Christian v. Stith Coal Co.
| Decision Date | 07 November 1914 |
| Docket Number | 479 |
| Parties | CHRISTIAN v. STITH COAL CO. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Walker County; J.J. Curtis, Judge.
Action by Wiley Christian against the Stith Coal Company. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.
F.A Gamble and Norman Gunn, both of Jasper, for appellant.
Bankhead & Bankhead, of Jasper, for appellee.
The appellant instituted this action to recover damages for the alleged breach of a contract to mine coal on the property of the defendant, appellee. The court gave the affirmative charge for the defendant, and so, it is asserted, upon the theory that the engagement shown by the evidence established an agreement to mine coal on defendant's property, but that its obligation was determinable at the will of either party. The agreement set forth in the evidence was not in writing; and its terms and purport, taking the view most favorable to the plaintiff, are to be ascertained from the testimony in the case, namely, that of the plaintiff. It is not practicable to undertake the statement of all the evidence relating to the elements of the agreement. Our conclusions, deduced from the undisputed evidence, lead to the application to this agreement of the doctrine of Lambie v. Sloss, I. & S. Co., 118 Ala. 427, 433-436 24 So. 108.
The agreement (we may assume for present purposes of review) gave to plaintiff the right to mine, for the stipulated sum per ton, all the coal in a definite area in one of defendant's mine entries; but no provision was made in the agreement for the time or period in or during which the right (assumed for the occasion) to mine the coal was assured the plaintiff. Indeed, the evidence of the plaintiff shows without dispute, that the actual right of plaintiff to mine the coal depended upon the condition whether the mine was operated by the defendant; the plaintiff affirming, both in his testimony and in recital of his acts in this very relation, that this right to actually mine and avail of this agreement was subject to defendant's right, unrestricted and unrestrained by anything in the contract, to determine when the mine should be operated. If, as the testimony shows the defendant might, without breach of any obligation of the agreement, suspend the operation of the mine and thereupon suspend plaintiff's right to mine the coal in the area in question, it is clear, as pointed out in ...
To continue reading
Request your trial