Christiansen v. Strand
| Citation | 81 S.D. 187,132 N.W.2d 386 |
| Decision Date | 20 January 1965 |
| Docket Number | No. 10147,10147 |
| Parties | Helen CHRISTIANSEN, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Walter M. STRAND, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | Supreme Court of South Dakota |
George W. Wuest, Tinan, Carlson & Wuest, Mitchell, for defendant and appellant.
John W. Larson, Kennebec, for plaintiff and respondent.
Plaintiff and defendant are joint purchasers of a 5,125 acre ranch in Lyman County, South Dakota, under a contract for deed. The defendant defaulted in his payments thereunder. The plaintiff after making such payments on his behalf, pursuant to a prior agreement of the parties, brought this action to have defendant's interest under the contract impressed with an equitable lien in her favor and asking its foreclosure. From a judgment granting plaintiff the requested relief defendant appeals.
On August 23, 1958, the defendant had entered into a contract to purchase this ranch from the owner, Clarence Lindley, for a consideration of $153,750 to be paid in installments on March 1st of each year. On the execution of the contract he paid the down payment of $5,000 and on March 1, 1959, he paid the 1959 annual installment of $15,000 plus interest at 4% per annum on the unpaid balance. He failed to pay the installment due on March 1, 1960. With the contract in default, Lindley engaged counsel and took steps to foreclose it. In an effort to refinance the purchase, defendant and his counsel, not the one who now appears for him, entered into negotiations with the plaintiff.
On October 6, 1960 these culminated in an understanding between plaintiff and defendant under which plaintiff paid to Lindley the 1960 annual installment in default with interest amounting to $21,837.47. Their arrangement was that she would then have an interest in the purchase equal to his. Plaintiff also paid Lindley $1,000 for legal expenses incurred as a result of Strand's default and $1,900 to Lyman County, being the taxes then due on the property. In consideration of these payments Lindley entered into a new contract for the sale of the ranch property to plaintiff and defendant as purchasers, each to have an undivided one-half ownership thereof. The terms were the same as in the original contract and credit was given on the purchase price for the down payment and annual installments paid on the principal by the parties. These amounted to $35,000.
On the same day the parties entered into this writing prepared by defendant's counsel, which is in the record as Exhibit B:
'PLEDGE
'In consideration of amount paid for taxes for me on this date in the amount of $1,900.00 or thereabouts, and also $1000 additional on check to Clarence Lindley this date, I agree to repay to Helen Christiansen said sum of money, plus interest at the legal rate from this date until paid. It is also agreed that if I default in any payments due from me on the real estate contract with Lindley, for either principal or interest or insurance at any time, it is agreed that Helen Christiansen may pay the same, and I agree to repay her together with interest, and for the amounts so advanced by her she shall have a lien on my interest in the real estate covered by the real estate contract which may be enforced by the Courts. If she does advance such funds and I do not repay her by December 1st, 1961, she shall be entitled to possession of the property involved, and it is understood by December 1st, 1962 I will repay her any sums which she may have advanced, and as security for such payment I pledge my interest in the contract hereto attached and real estate therein described.
/s/ Walter M. Strand
/s/ Helen Christiansen'
The two amounts specified in this agreement were later repaid to plaintiff by the defendant. Apparently he paid the sums due from him under the contract for deed in 1961 including interest and taxes, but not for the years 1962 or 1963. As to the payments due in 1962 and 1963 plaintiff paid her share and also that of the defendant. They are the only payments involved in this action.
The court determined that by reason of these payments defendant owed plaintiff the sum of $20,148.23 together with interest. Judgment was entered for this amount. It also decreed that she had an equitable lien against his one-half interest in the contract for deed that they had with Lindley to secure the repayment of funds advanced by her in payment of the obligation imposed on him by the contract and authorized its foreclosure in the manner provided by SDC 1960 Supp.Ch. 37.33. Defendant does not question the court's determination of the amount he owed plaintiff, but he does challenge the propriety of impressing his interest under the contract with an equitable lien in her favor.
He contends that the equitable lien which he agreed to in Exhibit B is confined by the phrase 'if she does advance such funds and I do not repay her by December 1st, 1961'. He claims that this specific language limits the lien to payments which he was obligated to make prior to that date. These are the two amounts mentioned in the exhibit and the 1961 principal and interest payment--which he paid himself. From this basis he urges that no equitable lien could arise by reason of the 1962 and 1963 payments.
His position on this is that the general statement in Exhibit B 'that if I default in any payments due from me on the real estate contract with Lindley, for either principal or interest or insurance at any time, it is agreed that Helen Christiansen may pay the same, and I agree to repay her together with interest, and for the amounts so advanced by her she shall have a lien on my interest in the real estate covered by the real estate contract which may be enforced by the Courts' is limited by the specific provision above quoted. Over defendant's...
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Dail v. Vodicka
...purchase, parol evidence was admissible at trial to make clearer the intention of the parties to the agreements. In Christiansen v. Strand, 1965, 81 S.D. 187, 132 N.W.2d 386, through Judge Rentto, we 'With us the rule that parol or extrinsic evidence may not be admitted to vary the terms of......
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Carr v. Benike, Inc., 14633
...N.W.2d 809 [ (1971) ], parol evidence is admissible to explain a written contract that is uncertain or ambiguous. Christiansen v. Strand, 81 S.D. 187, 132 N.W.2d 386 [ (1965) ]; Eggers v. Eggers, 79 S.D. 233, 110 N.W.2d 339 [ (1961) A writing is ambiguous when it is reasonably capable of be......
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