Christonson v. U.S.
| Decision Date | 15 February 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:05-CV-00145-MHW.,1:05-CV-00145-MHW. |
| Citation | 415 F.Supp.2d 1186 |
| Parties | M.R. CHRISTONSON, et al., Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES of America, et al., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Idaho |
M.R. Christonson, Boise, ID, pro se.
Christian Lundahl, Lehi, UT, pro se.
H.T. Lundahl, Lehi, UT, pro se.
K. Pontious, Malad City, ID, pro se.
Mari Galhardo, Evanston, WY, pro se.
Nellie Russo, Las Vegas, NV, pro se.
Robert C. Grisham, US Attorney's Office, James D. Lame, Joshua S. Evett, Elam & Burke, Jason D. Scott, Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, Christopher C. Burke, Greener Banducci Shoemaker P.A., Kevin J. Scanlan, Hall Farley Oberrecht & Blanton, Boise, ID, for Defendant.
Plaintiffs filed their voluminous First Amended Complaint pro se ("Complaint") against a litany of defendants, including several appellate, district and magistrate judges sitting in the District of Utah and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, Senator Orrin Hatch, and various title insurance companies, law firms, as well as other private defendants (collectively "Defendants"). The Complaint alleges causes of action ranging from civil rights claims under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971) to violations of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1601, et seq. to state law tort claims. Each group of Defendants has filed a motion to dismiss, all of which are currently pending before the Court.1
This case stands in a series of cases filed by Holli Lundahl ("Lundahl") and other plaintiffs (collectively "Plaintiffs") that relate to Lundahl's purchase of land in Temecula, California in 1991 and its subsequent foreclosure in 1994. In the decade that followed the foreclosure, Ms. Lundahl instituted several cases in state and federal courts in California, Utah, Wyoming, and Idaho, against various persons, governmental entities, judges, lawyers, title companies, and insurance companies. These parties have been required to defend themselves in these actions, expending tremendous resources, including all of the attendant attorney fees and costs, as well as the expenditure of their time. From the record before this Court, it is apparent that Ms. Lundahl has used the state and federal judicial systems to terrorize those she perceives to have conspired against her.
Lundahl purchased the California property with the intention of building a "showroom for state of the art physical therapy equipment" and to install steel storage facilities that would "house" the physical therapy equipment and other medical supplies until it could be distributed to various medical vendors. Plaintiffs assert they also intended to build a 25,000 square foot veterinary clinic to service the "equestrian `thoroughbred' estates surrounding the `high end' commercial property." Id. During the interim period while Lundahl attempted to launch her new business venture, Lundahl placed a motor home on the property, which she and others occupied at different times.
Plaintiffs allege that Paula Compton, the mother of Defendant Jeffrey Compton ("Compton"), held the deed of trust to the California property in the amount of $101,000 when the property was purchased. According to Plaintiffs, Lundahl paid $81,500 on the note. In 1992, Jeffrey Compton became the holder of the deed of trust. Plaintiffs allege that a dispute arose between Paula Compton and Lundahl as to the amount remaining on the note; the dispute was allegedly resolved in Lundahl's favor after a state court proceeding. Plaintiffs further assert that Jeffrey Compton became enraged after the Court issued an order in Lundahl's favor "because of [Jeffrey Compton's] scheme to steal the improved property by unlawful foreclosure." (Complaint, ¶ 15). Plaintiffs assert Compton's rage caused him to "wield[ ] a shotgun and commence[ ] shooting at the storage facilities thus far erected, the electrical lines and the gas tank to the expensive 40 foot motor home" on July 18, 1993. (Complaint, ¶ 15). As a result of the damage caused by the alleged shooting incident, Holli and Christian Lundahl supposedly filed insurance claims with their carriers, asking for reimbursement costs for the property damage and for legal representation to "go after" Jeffrey Compton. These claims were denied.
In response, to Plaintiffs' allegations, Compton maintains that he was skeet shooting when his bullets hit the motor home. Compton further alleges Lundahl failed to pay the state property taxes on the California property for nearly five years and that Lundahl was also several months behind in her payments to Compton. Compton apparently paid the delinquent property taxes rather than allowing the property to be sold by the state to satisfy the tax liability. Compton requested that Lundahl become current on her debt, but Lundahl allegedly failed to make the payments. After Lundahl's allegedly repeated failure to make payments, Compton instructed his attorney, Defendant Stephen Wheeler ("Wheeler"), to foreclose on the property. In compliance with this request, Wheeler arranged a public trustees sale that was held on October 17, 1994. Lundahl and the other plaintiffs claim the non-judicial foreclosure was improper and amounted to the "theft" of Lundahl's property. And so the litigation campaign began.
Before the sale was effectuated in 1994, it is the Court's understanding that Lundahl filed her first case in a California state court against Compton and a variety of other defendants, including the County of Riverside. Specifically, Lundahl sought relief for alleged RICO violations, assault, battery, and fraud. Lundahl also sought to enjoin the pending foreclosure proceedings that had been initiated against the California property. The California state court found that the property had been transferred to a bona fide purchaser, and thus denied as moot the motion for an injunction. The entire action was dismissed without prejudice. Lundahl appealed the decision to the appellate court, which affirmed the lower court's decision.
In order to recover money damages for the purportedly wrongful foreclosure by the Compton and Wheeler Defendants and to recover compensation from the various insurance companies for failure to provide coverage for these claims, Plaintiffs filed an action in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California against a variety of defendants including the insurance companies, a pharmaceutical company, and other private and public entities, alleging the defendants were engaged in a massive conspiracy against them. The complaint included claims for fraudulent conveyance, malicious prosecution, fiduciary fraud, abuse of process, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and malicious interference with contract and prospective economic advantage. This action was dismissed without prejudice in December of 1998.
The fact the California cases had been dismissed did not deter Lundahl and the other Plaintiffs. On January 14, 1999, Plaintiffs re-filed their complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah, asserting essentially the same claims that had been raised in California. Lundahl and the Utah plaintiffs also included allegations that numerous California state officials, in collusion with several private individuals and entities, had unfairly and in violation of their rights, thwarted their previous litigation efforts in California. On October 19, 2001, the Utah case was dismissed. Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration was summarily denied on November 26, 2001.
Failing yet again at the district court level, Lundahl and the Utah plaintiffs appealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Each Utah plaintiff attempted to filed a separate brief. In response, the Tenth Circuit ordered Plaintiffs to file a joint brief limited to 30 pages. On July 16, 2002, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the Utah plaintiffs' appeal for failure to prosecute, but allowed the plaintiffs to re-instate their appeal if an amended joint brief limited to 30 pages accompanied the petition to reinstate the appeal.2 Instead, the Utah plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, which was denied on May 5, 2003.
Their claims rejected in all of these courts, Plaintiffs, with Lundahl as their apparent leader, turned to Idaho and the District of Wyoming, filing claims alleging RICO violations, unlawful debt collection practices, abuse of process, fiduciary fraud, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, unlawful business practices, defamation, tortious interference with prospective contracts, economic advantage, and business relations, and pre and post-judgment interest. The complaint filed on April 15, 2005 in the United States District Court, District of Wyoming, Case No. CIV 05-00118—WFD was dismissed after Lundahl failed to pay her filing fee. As Lundahl paid her filing fee in the present case, the Court is confronted with nine motions to dismiss.3 With this as the background the Court will turn to the various motions pending before the Court.
Generally, the Court may not consider any material beyond the pleadings in ruling on a motion to dismiss under Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453 (9th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1219, 114 S.Ct. 2704, 129 L.Ed.2d 832 (1994). Furthermore, if a Rule 12(b)(6) motion raises "matters outside the pleading" and these matters are "presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56." Id. at 453. In this instance, numerous affidavits and declarations have...
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