Christoph v. City of Chilton (In re Christoph)

• Decision Date: 12 June 1931
• Parties: IN RE CHRISTOPH ET AL. CHRISTOPH ET AL. v. CITY OF CHILTON.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

205 Wis. 418

237 N.W. 134

IN RE CHRISTOPH ET AL.^a1CHRISTOPH ET AL.

v.CITY OF CHILTON.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

June 12, 1931.

Appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Calumet County; Edgar V. Werner, Circuit Judge.

In the matter of the petition of Theodore Christoph and others for detachment of certain lands from the City of Chilton. From a judgment dismissing the petition, petitioners appeal.--[By Editorial Staff.]

Affirmed.

This action was commenced on the 19th day of May, 1930, by Theodore Christoph and numerous other owners of agricultural lands lying within the limits of the city of Chilton, by filing a verified petition with the clerk of the circuit court for Calumet county, requesting that certain lands belonging to them aggregating 1,457.77 acres in area be detached from the city of Chilton and attached to the towns of Chilton and Charlestown, in said county, all pursuant to the provisions of section 62.075, as enacted by chapter 353 of the Laws of 1929. From a judgment entered on the 3d day of September, 1930, declaring said act unconstitutional and dismissing the petition, the petitioners appealed.

OWEN, FRITZ, and WICKHEM, JJ., dissenting.

Fox & Fox, of Chilton, for appellants.

George M. Goggins, of Chilton, and Robert M. Rieser, of Madison (Olin & Butler, of Madison, of counsel), for respondent.

NELSON, J.

So much of section 62.075 as is material to an understanding of this controversy is as follows: “ Cities, Detachment of Farm Lands. (1) When land used for agricultural purposes of an area of two hundred acres or more contiguous to the boundary of any city of the fourth class, whether of one or more farms, which shall have been within the corporate limits of such city for twenty years or more, and during all of said time shall have been used for agricultural purposes, the circuit court of the county in which such land is situated shall enter judgment detaching such land from such city and annexing it to an adjoining town or towns, and such detachment and annexation thereof shall become effective for all purposes on the first day of January next thereafter.” The city of Chilton is a city of the fourth class. No question is raised as to the correctness of the procedure or as to the lands being contiguous to the boundary and having been used for agricultural purposes for twenty years or more while within the corporate limits of the city of Chilton. The only question therefore which requires consideration is whether chapter 353 of the Laws of 1929 violates sections 1 and 22 of article 1 of the Constitution of the state of Wisconsin and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The court below held that this law is unconstitutional, void, and of no effect.

[1] In view of the provisions of both the Constitutions of the state of Wisconsin and of the United States, and in view of the very spirit of our governmental institutions, it seems clear to us that this law violates both the uniformity and equality provisions of our Constitutions, and is void, because based on a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable.

A careful analysis of this law shows that it is applicable only to 200 acres or more of agricultural lands, contiguous to the boundary, within the limits of cities of the fourth class, which have been within the corporate limits of such cities for twenty years or more and have been used during all of that time for agricultural purposes. It clearly applies to agricultural lands within cities of the fourth class and to nothing else.

The specific purpose which the Legislature had in mind in enacting this law is not stated in the law itself, but it is perfectly obvious that the only purpose of the law is to relieve agricultural lands located within cities of the fourth class from the burdens of city taxation. That such was the purpose of the act gives rise to no question. Such purpose is conceded by both petitioners and respondent.

The effect of this law is to grant to owners of 200 acres or more of agricultural lands located in cities of the fourth class the right or privilege to secede or to become detached from such cities, which right or privilege is denied to the owners of lands of like character, area, and location situated in cities of the first, second, or third classes.

[2][3][4] May the Legislature arbitrarily enact a law applicable to a class to whom is granted special privileges while denying the same rights to others who are in all respects similarly situated? That the Legislature may make classifications of persons, occupations, or industries and select them for special regulation, if there are reasonable and proper economic, political, or social reasons for so doing is well established. State ex rel. Milwaukee S. & I. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 174 Wis. 458, 183 N. W. 687;State v. Whitcom, 122 Wis. 110, 99 N. W. 468. But classifications of persons or property must be based upon reasonable differences or distinctions which distinguish the members of one class from those of another in respects germane to some general and public purpose or object of the particular legislation. State ex rel. Milwaukee S. & I. Co. v. Railroad Commission, supra. While the Legislature, in proper cases, clearly has the right to classify persons, property, occupations, or industries, it must always be borne in mind that the equal protection of the laws is guaranteed, and that, if any classification made by a statute grants to one class rights or privileges which are denied to another class under the same or substantially similar conditions, it offends against the principle of equal protection of the law. As was held in Wisconsin Association of Master Bakers v. Weigle, 167 Wis. 569, 168 N. W. 383, the uniformity and equality rule of the Constitution permits separation into classes if they have characteristics legitimately distinguishing the members of one class from another in respects germane to some public purpose.

That both the Constitutions of the state of Wisconsin and of the United States condemn laws which grant special privileges to a favored class, cannot be doubted. That the very spirit of our institutions is against the granting of special privileges to a favored class is indeed elementary. As was said in Black v. State, 113 Wis. 205, page 218, 89 N. W. 522, 527, 90 Am. St. Rep. 853: “The emphatic protest against special privileges to any favored person or class of persons may be found in varying terms in all of our constitutions. Our fathers came here to escape the reign of privilege, and they made equality before the law the very corner stone of their plan of government. In our own constitution it is thus expressed, in section 1, art. 1: ‘All men are born equally free and independent and have certain inherent rights, among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.’ This may be said to be somewhat vague and general,--somewhat in the nature of a rhetorical flourish; but when it is said that all men equally free have the inherent rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, it is certain that it is not meant that some have or may have greater privileges before the law than others. The phrase must mean equality before the law, if it means anything. The idea is expressed more happily in the fourteenth amendment, where it is said that no state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the ‘equal protection of the law.’ * * * There may, indeed, be classification; and if the classification be founded upon real differences, affording rational grounds for a distinction, such classification will not violate the rule of uniformity and equality.”

As before stated, the clear effect of chapter 353 is to grant to owners of 200 acres or more of agricultural lands within cities of the fourth class, privileges of detachment which are denied to owners of similar lands located in cities of all other classes.

Is there a difference or distinction between agricultural lands located in cities of the fourth class and similar lands located in cities of other classes that is germane to the purpose of the law? We think not. Is there an economic distinction between agricultural lands located in cities of the fourth class and lands located in cities of the other classes? We can conceive of no proper or reasonable distinction which can operate as a basis for the classification attempted by this act. No possible distinction has been suggested by the petitioners except the one that agricultural lands located in the larger cities have market advantages which are superior to those enjoyed by owners of agricultural lands in cities of the fourth class, and that this claimed distinction alone affords a reason for permitting agricultural lands to be detached from cities of the fourth class, while requiring similar lands in cities of other classes to remain therein subject to the burdens of city taxation. As we view the matter, there is no economic difference between agricultural lands located in cities of the fourth class and similar lands located in cities of other classes that can operate as a reasonable basis for classification justifying the granting of privileges to those...