Christman v. Emineth

• Decision Date: 01 October 1973
• Docket Number: No. 8900,8900
• Citation: 70 A.L.R.3d 366,212 N.W.2d 543
• Parties: Carl T. CHRISTMAN, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Florian EMINETH et al., Defendants, The Federal Land Bank of Saint Paul, St.Paul, Minnesota, Defendant/Appellee. Civ.
• Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Page 543

212 N.W.2d 543

70 A.L.R.3d 366

Carl T. CHRISTMAN, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Florian EMINETH et al., Defendants, The Federal Land Bank of Saint Paul, St.Paul, Minnesota, Defendant/Appellee.

Civ. No. 8900.

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

Oct. 1, 1973.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 4, 1973.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The words 'all oil, gas and other minerals' in the deed in question are construed to include lignite coal.

2. Words used in any statute are to be understood in their ordinary sense, unless a contrary intention plainly appears. Section 1--02--02, N.D.C.C.

3. Words and phrases shall be construed according to the context and the rules of grammar and the approved usage of the language. Technical words and phrases and such others as have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law, or as are defined by statute, shall be construed according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning or definition. Section 1--02--03, N.D.C.C.

4. For reasons stated in the opinion, the excepting and reserving clause contained in the deed in question comes within Sections 47--10--21 and 47--10--22, N.D.C.C.

5. A law enacted by the Legislature is presumed to be constitutional, unless it is shown that it is manifestly violative of the organic law.

6. The courts will construe statutes so as to harmonize their provisions with the Constitution if it is possible to do so, to the end that they may be sustained.

7. Every presumption is in favor of the propriety and constitutionality of legislation, and improper motives in its enactment are never imputed to the Legislature.

8. Where a classification is reasonably necessary to effect the purpose of a law which is otherwise within the province of the Legislature to enact, the classification will not render the law repugnant to the Constitution.

9. State legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality.

10. A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.

11. Only invidious discrimination is prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

12. All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation. N.D.Constitution, Section 11.

13. No special privileges or immunities shall ever be granted which may not be altered, revoked or repealed by the legislative assembly; nor shall any citizen or class of citizens be granted privileges or immunities which upon the same terms shall not be granted to all citizens. N.D.Constitution, Section 20.

14. No state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. U.S.Constitution, Amendment XIV, Section 1.

15. Merely because a statute distinguishes between citizens or classes of citizens does not make it unconstitutional. If a classification is reasonably necessary to effect the purposes of a law which is otherwise within the province of the Legislature to enact, the classification will not render the law repugnant to the Constitution.

16. The classification must be one based upon some reasonable grounds, some difference which bears a just and proper relation to the attempted classification and is not a mere arbitrary selection.

17. Sections 11 and 20 of the North Dakota Constitution and Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution do not prohibit or prevent classification, provided such classification is reasonable for the purpose of legislation, is based on proper and justifiable distinctions considering the purpose of the law, is not clearly arbitrary, and is not a subterfuge to shield one class or to burden another or to oppress unlawfully in its administration.

18. A proper classification for legislative purposes must embrace all who naturally belong to the class.

19. Legislation cannot arbitrarily divide a class into two parts and constitute a different rule of law governing each of the parts.

20. As there is no reasonable basis for requiring that the nature, length, width and thickness of coal reservations be described in a deed when such a description is not required in grants of coal, the classification inherent in Sections 47--10--21 and 47--10--22, N.D.C.C., is unreasonable and the discrimination resulting therefrom is invidious. Those sections are therefore unconstitutional, being in violation of the equal protection clauses of Section 20 of the Constitution of North Dakota and Amendment Fourteen, Section 1, of the Constitution of the United States.

Harvey J. Miller, Dickinson, and Sperry & Schultz, Bismarck, for plaintiff/appellant.

Pearce, Anderson, Pearce, Thames & Pearce, Bismarck, for defendant/appellee.

Conmy, Feste, DeMars & Bossart, Fargo, amicus curiae on behalf of Burlington-Northern.

E. J. Rose, Bismarck, amicus curiae.

ERICKSTAD, Chief Justice.

The plaintiff, Carl T. Christman, appeals from a judgment of the district court of Morton County which held that the defendant, The Federal Land Bank of Saint Paul, was the holder of fee simple title to fifty per cent of all the oil, gas and other minerals, including lignite coal, in or under certain lands situated in Oliver County, North Dakota, together with the right to enter upon the surface of the land to explore for and remove said minerals.

On September 7, 1940, The Federal Land Bank of Saint Paul acquired title to the N 1/2 of Section 33 and the SW 1/4 and SW 1/4 NW 1/4 of Section 34, in Township 142 North, Range 83 West, in Oliver County, North Dakota, through a sheriff's deed issued by the sheriff of Oliver County upon a foreclosure of a mortgage. The deed was duly recorded.

On October 19, 1940, The Federal Land Bank sold said lands to Florian Emineth and Magdalena Emineth under contract for deed for the sum of $3,200.

On October 22, 1943, pursuant to said contract for deed, The Federal Land Bank, as grantor, executed and delivered to Florian and Magdalena Emineth its limited warranty deed, which was duly filed and recorded. Said deed contained the following clause:

'Excepting and reserving to the party of the first part and its successors and assigns fifty per cent of all right and title in and to any and all oil, gas and other minerals in or under the foregoing described land with such easement for ingress, egress and use of surface as may be incidental or necessary to use of such rights.'

On January 7, 1954, Florian and Magdalena Emineth executed and delivered a warranty deed to Conrad B. Miller and Lora B. Miller which was duly filed in the office of the register of deeds. Said deed contained the following clause:

'Excepting therefrom and reserving to the grantors an undivided one-half interest in all oil, gas and other minerals of every kind, nature or description in, upon and under all of said lands and now owned by the grantors or either of them, and reserving to the grantors an easement for ingress to and egress from said lands and such use of the surface thereof as may be incidental or necessary to the use of such oil, gas and other mineral rights * * *'

On November 19, 1964, The Federal Land Bank filed a notice of claim to 'an undivided 50% Interest to all right, title and interest in and to all minerals, in, on, or under the surface of said * * * land', which was duly recorded.

On October 4, 1966, Conrad B. Miller, a widower, executed and delivered a warranty deed to Carl T. Christman conveying said lands to him. This deed was filed and duly recorded. It contained a clause saying the conveyance was 'subject to all reservations and exceptions of record.'

On September 30, 1968, Mr. Christman brought an action to quiet title to the N 1/2 of Section 33, and the SW 1/4 and SW 1/4 NW 1/4 of Section 34, all in Township 142 North, Range 83 West, Oliver County, North Dakota. The action was transferred from Oliver County to Morton County for the purpose of trial only.

Joined as defendants were: Florian Emineth and Magdalena Emineth; William M. Mutz and William K. Engelter, claimants of a 1/8 interest in all oil, gas and other minerals pursuant to a mineral deed from Florian and Magdalena Emineth dated January 13, 1954; Minnkota Power Cooperative, Inc., the holder of a warranty deed from Carl Christman for 111.09 acres of the N 1/2 of Section 33, dated September 30, 1966; and The United States of America.

Due and legal service of process was made upon all of the defendants. The action against Minnkota Power Cooperative, Inc. was settled and dismissed, taking its 111.09 acres in the N 1/2 of Section 33 out of this case. The action against the United States of America was dismissed and The Federal Land Bank of Saint Paul was joined as a defendant. The remainder of the defendants defaulted, leaving The Federal Land Bank as the sole defendant.

Mr. Christman alleged that lignite coal was not a mineral and therefore was not included within the term 'other minerals' as used in the various deeds mentioned previously. He therefore asked that The Federal Land Bank's claim to the lignite coal in or under the land in question be adjudged null and void and that the (Christman) be adjudged the owner in fee simple of all the lignite coal found in or under the land.

Mr. Christman later amended his complaint to include the allegation that the exception and reservation of mineral rights in the transfer from The Federal Land Bank to the Emineths in 1943 did not recite a reservation to said grantor of the coal deposits in said property and did not contain an accurate description of any coal reserved to grantor, its nature, length, width and thickness, all as required by Sections 47--10--21 and 47--10--22 of the North Dakota Century Code.

In addition to a general denial, The Federal Land Bank answered by alleging:

(1) That lignite coal is a mineral, and as such it is included in the exception...