 F.3d at 1160; Standley, 5 F.3d at 322. Consequently, these remedies are designed to achieve very dif......
  • Strom v. Companies
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa
    • June 6, 2011
    ...claims under the ADEA and the ICRA,” the court need not discuss plaintiff's claims under ICRA); Christensen v. Titan Distribution, Inc., 481 F.3d 1085, 1095 n. 4 (8th Cir.2007) (same); Fisher v. Pharmacia & Upjohn, 225 F.3d 915, 919 n. 2 (8th Cir.2000) ( “The ICRA is interpreted to mirror f......
  • Campbell v. State Third Judicial Dist. Dep't of Corr.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa
    • November 22, 2011
    ...claims under the ADEA and the ICRA," the court need not discuss plaintiff's claims under ICRA); Christensen v. Titan Distribution, Inc., 481 F.3d 1085, 1095 n.4 (8th Cir. 2007) (same); Fisher v. Pharmacia & Upjohn, 225 F.3d 915, 919 n.2 (8th Cir. 2000) ("The ICRA is interpreted to mirror fe......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • Deposing & examining the expert economist
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Deposing & Examining Employment Witnesses
    • March 31, 2022
    ...omitted); EEOC v. Joe’s Stone Crab, Inc. , 15 F.Supp.2d 1364, 1378 (S.D.Fla. 1998). In Christensen v. Titan Distribution, Inc. , 481 F.3d 1085 (8th Cir. 2007), the jury found for the plaintiff on both his ADA and his ADEA claims, finding willfulness under the ADEA, and awarding the plaintif......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT