Christian v. Ransom

• Decision Date: 09 December 1935
• Docket Number: 24835.
• Citation: 183 S.E. 89,52 Ga.App. 218
• Parties: CHRISTIAN v. RANSOM et al.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

183 S.E. 89

52 Ga.App. 218

CHRISTIAN v. RANSOM et al.

No. 24835.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Second Division

December 9, 1935

Syllabus by the Court.

As the alleged defamatory words did not charge the commission of a crime and were not for any other reason slanderous per se and as no special damages are alleged, a cause of action was not set forth.

Error from Superior Court, Fulton County; Edgar E. Pomeroy, Judge.

Petition by G. K. Christian against Ronald Ransom, receiver, and others. To review a judgment sustaining demurrers to his petition, plaintiff brings error.

Affirmed.

Robert B. Blackburn and William Woodruff, both of Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.

Harold Hirsch & Marion Smith and Hamilton Lokey, all of Atlanta, for defendants in error.

SUTTON Judge.

Plaintiff sued the defendants for damages on account of certain slanderous words uttered by the defendant Camp, the agent or servant of the defendants Ransom and Hendrix, who were receivers for the Hurt Building in the city of Atlanta. There was an order permitting such receivers to be sued in Fulton superior court. From the petition, as finally amended, and the demurrers, the following facts substantially appear:

Camp was in charge of an office building under control of the other defendants, as receivers. There had been an order of court that no peddling or canvassing of the tenants of the building should be permitted. Camp had been apprised of this order and requested to enforce it. Plaintiff came into the lobby of the building. There were a number of people waiting for the elevator. Plaintiff was stopped by Camp, who stated "I have a right to stop anybody I please, especially a suspicious character like you are, knowing you have been selling stuff here for six or eight years and I am going to watch you very closely, and if you are not careful I will get you yet and we will send you down to the jail and you will sure have to work down there." Camp then called to a policeman and further stated to plaintiff: "I have a right to send you down; I may do it yet. If any of them upstairs call up and say you are there, I am going to send you down." Said statements were made in the presence of a number of people and greatly humiliated and embarrassed plaintiff, and the words, "I have a right to send you down," made in the presence of a policeman and of others, imputed to plaintiff the commission of a crime. It is alleged that Camp in so using said words was authorized so to do by the receivers. The plaintiff alleged that he was lawfully in the lobby of the building to see a friend of his to arrange a business engagement at his home. He alleged that said statements imputed to him a crime punishable by law, were made in reference to his trade, were calculated to injure him therein, and were damaging to him in that they caused him mental pain, humiliation, and embarrassment. Just what plaintiff's trade, business, or profession was is not stated nor how such words damaged or injured him in it is not alleged. By amendment plaintiff alleged that the statements were made by Camp falsely and maliciously, and that Camp called a policeman but did not actually have plaintiff arrested, and that the utterances in the presence of the people in the lobby greatly humiliated plaintiff. There were about twenty-five people present, whose names are unknown to plaintiff, but all of them heard the words used. The plaintiff further alleged that such words charged the imputation to him of a crime involving moral turpitude, to wit, larceny, and also illegal trespassing on property of the defendants. The plaintiff alleged that the Hurt Building was a public place and that the policeman was an officer of the city of Atlanta and was in uniform. The plaintiff alleged that the words were authorized by the receivers and were within the scope and authority of Camp, and that such use of these words was under the direction of the receivers. Such words, so used, plaintiff charged, were calculated to create a suspicion in the minds of those who heard them and cause such persons to distrust plaintiff, and thus injured plaintiff in his occupation as a salesman to the extent of $5,000. The plaintiff charged that such words were uttered by Camp while he was handling the elevator service therein, and were uttered for the benefit of the receivers. The plaintiff did not allege any special damage, but sought the recovery of general damages alone. The action was generally and specially demurred to by all the defendants separately. The court sustained the demurrers, providing in his order that "plaintiff is given ten days to amend the special demurrers." Plaintiff filed an amendment within the time and defendants again demurred generally and specially. The judge then passed an order sustaining all of the demurrers of all the defendants, holding that the plaintiff had not sufficiently amended the petition in compliance with the first order, which was the law of the case. The bill of exceptions is brought to review this latter judgment.

"Slander or oral defamation, consists, first, in imputing to another a crime punishable by law; or, second, charging him with having some contagious disorder, or being guilty of some debasing act which may exclude him from society; or, third, in charges made against another in reference to his trade, office, or profession, calculated to injure him therein; or, fourth, any disparaging words productive of special damage flowing naturally therefrom. In the last case, the special damage is essential to support the action; in the first three, damage is inferred." Code 1933, § 105-702. Plaintiff alleges that the words uttered by Camp, as agent, or servant of the receivers, within the scope of his employment and at their instance and direction, imputed to him the crime of larceny. In short, plaintiff specifically alleges that the use of the language, "'I have a right to send you down,' made in the presence of a policeman, in the presence of other people, imputed to" him the commission of a crime, and "that the words used were calculated to impute to plaintiff the crime of larceny which involves moral turpitude, and of illegal trespassing." Did the words above quoted impute to the plaintiff the commission of a crime, the crime of larceny? There are...