Christian v. State
Citation | 405 Md. 306,951 A.2d 832 |
Decision Date | 30 June 2008 |
Docket Number | No. 26 September Term, 2005.,No. 95 September Term, 2005.,26 September Term, 2005.,95 September Term, 2005. |
Parties | Daniel M. CHRISTIAN v. STATE of Maryland. Kalilah Romika Stevenson v. State of Maryland. |
Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Martha Weisheit, Mark Colvin, Assistant Public Defenders (Nancy S. Forster, Public Defender, on the brief), Baltimore, for petitioner.
Brian S. Kleinbord, Jeremy M. McCoy, Assistant Attorney Generals (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland, on the brief), Baltimore, for respondent.
Argued before BELL, C.J., RAKER,* WILNER,* CATHELL,* HARRELL, BATTAGLIA and GREENE, JJ.
In Christian v. State and Stevenson v. State, these consolidated cases, we must determine whether certain mitigation defenses, applied thus far only to homicide offenses and assault with intent to murder may now be applied to first degree assault. See Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27 § 12A.1 Daniel Christian contends that his first degree assault conviction should be mitigated to a second degree assault conviction based on the doctrine of imperfect self-defense. Kalilah Romika Stevenson similarly argues that her conviction for first degree assault should be mitigated to second degree assault based on hot-blooded response to adequate provocation. We shall hold that the mitigation defense of hot-blooded response to adequate provocation as well as the common law doctrine of imperfect self-defense can apply to the crime of first degree assault.
Petitioner Daniel Christian was charged with first degree assault, carrying a deadly weapon, and related charges in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. Petitioner was tried by jury for the assault and deadly weapon charges on October 3, 2002.2 The charges arose out of a confrontation instigated by Raynard Moulden, the victim, who suspected that Christian had become involved with Moulden's girlfriend. A confrontation involving these three people occurred in a mall parking lot. According to Moulden, he verbally accused the petitioner of sleeping with his girlfriend, and turned to "nudge" his girlfriend, whereupon the petitioner attacked him. Christian claimed, to the contrary, that Moulden "shoved" the girlfriend in the face, and that as Christian walked away from Moulden to avoid confrontation, Moulden ran up as if he was going to tackle petitioner. Christian said that he stabbed Moulden to defend himself. The girlfriend's statement to the police immediately following the incident largely corroborated petitioner's story; at trial, however, her testimony corroborated Moulden's version of events.
At trial, petitioner requested a jury instruction on imperfect self-defense as a defense to the first degree assault charge. The court denied this request. The jury convicted petitioner of first degree assault, second degree assault, and carrying a dangerous and deadly weapon openly with the intent to injure, and the court sentenced him to a term of incarceration for ten years for first degree assault. The remaining convictions merged for sentencing purposes. Petitioner noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. Before that court, he argued that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on imperfect self-defense with respect to the charge of first degree assault. The Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported opinion, rejected petitioner's argument, stating as follows:
This Court granted certiorari to consider whether, in light of the 1996 assault statutes and the recognition of first degree assault as a proper foundation for felony murder in Roary v. State, 385 Md. 217, 867 A.2d 1095 (2005), this Court should now recognize imperfect self-defense as a defense to first degree assault. Christian v. State, 387 Md. 465, 875 A.2d 769 (2005).
No. 95 Stevenson v. State
Petitioner Kalilah Romika Stevenson was charged with first degree assault and related charges in the Circuit Court for Wicomico County. Petitioner proceeded to trial before a jury. The charges arose out of a violent confrontation between petitioner and her husband, Antonio Corbin, on September 3, 2003. The parties had separated and were living apart at the time that the incident occurred. Corbin had taken their daughter to the emergency room when she fell ill, and Stevenson arrived separately to complain that Corbin should not have taken the daughter to be treated without first calling the daughter's doctor, as Stevenson's insurance required. They fought openly, and Corbin eventually left the hospital with his girlfriend, returning to his home in Salisbury, Maryland, where he resided with his mother.
Shortly thereafter, Stevenson arrived at Corbin's home to retrieve her daughter's book bag, and she began arguing with Corbin's mother. Corbin's testimony and Stevenson's testimony at trial presented conflicting versions of the events. Corbin testified that he intervened and began arguing with Stevenson, and that they were "pushing each other back and forth," and he tried to push her out of the house to calm her and his mother down. He said that he was walking out the back door when Stevenson took a butcher knife from the kitchen and stabbed him twice in his left forearm. He denied threatening Stevenson or approaching her in a threatening manner.
By contrast, Stevenson testified that when she attempted to retrieve her daughter's book bag, Corbin's mother pulled a gun on Stevenson. As she pushed the gun away, she claimed Corbin punched her and kept beating her until she found herself in the kitchen. There, she spotted the backpack, grabbed it and ran to her car. Stevenson testified that she did not grab a knife or stab Corbin. Stevenson testified that she was in fear for her life and stated that she had called the police and filed assault charges against Corbin on multiple prior occasions.
The trial court instructed the jury on self-defense, but denied petitioner's request that the jury be instructed on the mitigation defense of hot-blooded response to mutual combat, a form of legally adequate provocation, because the trial court found that the defense was inapplicable to first degree assault. The jury found petitioner guilty of first degree assault, second degree assault, reckless endangerment, and malicious destruction of property, and the court sentenced her to a term of incarceration of ten years for first degree assault and merged the remaining convictions.
Petitioner noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, raising the issue of the court's refusal to grant the jury instruction on hot-blooded response to adequate provocation. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the conviction, reasoning that since assault was not a "shadow offense" of murder, the mitigation defense of hot-blooded response to adequate provocation was inapplicable. Stevenson v. State, 163 Md.App. 691, 696, 882 A.2d 323, 326 (2005). The Court of Special Appeals, however, stated as follows:
Id. at 693, 882 A.2d at 324-25 (footnote omitted).
We granted certiorari to address whether the mitigation defense of hot-blooded response to mutual combat could apply to the crime of first degree assault. Stevenson v. State, 390 Md. 90, 887 A.2d 655 (2005).
Stevenson and Christian offer three basic arguments in favor of applying mitigation defenses to the crime of first degree assault to second degree assault. First, they argue that, in light of the recodification of the assault statutes in 1996, we should now recognize that imperfect self-defense may mitigate first degree assault. Petitioners contend that first degree assault is the equivalent of the former crime of assault with intent to murder, or that the intent to cause serious physical injury now supplies sufficient malice to recognize first degree assault as a shadow form of homicide. Second, petitioners note that, based on Roary v. State, 385 Md. 217, 867 A.2d 1095 (2005), first degree assault now serves as a predicate crime for felony murder, and as such, mitigation defenses should apply. Finally, petitioners argue that allowing the defenses would eliminate an anomaly in Maryland law, whereby a defendant whose victim dies may be sentenced to less time than a defendant whose victim lives. Petitioners cite to other states that allow for the mitigation of first degree assault.3
By contrast, the State argues that the question in this case is controlled by Richmond v. State, 330 Md. 223, 623 A.2d 630 (1993), where, prior to the 1996 statutes, we declined to expand the availability of mitigation defenses beyond assault with intent to murder. The State contends that the new statutes place the former crime of assault with intent to murder outside the scope of first degree assault, into the newly codified offense of attempted murder....
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