Christianson v. Fayette R. Plumb, Inc.

CourtWashington Court of Appeals
Writing for the CourtWILLIAMS; HOROWITZ, C.J., and CALLOW
CitationChristianson v. Fayette R. Plumb, Inc., 499 P.2d 72, 7 Wn.App. 309 (Wash. App. 1972)
Decision Date17 July 1972
Docket NumberNo. 401,No. 798--I
PartiesHans L. CHRISTIANSON and Hans L. Christianson, Guardian ad Litem for Teddy V. Christianson, an infant, Appellants, v. FAYETTE R. PLUMB, INC., a Corporation, Respondent, Highline School District, a Municipal Corporation, et al., Defendants.

William E. Kuhn and William B. Moore, Seattle, for appellant.

Lee, Carney, Smart & Bever, Nelson T. Lee, Milton C. Smith, Seattle, for respondent.

WILLIAMS, Judge.

In this action, relief was sought for Teddy V. Christianson, a minor, for injury which he sustained when a fragment of metal struck his eye during a school class in shop. Initially, the defendants were Fayette R. Plumb, Inc., as manufacturer of a hammer which Teddy was using, Highline School District, as operator of the school which he was attending, and Mr. Inch, as supervisor of the class. Highline and Mr. Inch were dismissed without prejudice pursuant to a settlement agreement entitled 'covenant not to sue.' Plumb was then dismissed from the case by summary judgment on the theory that the release of one joint tort-feasor releases all. This appeal is from the judgment dismissing Plumb.

For the purposes of this review, the facts are these: Teddy was pounding a metal shovel with a hammer as a part of his class work. The hammer had been purchased by Highline for use in the class. Mr. Inch was the teacher. A metal bit fragmented from the face of the hammer and struck one of Teddy's eyes, putting it out. The sole question presented is whether the covenant not to sue, 1 by which Highline and Mr. Inch were dismissed from the case upon payment of $37,500, served to release Plumb from liability. We agree with the trial court that the covenant not to sue was, in fact, a release which effectively discharged Highline and Mr. Inch from further liability. We hold, however, that the same instrument did not release Plumb.

The reason for the common-law rule that release of one joint tort-feasor releases all is to preclude double recovery. Also, as stated in Abb v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 28 Wash. 428, at 431, 68 P. 954, at 955, 92 Am.St.Rep. 864, 58 L.R.A. 293 (1902):

(i)t is, and has long been, a generally recognized rule that there is no line of separation between the liability of joint tort feasors. The tort is a thing integral and indivisible, and any claim for injuries arising therefrom runs through and embraces every part of the tort. The liability of one cannot be carried into any portion of the joint tort that is not followed by an equal liability of the other tort feasors. Each is liable for the whole, and the injured party may pursue one separately, or he may pursue all jointly, or any number jointly less than the whole number. This principle is discussed in Doremus v. Root, 23 Wash. 710, 63 P. 572, 54 L.R.A. 649, and Birkel v. Chandler, 26 Wash. 241, 66 P. 406.

In Young v. Dille, 127 Wash. 398, 404, 220 P. 782, 784 (1923), joint tort-feasors are defined as follows: 'To be joint tort-feasors the parties must either act together in committing the wrong, or their acts, if independent of each other, must unite in causing a single injury.'

Although the joint tort-feasor release rule is simple, perplexing problems have arisen relative to the rule in recent years largely because of the reluctance of courts to apply it strictly. Pellett v. Sonotone Corp., 26 Cal.2d 705, 160 P.2d 783, 160 A.L.R. 863 (1945). In Washington, as else-where, the release of one joint tort-feasor as defined in Young v. Dille, Supra, has not meant the release of the other tort-feasors in every instance. Furthermore, under certain circumstances--this case is an example--a covenant not to sue has been considered to be a release. See Haney v. Cheatham, 8 Wash.2d 310, 111 P.2d 1003 (1941); Sideris v. Northwest Bonded Escrows, Inc., 51 Wash.2d 851, 322 P.2d 349 (1958); Getzendaner v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 52 Wash.2d 61, 322 P.2d 1089 (1958); DeNike v. Mowery, 69 Wash.2d 357, 418 P.2d 1010 (1966); White Pass Co. v. St. John, 71 Wash.2d 156, 427 P.2d 398 (1967); Gosse v. Swedish Hosp., 4 Wash.App. 574, 483 P.2d 147 (1971); Litts v. Pierce County, 5 Wash.App. 531, 488 P.2d 785 (1971).

It is unnecessary to discuss these cases and the reasons for them because we deem it advisable to modify the joint tort-feasor release rule to conform to Restatement of Torts § 885 (1939), which is:

(1) A valid release of one tortfeasor from liability for a harm, given by the injured person, discharges all others liable for the same harm, unless the parties to the release agree that the release shall not discharge the others and, if the release is embodied in a document, unless such agreement appears in the document.

(2) A covenant not to sue one tortfeasor for a harm does not discharge any other liable for the harm.

(3) Payments made by one tortfeasor on account of a harm for which he and another are each liable, diminish the amount of the claim against the other whether or not it was so agreed at the time of payment and whether the payment was made before or after judgment; the extent of the diminution is the amount of the payment made, or a greater amount if so agreed between the payor and the injured person.

The basic principle of this Restatement rule is supported in Mills v. Inter Island Telephone Co., 68 Wash.2d 820, 829, 416 P.2d 115, 121 (1966), wherein the Supreme Court said:

The correct rule adopted by this court is that the distinction between a covenant not to sue and a release will be preserved according to the intention of the parties, unless the document is operative as a release because (1) a reasonably compensatory consideration has been paid by a codefendant (2) for the alleged tort (3) to (for the benefit of) the party plaintiff who gives the covenant not to sue.

Even before Mills, the Supreme Court recognized that one wrongdoer should fully compensate the claimant for his injury before the court dismissed other wrongdoers from the case. DeNike v. Mowery, supra. The court adopted the opinion of Derby v. Prewitt, 12 N.Y.2d 100, 236 N.Y.S.2d 953, 187 N.E.2d 556 (1963), in DeNike v. Mowery, supra, 69 Wash.2d at 369, 418 P.2d at 1018: 'that the decisive consideration is whether the settlement constituted, or was intended to constitute, full compensation for . . . injury and is a proper question for the trier of fact.' 2

The above-quoted rule of Mills was applied in Hargreaves v. American Flyers Airline Corp., 6 Wash.App. 508, 494 P.2d 229 (1972). There, the injured party was hit by an airplane propellor and made claim against the airline which owned the airplane and a baggage company serving it. The trial court, without evidence, decided that the $95,000 paid by the airline was reasonably compensatory consideration and held that the covenant not to sue was a release, not only of the airline, but the baggage company as well. Division one, panel two of the court of appeals reversed, holding that what is reasonably compensatory consideration under the rule stated in Mills is a question of fact. The cause was therefore remanded for a factual finding on the issue of whether or not the amount paid by the airline was reasonably compensatory. The opinion is not clear as to whether the trial court was required to make a factual finding as to the validity of the release (was the amount paid therefor reasonably compensatory) before permitting the claimant to proceed with his action.

Restatement of Torts § 885, above quoted, provides that the claimant may proceed against those defendants who are not parties to the release-type document, but that any amount paid by defendants who have settled shall be deducted from any judgment. Plumb, in its motion for summary judgment, requested this procedure as an alternative in the event that judgment was entered against it; and this request should have been granted.

Although it is contended that the adoption of the Restatement rule would permit a claimant to divide the defendants and conquer, that result is not likely under our rules of joinder, CR 19--22. Nor does it seem reasonable that a claimant would go to the trouble and expense of multiple trials in the hope of getting a high verdict in one of them. Rather, it would appear that such a procedure would foster settlements and reduce litigation.

The summary judgment of dismissal of Plumb is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

HOROWITZ, C.J., and CALLOW, J., concur.

APPENDIX

Covenant Not to Sue

THIS AGREEMENT made this 9th day of April, 1970, by and between HANS L. CHRISTIANSON, individually, HANS L. CHRISTIANSON, Guardian Ad litem of Teddy V. Christianson, an infant, and TEDDY V. CHRISTIANSON (all hereinafter called 'Christianson'), and HIGHLINE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 401, a municipal corporation (hereinafter called 'Highline'), and RICHARD INCH and JANE DOE INCH (hereinafter called 'Inch'):

WITNESSETH:

WHEREAS, Christianson has separate claims against Fayette R. Plumb, Inc. (hereinafter called 'Plumb'), Highline and Inch as a result of an accident wherein Teddy V. Christianson was severely and permanently injured; and,

...

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14 cases
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    • Washington Supreme Court
    • 11 February 1976
    ...373 P.2d 767 (1962); State ex rel. Chelan Elec. Co. v. Superior Court, 142 Wash. 270, 253 P. 115 (1927); Christianson v. Fayette R. Plumb, Inc., 7 Wash.App. 309, 499 P.2d 72 (1972). In none of these cases, however, does the court mention the issue of retroactivity, either as it applies to t......
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    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • 18 November 1976
    ...(1962); State ex rel. Chelan Elec. Co. v. Superior Ct., 142 Wash. 270, 253 P. 115, 58 A.L.R. 779 (1927); Christianson v. Fayette R. Plumb. Inc., 7 Wash.App. 309, 499 P.2d 72 (1972). See Tully v. State, 4 Wash.App. 720, 723, n. 2, 483 P.2d 1268 (1971); Hunter v. North Mason School Dist., 85 ......
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  • DeMaris v. Brown
    • United States
    • Washington Court of Appeals
    • 17 December 1980
    ...approach and an enunciation of the procedure to be followed in its implementation. Mills v. Inter Island Tel. Co., supra; Christianson v. Fayette R. Plumb, Inc., supra. The relevance to concurrent tort-feasors of the Mills, Christianson and Elliott decisions, as they relate to covenants not......
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    • United States
    • Washington State Bar Association Washington Appellate Practice Deskbook (WSBA) Table of Cases
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    • Washington State Bar Association Washington Appellate Practice Deskbook (WSBA) Chapter 15 Oral Argument
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