Christian v. Pennsylvania Financial Responsibility Assigned Claims Plan

• Decision Date: 03 January 1997
• Citation: 686 A.2d 1,454 Pa.Super. 512
• Parties: Eleanor CHRISTIAN, Appellant, v. PENNSYLVANIA FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY ASSIGNED CLAIMS PLAN, Appellee.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

Page 1

686 A.2d 1

454 Pa.Super. 512

Eleanor CHRISTIAN, Appellant, v. PENNSYLVANIA FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY ASSIGNED CLAIMS PLAN, Appellee.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Sept. 10, 1996.

Filed Oct. 31, 1996.

Reargument Denied Jan. 3, 1997.

George J. Badey, III, Philadelphia, for appellant.

Brandon G. Johnson, Philadelphia, for appellee.

Before KELLY and SAYLOR, JJ., and MONTEMURO, Senior Judge. ^*

MONTEMURO, Judge.

This is an appeal from an Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County denying Appellant Eleanor Christian's Motion for Sanctions pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 4019(d). This Motion sought to recover attorney's fees and costs incurred as a result of the Plan's failure to admit specific requests for admissions served by Christian. The trial court held that the Plan possessed reasonable grounds for denying the requests and therefore denied the Motion for Sanctions. We affirm.

Appellant, Eleanor Christian, initiated action against Defendant-Appellee, Pennsylvania Financial Responsibility Assigned Claims Plan ("the Plan"), ¹ on February 8, 1995 as an arbitration matter in the Court of Common Pleas for Philadelphia County. Christian sought benefits from the Plan for injuries sustained when she was struck by an uninsured vehicle. Christian served the Plan with both a complaint and "Plaintiff's First Request for Admissions, Accompanying Interrogatories, and Request for Production of Documents." The Plan timely answered Christian's Requests stating its lack of information and objections as appropriate. During the course of litigation, the Plan later amended its answers to Christian's Request for Admissions, specifically denying those which the Plan considered legal conclusions or genuine issues of material fact for determination at arbitration.

On October 10, 1995, an arbitration panel entered an award for Christian in the amount of $15,000.00, which represents the Plan's per-person statutory limit of liability for uninsured motorist claims pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1754. No appeal was taken by either party within the thirty day appeal period. Thereafter, on or about November 27, 1995, Christian filed a "Motion for Taxation of Attorney's Fees as Costs Pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 4019(d)" and a Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions. Attached to the Memorandum, Christian included an affidavit of attorney's fees in the amount of $3,231.25, allegedly incurred as a result of having to prove the denied requests for admissions at arbitration, and a Bill of Costs filed November 28, 1995 in the amount of $643.72. The Plan filed a timely exception to the Bill of Costs on December 18, 1995.

The trial court denied Christian's Motion for Sanctions in an Order docketed on January 24, 1996. The following day, Christian filed a praecipe to enter judgment on the arbitration award. This appeal followed.

Christian raises the following issues for our review:

1. Is the Pennsylvania Financial Responsibility Assigned Claims Plan immune from discovery sanctions for failure to admit pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 4014 and 4019(d)[?]

2. May a party unreasonably, and without any basis, fail to admit a matter on the basis that the matter which forms the subject of the request presents a "genuine issue of fact for trial," and then when those matters are later proven at an arbitration hearing, avoid sanctions pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 4019(d)[?]

(Appellant's Brief at 2). Before we consider the merits of this appeal, we must first determine whether Christian has appealed from a final order.

An appeal to this Court is appropriate only if it is from a final order, unless otherwise specifically permitted by statute or rule. Jenkins v. Hospital of Medical College of Pennsylvania, 535 Pa. 252, 259, 634 A.2d 1099, 1102 (1993). Generally, an order granting or denying discovery sanctions in a Motion pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 4019 is interlocutory in nature and therefore not typically subject to an appeal until the underlying case is completed. Bruno v. Elitzky, 515 Pa. 47, 50, 526 A.2d 781, 782 (1987); Joyce & Associates v. Pivirotto, 358 Pa.Super. 50, 52, 516 A.2d 763, 764 (1986)(discovery sanction orders not reviewable prior to final judgment in main action absent unusual circumstances). An appeal may, however, lie from an order imposing or denying sanctions if the order constitutes a final order. An order is not "final" unless it is one which ends litigation by putting a litigant out-of-court or disposing of the entire case. Grove North America v. Arrow Lift & Construction Equipment Co., Inc., 421 Pa.Super. 12, 17, 617 A.2d 369, 372 (1992). Christian asserts that, although the trial court's Order was initially interlocutory, it became appealable on January 25, 1996 the instant praecipe for judgment was entered on the arbitration award. (Appellant Brief at 1, n. 1). The trial court disagreed, stating that because this Order was not final, it is not appealable, and therefore the appeal should be quashed. (Trial Ct. Op. at 2). This Court finds that the trial court Order denying sanctions is appealable, although not for the reasons stated by Christian.

A "[r]eduction of an order to judgment ... upon praecipe of a party is a purely ministerial act. Entry of judgment cannot render appealable an otherwise unappealable order." Hall v. Lee, 285 Pa.Super. 542, 547 n. 2, 428 A.2d 178, 181 n. 2 (1981). It is therefore appropriate, and perhaps necessary, for this Court to look beyond the judgment to determine whether an action is in fact ripe for appeal. Id. The Order in the instant appeal does not fall squarely within the definition of a "final order," as it does not dispose of the entire case or oust a litigant from court. Rather, the Order was filed three months after the underlying action concluded with the entry of an arbitration award.

Most discovery sanctions under Pa.R.C.P. 4019 govern the conduct of parties during pretrial discovery and are ordinarily imposed before final disposition of the underlying action. See, e.g., Pa.R.C.P. 4019(a)(imposing sanctions for failure to serve sufficient answers to interrogatories, respond to request for production, or appear at deposition). Sanctions under Pa.R.C.P. 4019(d) are different. Subsection (d) allows the court to enter an order imposing specific sanctions where a party fails to make a requested admission under Pa.R.C.P. 4014. Implicit in subdivision (d) is the requirement that a party file a motion for sanctions only after a trial and entry of a verdict or decree. Goodrich-Amram 2d § 4019(d):4 at 625. As a prerequisite for a motion under this Rule, a party requesting admissions must first prove those matters at trial which the opposing party failed to admit as requested. Moreover, an order pursuant to Rule 4019(d) taxes as costs against the opposing party the reasonable expenses and attorney's fees incurred in proving the unjustifiably denied admissions.

Therefore, it is only after the case is reduced to judgment that a motion under Rule 4019(d) is proper. Only at that point is it known whether an adverse party is subject to costs and whether proof of the denied admissions was made. Because a motion pursuant to Rule 4019(d) occurs after the completion of the underlying action, by its very nature, it is essentially a discrete proceeding which ends upon the issuance of an Order granting or denying sanctions; litigation is then concluded and the litigant is out-of-court. Therefore, the finality of the Order denying sanctions is determined not by the entry of judgment, but by the language and requirements of Pa.R.C.P. 4019(d). Because this is a final and appealable Order, this Court has jurisdiction to determine whether the trial court erred in denying Christian's motion for sanctions against the Plan.

It is well-settled that the specific sanctions imposed under Pa.R.C.P. 4019 for violation of discovery rules are left to the sole discretion of the trial court. Sun Pipe Line Co. v. Tri-State Telecommunications, Inc., 440 Pa.Super. 47, 67, 655 A.2d 112, 122 (1995) Therefore, the standard of review governing this appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Christian's motion for sanctions. An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment. It requires a showing of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, ill-will, or such lack of support as to be clearly erroneous. Paden v. Baker Concrete Construction, Inc., 540 Pa. 409, 412, 658 A.2d 341, 343 (1995). Under this standard, the party challenging the trial court's discretion on appeal bears a heavy burden. In re Application of Milton S. Hershey Medical Ctr., 535 Pa. 9, 13, 634 A.2d 159, 161 (1993).

On appeal, Christian challenges the denial of sanctions for the Plan's failure to admit requests for admissions numbers 4, 7, and 8. (Appellant Brief at 8). The texts of the challenged requests are as follows:

1. Request to Admit No. 4: The accident in which plaintiff was injured occurred because while Joann R. Chamberlin was backing up her vehicle as set forth in the preceding request for admission, she did not notice the plaintiff crossing 10th Street behind her vehicle, and she struck the plaintiff with the back of her vehicle. (Plaintiff's First Request For Admissions at 5).

2. Request to Admit No. 7: Plaintiff Eleanor Christian at all times pertinent hereto did not own a motor vehicle, nor did she reside in a household with anyone who did own a motor vehicle, nor was she named as an insured or in any other way covered by a policy of motor vehicle insurance. (Plaintiff's First Request for Admissions at 8).

3. Request to Admit No. 8: The driver of the said vehicle, Joann R. Chamberlin, at all times pertinent hereto, had no policy of motor vehicle insurance which covered the plaintiff's injuries herein, and therefore, coverage for plaintiff's damages is provided by the defendant. (Plaintiff's First Request for Admissions at 9).

The Plan denied each of the above requests as genuine...