Christian v. Porter, 46

• Decision Date: 08 September 1954
• Docket Number: No. 46,46
• Citation: 65 N.W.2d 779,340 Mich. 300
• Parties: Guy CHRISTIAN, Special Administrator of the Estate of William J. Craig, Deceased, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Lillian PORTER, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 779

65 N.W.2d 779

340 Mich. 300

Guy CHRISTIAN, Special Administrator of the Estate of William J. Craig, Deceased, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Lillian PORTER, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 46.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Sept. 8, 1954.

Kelly & Kelly, Jackson, for defendant and appellant.

Dudley & Rogers, Jackson, for plaintiff and appellee.

Before the Entire Bench.

KELLY, Justice.

Plaintiff as special administrator of the estate of William J. Craig, deceased, commenced this suit in chancery to recover the face value and interest on five $1,000 United States treasury bonds, alleging that defendant, Lillian Porter, wrongfully procured and fraudulently converted bonds belonging to the deceased.

In her answer defendant stated she went to the Craig home at Mr. Craig's request and took care of her sister, Mrs. Craig, during several months of her last illness; that both defendant and Mr. Craig were elderly people and that after her sister's death on June 4, 1940, Mr. Craig asked her to stay and take care of him; that he inquired as to her financial condition and when she told him she possessed only small savings he said he would make some provision for her; that shortly thereafter she accompanied him to the bank where he withdrew five $1,000 United States bonds from his safety deposit Box and gave them to her with the admonition that he wanted her to have them and take care of them, but to tell no one about them. That her refusal to disclose these facts heretofore was in response to the request and instruction of Mr. Craig.

Defendant filed a motion to transfer the cause to the law side of the court on the grounds that the action being one for money damages, plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law. This motion was denied. Upon trial the court decreed that the plaintiff was entitled to the full face value of the bonds in the amount of $5,000, plus accrued interest of $1,055.37, or a total judgment in money of $6,055.37, together with costs. Defendant contends the court erred in denying her motion to transfer the action to the law side of the court.

The right of a trial by jury is secured by the Constitution of the State of Michigan 1908, art. 2, § 13. The legislature emphasized the importance of commencing actions on the proper side of the court by enacting C.L.1948, § 611.2, Stat.Ann. § 27.652, which provides 'If at any time it appear that a suit commenced in equity should have been brought as an action on the law side of the court, or if it appear that an action commenced on the law side of the court should have been brought in equity, it shall be forthwith transferred to the proper side, and be there proceeded with, with only such alteration in the pleadings as shall be essential.'

This Court construed this statute in the case of Lake Superior Brass Foundry Co. v. Houghton Circuit Judge, 209 Mich. 380, 176 N.W. 409, 410, stating:

'The right of trial by jury is secured to plaintiff by the Constitution of this state. [Article 2, § 13.] This statute in no way attempts to deprive the plaintiff of such right, nor should such a construction be given it as would even tend to work out such a result in violation of the constitutional provision.'

The trial court does not have discretionary powers in determining this question, but must follow the statute. See Commissioner of Insurance v. Lapeer Circuit Judge, 302 Mich. 614, 5 N.W.2d 505.

Appellee cites cases establishing the general rule that courts of equity have concurrent jurisdiction with courts of law to grant relief from fraud, and calls attention to the fact that the bill of complaint charged fraud. The mere mention of fraud would not place the case in chancery. In Austin v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 291 Mich. 513, 289 N.W. 235, 238, it is stated:

'The mere mention of the word fraud, without any supporting data, is insufficient to carry the case to chancery. Equitable jurisdiction does not rest on the persistence with which it is asserted, and although 'fraud' is charged in several paragraphs of the bill, the basic essentials of such an action are not made out. So long as the distinction between law and equity remains in our jurisprudence, equitable jurisdiction must be based on more than an epithet or a label. Otherwise, it would be as reasonable to argue that a replevin action becomes a matter for equity when it is alleged that the goods are 'fraudulently' withheld, or that assumpsit to collect a debt is similarly transformed by the claim that the debtor 'fraudulently' refuses to pay. See Teft v. Stewart, 31 Mich. 367, 370.'

It is not sufficient that plaintiff allege he has been defrauded, but pleadings must show that the equity powers of the court are necessary to make a proper disposition of the case. In Mack v. Village of Frankfort, 123 Mich. 421, 429, 82 N.W. 209, 212, the Court said:

'I do not understand that, every time a man has been defrauded in a horse trade or in the purchase of a stock of goods, he may invoke the aid of a court of equity, even though he had an adequate remedy at law. It is doubtless true that in cases of fraud the equity court has concurrent jurisdiction with courts of law, and its aid may be invoked if the relief sought is of an equitable character, but this case is not such a one. The bill calls for a money judgment, and does not show that the equity powers of the court are necessary for its enforcement. The case is of such a character that it can best be investigated in a court at law, where the parties can have the benefit of a jury trial, if they so desire. Bennett v. Nichols, 12 Mich. 22; Smith v. Walker, 57 Mich. 456, 22 N.W. 267, 24 N.W. 830, 26 N.W. 783; Stoddard v. McLane, 56 Mich. 11, 22 N.W. 95; Prescott v. Pfeiffer, 57 Mich. 21, 23 N.W. 477.'

In the instant case plaintiff sought and obtained a money judgment, even though he prayed:

'That a trust be impressed upon the account in deposit in the said Jackson City Bank & Trust Company and that the said Jackson City Bank & Trust Company be ordered to pay over to your plaintiff such funds impressed with such a trust.'

In Bassett v. Trinity Building Co., 254 Mich. 207, 236 N.W. 237, 238, it was held that the action should have been commenced on the law side of the court. The bill alleged fraud and prayed for an impressment of a lien and an injunction. In commenting upon the fact that the decree provided for the equivalent of a money judgment, this Court said:

'Stripping the bill of complaint of the charges of conspiracy and the claim of rescission, the equity suit became one solely for the recovery of damages for fraud, fraudulent misrepresentations, and breach of warranty.'

Appellee alleges that 'An accounting was prayed, seeking to ascertain the number of coupons attached to the said bonds and their amounts.' The exact amount of the bonds was set forth in the bill of complaint. The bank was made a party defendant and made a disclosure of the amount of the coupons. No accounting was necessary.

Appellee also calls attention to the fact that: 'The plaintiff prayed for an injunction restraining the defendant, Jackson City Bank & Trust Company, from permitting the defendant, Lillian Porter, to dispose of, mortgage, assign, encumber or withdraw any of the funds. Injunctive relief was also sought against Lillian Porter from withdrawing said funds.' The law processes of garnishment and attachment would have obviated the necessity of the injunction or the impressment of a trust.

In Laubengayer v. Rohde, 167 Mich. 605, at page 610, 133 N.W. 535, at page 537, this Court stated:

"In this state equity has not taken jurisdiction of cases where a...