Christenson v. Ohrman

• Citation: 159 Kan. 565,156 P.2d 848
• Decision Date: 10 March 1945
• Docket Number: 36284.
• Parties: CHRISTENSON et al. v. OHRMAN.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

156 P.2d 848

159 Kan. 565

CHRISTENSON et al. v. OHRMAN.

No. 36284.

Supreme Court of Kansas

March 10, 1945

Appeal from District Court, Sherman County; W. K. Skinner, Judge.

Appeal from District Court, Sherman County; W. K. Skinner, Judge.

Action by Theodore Christenson and another against George A. Ohrman tenant, who sought to recover certain wheat or the value thereof. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiffs appeal.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. A tenant may surrender to a landlord a part of the land being occupied by the tenant and by mutual agreement with the landlord retain the right to plant and harvest a crop on another part of the land and under such circumstances a surrender by operation of law will not be implied as to the entire land.

2. As a general rule, in construing provisions relating to renewals or extensions of leases between landlord and tenant, where there is any uncertainty, the tenant is favored and not the landlord.

Thomas H. Taggart and Charles G. Dockhorn, both of Goodland, for appellants.

Elmer E. Euwer, of Goodland, for appellee.

BURCH Justice.

This action involves a dispute between a landlord and a tenant over the right of the tenant to recover certain wheat, or its value, which was grown on a part of the land involved after the tenant had been notified to vacate all of the farm.

The case was submitted to the district court upon an agreed statement of facts and was submitted, upon appeal, to this court without oral argument.

Stripped of its uncontroversial details, the factual picture is as follows:

Appellee was a tenant on a certain farm consisting of 160 acres by reason of his having entered into a written lease with the owner, Daniel Boyer. The written lease ended as of March 1 1938, but appellee, by holding over, continued in possession of the land until the summer of 1941, at which time the owner notified appellee by letter that the owner had rented the land for the 1942 crop year to one of the appellants, namely Ted Christenson. The letter enclosed a notice to vacate and also contained a statement to the effect that appellee should allow Ted Christenson to enter upon the land and prepare the same for the purpose of sowing small grain for the 1942 crop year.

Prior to receipt of such letter, the appellee had disked and summer-fallowed about sixty acres of the land. The last work had been done in July, just prior to the receipt of the letter which was dated July 27th. After receipt of such letter the appellee and the owner exchanged letters, in which appellee objected to being dispossessed of that portion of the land which he had summer-fallowed; complained because he had not been previously notified; demanded that he be paid for his labor in connection with the summer-fallowing, or, in the alternative, that he be allowed to plant the sixty acres.

The correspondence referred to thus far is significant only in showing that a dispute existed between the respective parties. Careful examination of the same does not disclose any other points therein which are of legal consequence.

Proper construction of the final letter written by the landlord to the appellee, however, develops a legal question and, therefore, particular consideration must be given to its contents. The final letter from the owner to the appellee read as follows:

'Received your letter of the 29th wherein you state that you want one dollar per acre for the 60 acres of summer-fallowing. I will not and cannot pay for any work you have done and may be entitled to. If, therefore, you think that you are doing the right thing, you may plant the 60 acres in a fall crop. I do feel, however, that is not the proper attitude for you to take. While you say that you did not receive my letter of 15th day of May, a letter was mailed you advising you of the fact that I had rented the land to Mr. Christenson, and that you were to vacate the farm March 1st, 1941. This letter was not returned to me although I had my return card on the letter. You also advised that Mr. Christenson had not said anything to you in regards to he renting the farm. I received a letter from Mr. Christenson soon after he received a letter I had written him on May 15th that he thought that he might have a little difficulty in planting the fall crop on this farm. From these facts it would appear to me that you were advised of the fact that the land was leased to Mr. Christenson. But let that be as it is, if you insist on putting in a fall crop on the summer-fallowed land, I am assuming that it will be your privilege to do so, but do feel that you are not doing the right thing by me if you do so.

' Am satisfied that this matter can be ironed out by Mr. Christenson putting in his fall crop on the ground where you had small grain this year, and Mr. Christenson can use the summer-fallowed land to other crops next spring. I am writing Mr. Christenson in regards to this matter today.' (Italics supplied.)

After receipt of the foregoing letter, which was dated the 31st day of July, 1941, appellee drilled wheat upon 58.8 acres of the land. Either before or after such date, the appellant, Ted Christenson, entered upon the remaining part of the 160 acres under the terms and provisions of a written lease which he had obtained from the owner, Daniel Boyer, as of the 16th day of May, 1941, and he also between July 24th and July 31st pulled onto the summer-fallowed land and unit-tilled approximately four acres of the sixty acres in question and later, during the fore part of August appellant Christenon made about four rounds along the south side of the summer-fallowed land. When the appellee came to the land to see about cutting the wheat on July 18, 1942 he found that the appellant, Ted Christenson, had hired a combine and that most of the wheat had been harvested. The stipulation states that the grain was hauled and sold to an elevator and that the wheat tickets were made out to the appellants, Ted Christenson and Tom Taggart.

The parties stipulated further that there were grown and harvested on the summer-fallowed land 968 bushels and 20 pounds of winter wheat of the market value of 88 cents per bushel; that one-fourth of the wheat belonged to the owner of the land, Daniel Boyer, who had been paid the proper sum of $213.03 therefor; and that one D. Maness, who combined and hauled the wheat to the grain company, had been paid therefor the sum of $189.02. It was further stipulated that the appellee had made due demand upon the appellants for return of the wheat or the value thereof.

From the stipulated evidence the trial court found that the appellee was in possession of 58.8 acres of fall wheat growing on the land; that he had never been legally dispossessed therefrom; that, therefore, he was entitled to receive the balance of the money on hand after allowing the referred-to deductions; and entered judgment for appellee in the amount of $450.06.

A motion for a new trial was filed and overruled, and notice of appeal properly perfected.

1. The first contention asserted by the appellants is that the appellee, in surrendering part of the land, necessarily, as a matter of law, surrendered all the land covered by the lease. In support of such contention appellants cite a quotation from 32 Am.Jur. 762, § 900, which reads as follows:

'As implied in the definition of the term, surrender extinguishes all interest of the tenant in the term and consequently all rights conditioned upon its continuance. Thus, it extinguishes all rights of the lessee to the growing crops; and where, in the case of a lease of farming lands, the lessee had done fall plowing and thereafter surrendered the term, it was held that he had no claim against the lessor for the reasonable value of such plowing, although it inured to the benefit of the lessor.'

Such a rule of law may be applicable in instances where there has been a complete and unconditional surrender by the tenant and most, if not all, of the cases cited by the writer of the text in support of the general statement are instances wherein the facts show clearly a complete and unconditional surrender. For example, in the supporting case of Smith v. Sprague, 119 Mich. 148, 77...