Christie v. Port of Olympia, 30150.
Citation | 179 P.2d 294,27 Wn.2d 534 |
Decision Date | 08 April 1947 |
Docket Number | 30150. |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Washington |
Parties | CHRISTIE v. PORT OF OLYMPLA et al. (INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S AND WAREHOUSEMEN'S UNION, Intervener). |
Action by Burke Christie, a taxpayer, against the Port of Olympia Peter G. Schmidt and others, as Commissioners of the Port of Olympia, to enjoin defendants from carrying into effect their resolution providing for payment of retroactive additional compensation, retroactive overtime compensation, and retroactive vacation pay to longshoremen, wherein the international longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union intervened. From a decree granting the injunction, the defendants and intervener appeal.
Reversed and cause dismissed.
Appeal from Superior Court, Thurston County; John M. Wilson, judge.
Leo Teats, of Tacoma, and George F. Yantis, of Olympia, for appellants.
Gladstein Andersen, Resner & Sawyer, of San Francisco, Cal., for intervener-appellant.
R. F Dotsch, of Olympia, and Ray Dumett and Tom M. Alderson, both of Seattle, for respondent.
Zabel, Poth & Paul and Bassett & Geisness, all of Seattle, amici curiae.
This appeal arises out of a controversy concerning longshoremen's wages. On the face of the pleadings, the action appears to be concerned with the claim of one man only. It is, however, a test suit, brought by a taxpayer, and similar claims of other workmen employed by the defendant port during that period may stand or fall as the result of the decision to be rendered herein. Furthermore, it is anticipated that the decision of certain of the legal questions raised in this case will, or at least may, determine similar wage claims of a great number of employees of the other public ports of the state. It is for that reason that the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union have intervened. Briefs have been filed on its part, and additional briefs by several amici curiae representing Washington locals of that organization. Two Seattle attorneys participated in the trial, one of whom, in stating their reasons for so doing, said:
(Italics ours.)
Plaintiff taxpayer prayed that the defendant Port Commissioners be permanently enjoined from carrying into effect the following resolution:
The material portion of the decree entered by the trial court and from which this appeal is taken reads as follows:
'Ordered, adjudged and decreed that the defendants, and each of them, be and they are hereby, permanently enjoined from further proceeding with or attempting to carry into effect either directly or indirectly, resolution No. 422 of the Port of Olympia, adopted July 18, 1946, either in whole or in part.' The representatives of the workmen insist that their clients are entitled to the so-called retroactive pay as a matter of common honesty. The Port of Olympia takes that position and, as we have seen, the representatives of the other public ports of the state recognize their moral obligations in the premises, but are apprehensive as to their power to discharge them. As was stated by one of respondent's attorneys at the beginning of the trial, the question raised in this case is one of power. The deal with it, we must first survey the factual background.
Although we may take judicial notice of certain relevant circumstances which are universally known, our factual sources are otherwise limited to such admissions as are made in the pleadings, and to a six-page transcript of stipulated facts, supplemented by some twenty pages of transcribed oral testimony given by Ernest C. Gribble, manager of the defendant port, and eleven pages of similar testimony given by Frank Andrews, a longshoreman by trade, now and for some years president of the local longshorement's union, as well as a member of the executive board of the International, and by virtue of such membership a member of its negotiating committee. There is no substantial conflict between the evidence given by Gribble, the manager of the port, and Andrews, the president of the local union, and no witnesses were called to rebut their testimony.
As declared in the act providing for the creation of port districts (Laws of 1911, chapter 92, p. 412, Rem.Rev.Stat. § 9688 et seq.), the purpose of the act was, and is, to provide suitable facilities for the transfer of goods from shore to ship, and from ship to shore. Such operations necessitate the employment of longshoremen and stevedores, a class of labor which not only requires men of strong physique, but in the case of foremen especially, men of experience and skill. For many years, such workmen have been organized into local unions, tightly woven into the structure of their parent body and rigidly responsive to its leadership. As a result, the employers of such labor also organized. We quote from the stipulation of facts:
'The Waterfront Employers Association of the Pacific Coast is a non-profit corporation of the State of California, herein called the 'Association,' and its membership includes all employers engaged in stevedoring and handling of cargoes at terminals at Pacific Coast ports exclusive of public port authorities, such as defendant Port of Olympia and certain other employers not here material.
It is reasonable to suppose that such a development of policy and practice was inevitable. The public ports, of necessity, would have to follow the lead of their vastly more numerous competitors, organized, as they were, into a great association, including all other employers, of longshoremen on the Pacific Coast. That the ports did so from 1934 on is agreed, and, even if it were not so agreed, the fact is established by the testimony of both Gribble and Andrews. The public ports, however, did not go so far as to enter into written contracts with the International. It appears that the defendant port, and the public ports generally, were doubtful as to their right to enter into such contracts with a labor union. We quote a portion of the testimony of Port Manager Gribble:
(Italics ours.)
At another point in giving his testimony, Mr. Gribble said that, at a meeting held by the public ports, the commissioners of several stated:
'* * * that they had received an opinion from their attorney that it was illegal for public ports even to sit in a labor relations committee meeting * * *,' and that he reported this to the Port of Olympia commission....
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