Christian v. Waialua Agricultural Co.

• Decision Date: 01 February 1938
• Docket Number: No. 8329.,8329.
• Citation: 94 F.2d 806
• Parties: CHRISTIAN v. WAIALUA AGRICULTURAL CO., Limited, et al. WAIALUA AGRICULTURAL CO., Limited, v. CHRISTIAN et al.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

94 F.2d 806 (1938)

CHRISTIAN v. WAIALUA AGRICULTURAL CO., Limited, et al.

WAIALUA AGRICULTURAL CO., Limited, v. CHRISTIAN et al.

No. 8329.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

February 1, 1938.

Charles M. Hite, of Honolulu, T. H., and Sloss, Turner & Finney, M. C. Sloss, E. D. Turner, Jr., and Charles E. Finney, all of San Francisco, Cal. (Sloss, Turner & Finney, of San Francisco, Cal., of counsel), for appellant Christian.

Alfred L. Castle, of Honolulu, T. H., and Herman Phleger and Maurice E. Harrison, both of San Francisco, Cal. (Robertson, Castle & Anthony, of Honolulu, T. H., and Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, of San Francisco, Cal., of counsel), for cross-appellant Waialua Agr. Co.

Before WILBUR, GARRECHT, and HANEY, Circuit Judges.

HANEY, Circuit Judge.

A vigorous petition for rehearing has been filed. We deem it advisable to discuss only a few of the points presented therein.

First. We held that "contracts made by an incompetent are void because an incompetent is incapable of giving the required assent thereto." We further held that a grant of relief against a contract does not follow a mere showing that the contract is void, and that "the situation of the parties is the controlling factor" in determining whether relief should or should not be granted. Heretofore, the majority of the courts have reached the same result on the ground that an incompetent person's contract is voidable. We were, and are, unwilling to accept that reasoning because, we believe, an incompetent person "is incapable of giving the required assent." Under such circumstances it is inconsistent to say that an incompetent at one time could give or manifest the required assent, and later at his request say that he could not. Such inconsistency does not appear, when we consider such a contract as invalid, and determine whether relief will be granted by the position of the parties as explained in the opinion.

In this connection, we neither said nor implied that we reached that conclusion on the theory that "a contract is the meeting of the minds," in a strict sense, as the company seems to suggest. A manifestation of mutual assent is required, 1 Williston On Contracts, Rev.Ed. 25, § 18; 1 Restatement Of The Law Of Contracts 24, § 19, as we originally stated. If the assent is manifested by acts, those acts "must be done with the intent to do those acts." 1 Restatement, supra, 25, § 20. An intention is a determination of the mind. One without a mind cannot have an intention.

The company says great harm will result from the rule as announced by us. There are, however, two fallacies in its reasoning. In the first place, it fails to recognize what the rule is. It assumes that relief will be granted upon a showing of incompetency. Such is not the case. The record of land titles can be disturbed only upon proof of incompetency and of a position of parties which authorizes relief. Both are required. We stated in the original opinion the various situations when relief would or would not be granted. The company leaps to its conclusion upon consideration of part of the rule only.

In the second place, the rule has not the injurious results attributed to it. We have reached the same result or results reached by a great majority of the courts. It is true that we have reached that result on different reasoning, but the result is the same. It has already been pointed out why we did not adopt the reasoning of the majority of the courts.

Second. The company makes considerable argument regarding restitution. We used the term "status quo" in the sense that it meant restoration of what was received under the contract. 3 Black on Rescission...