Christenson v. State, S90P1386
| Decision Date | 15 March 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. S90P1386,S90P1386 |
| Citation | 261 Ga. 80,402 S.E.2d 41 |
| Parties | CHRISTENSON v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
James A. Messner, Columbus, Frederick Robinson, Stephen M. McNabb, Michael G. McGovern, Fulbright & Jaworski, Washington, D.C., Richard A. Bunn, Columbus, for Christenson.
Douglas C. Pullen, Dist. Atty., Columbus, Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Atlanta, Charles E. Bagley, Asst. Dist. Atty., Columbus, Leonora Grant, Asst. Atty. Gen., Atlanta, for the State.
Joseph L. Chambers, Sr., Prosecuting Attorneys' Council, Smyrna.
Patsy Morris, Atlanta.
The defendant, Scott Lynn Christenson, was convicted by a jury in Harris County of the murder and armed robbery of Albert L. Oliver, III. He was sentenced to death for the murder. This is his appeal. 1
1. Christenson spent most of the afternoon of July 6, 1989 working out at a gym next door to the victim's place of employment. After his workout, he waited in front of the gym, carrying a gym bag inside of which were two handguns. His parents drove by and asked him if he needed a ride. He answered in the negative. Soon afterward, the victim exited the building next door and went to his four wheel drive Toyota utility vehicle, which contained a several-thousand-dollar, competition-quality stereo system big enough to almost completely fill the luggage area of the vehicle. Christenson was acquainted with the victim, and approached him to ask for a ride to a friend's house. Christenson's parents observed him enter the victim's truck and ride off.
Christenson directed the victim to a remote area of Harris County, and withdrew a gun from his bag. According to Christenson, a struggle for the gun ensued, the truck came to a stop, the passenger door fell open, and the two men fell out to the ground. Christenson gained control of the gun and shot the victim five times. Then he stuffed the victim's body into the passenger side of the truck, drove off the highway 100 yards, and left the body, covered with sticks and brush. He drove the victim's truck to Arkansas where he was arrested the next day for stealing gasoline. He called home to ask his father for money to post his bond. His father contacted the local police, who called Arkansas and informed them the truck was stolen and its owner missing. The defendant was interrogated in Arkansas and admitted the truck was stolen, although he denied stealing it. After the victim's body was recovered, the defendant admitted stealing the truck and shooting its owner.
The evidence supports the conviction. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
2. Christenson's first four enumerations of error raise issues concerning his mental condition and his psychological evaluation. The facts and circumstances of the trial proceedings relevant to these issues are set forth in subdivision (a) below, and his legal contentions are addressed in subdivisions (b) through (e).
(a) The defendant was 18 years old at the time of the crime. He had been in nearly constant trouble with the law for several years, committing numerous burglaries and thefts. After his first adult conviction in 1988--for first degree forgery, burglary, and stealing two motor vehicles (one of which was a Toyota truck)--the defendant was referred to the Bradley Center, a private mental health hospital, for evaluation and treatment. (All but 90 days of his sentence was probated.)
He was diagnosed as being a person of "bright-normal intelligence" who was emotionally constricted, self-absorbed and narcissistic, seductive and manipulative and who had abused alcohol. It was noted that his "condition at discharge is not improved," and that "it is doubtful that [Christenson] internalized any impulse control essential to staying out of trouble and maintaining abstinence from alcohol after discharge."
Christenson was not diagnosed as having any serious mental disorder.
Prior to this trial, the defendant filed motions seeking a "psychiatric" evaluation and seeking funds for independent psychiatric assistance. The court granted the motion for evaluation and reserved a ruling on the request for funds pending the results of the court-ordered evaluation.
Christenson was evaluated at the West Georgia Regional Hospital. A psychologist interviewed the defendant, and administered a neurological screening test, an MMPI (Minnesota Multi Phasic Personality Inventory) and an IQ test. The defendant scored lower on the IQ test than he had earlier when evaluated by the Bradley Center. The psychologist attributed this to the defendant's drug usage and the resultant inattention to surroundings and environment; he was not "getting information." His IQ was still in the normal range, however. The neurological screening test did not reveal any signs of neurological damage, and neither the MMPI nor the interview revealed any signs that the defendant was suffering from a serious mental disorder.
Based upon the evidence presented to it, the court denied the defendant's motions for funds for independent psychiatric assistance. The psychologist did not testify at trial.
(b) In his second enumeration of error, the defendant contends the trial court erred by conducting "no hearing into appellant's competency." However, the defendant withdrew his plea of mental incompetence to stand trial. See OCGA § 17-7-130. It is true that the trial court might in an appropriate case be required to conduct a hearing to determine the defendant's competence to stand trial even where the defense has not moved for a hearing, but this is not such a case. Nothing before the trial court raised any question about the defendant's competence to stand trial. See Ford v. State, 255 Ga. 81(8g), 335 S.E.2d 567 (1985). Compare, Holloway v. State, 257 Ga. 620(2), 361 S.E.2d 794 (1987) ().
(c) In his first and third enumerations, Christenson contends the court erred by refusing to provide independent psychiatric assistance to the defense in relation to both the guilt and the sentencing phases of the trial.
[W]hen a defendant demonstrates to the trial court that his sanity at the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial, the state must, at a minimum, assure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in the evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense.
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 1096, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985).
Christenson presented no evidence by which the court could reasonably have inferred that the question of sanity would be a significant factor at the guilt phase of the trial. Eddy v. State, 255 Ga. 321(2), 338 S.E.2d 262 (1986).
Ake also requires that a state provide a defendant with "psychiatric assistance in presenting mitigating evidence at his sentencing proceeding, where the state presents psychiatric evidence against the defendant." Bowden v. Kemp, 767 F.2d 761, 763 (11th Cir.1985). As noted above, the state presented no psychiatric (or expert psychological) testimony at the sentencing phase of the trial. Compare Walker v. State, 254 Ga. 149, 154-55(5), 327 S.E.2d 475 (1985). Moreover, this is not a case in which the defendant might be entitled to psychiatric assistance at the sentencing phase even where the state does not present psychiatric testimony. See Holloway v. State, supra. The evidence in this case shows that the defendant is selfish and manipulative, lacks regard for the rights of others, has abused drugs and alcohol, and has committed numerous crimes. But it does not show that the defendant suffers from any serious mental disorder. It was not abuse of discretion to deny the defendant's request for court-funded independent psychiatric assistance. Childs v. State, 257 Ga. 243(5), 357 S.E.2d 48 (1987).
(d) Preliminary to ruling on the defendant's request for independent psychiatric assistance, the defendant was sent to West Georgia Regional Hospital for a mental evaluation. Although the court's order referred to a "psychiatric" evaluation, the defendant was evaluated by a psychologist having a Ph.D. degree in clinical psychology. At the state's request, the psychologist appended to her report an addendum describing incriminating statements made by the defendant about the crime while he was being evaluated. The defendant's attorneys moved to dismiss the indictment, and suppress the addendum, contending the state was guilty of misconduct by performing a psychological evaluation instead of a psychiatric evaluation and by eliciting incriminating statements without obtaining a voluntary waiver of the defendant's right not to incriminate himself.
The court's order for "psychiatric examination" put the defendant's attorneys on notice that he would be sent to the West Georgia Regional Hospital for evaluation of, among other things, his ability to distinguish right from wrong at the time of the crime. Before being evaluated, the defendant was advised that he could refuse to answer any questions about his "case, problem, or mental condition," that anything he said could be "brought out in court," and that he could stop the examination "at any time" for consultation with his attorney. The defendant signed a form stating he understood these rights.
This is not a case in which an evaluation was conducted without notice to counsel and without an advisement of rights to the defendant. The defendant's complaint that the evaluation was conducted by a psychologist rather than by a psychiatrist apparently is premised on an assumption that his communications to a psychiatrist would have been privileged while his communications to a psychologist were not. However, while there is generally a privilege concerning...
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