Christopher Lake Development Co. v. St. Louis County

• Decision Date: 14 November 1994
• Docket Number: No. 93-4080,93-4080
• Parties: CHRISTOPHER LAKE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY; J.H. Berra Construction Company, Inc.; Richard Piatchek; William G. Cocos, Jr., as the Partners in Christopher Lake Development Company, a Missouri General Partnership, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ST. LOUIS COUNTY, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 1269

35 F.3d 1269

CHRISTOPHER LAKE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY; J.H. Berra Construction Company, Inc.; Richard Piatchek; William G Cocos, Jr., as the Partners in Christopher Lake Development Company, a Missouri General Partnership, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ST. LOUIS COUNTY, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 93-4080.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

Submitted June 15, 1994.

Decided Sept. 23, 1994.

Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing

En Banc Denied Nov. 14, 1994.

Ross H. Briggs, St. Louis, MO, argued, for appellants.

Christopher J. McCarthy, Clayton, MO, argued, for appellee.

Before RICHARD SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Chief Judge, FLOYD R. GIBSON, Senior Circuit Judge, and WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

FLOYD R. GIBSON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Christopher Lake Development Company and its general partners (collectively the "Partnership") brought this 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 action against St. Louis County, challenging a land development specification. The Partnership alleged violations of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause, of the fourteenth and fifth amendments' due process clauses, and of state law. The district court dismissed the Partnership's "as applied" claims because they were not ripe for adjudication, dismissed the facial challenge for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and dismissed the pendent state claim. We reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual History

The Partnership purchased forty-two acres of property in St. Louis County for the development of two residential communities, Waterford Estates and Christopher Lake Estates. A portion of this land contained sink-holes, which are natural holes in the limestone that provide underground drainage for storm water. The County approved the Partnership's property for residential use and preliminarily approved it for "planned environmental units" or subdivisions. The County's preliminary approval was conditioned on its approval of the Partnership's site development plans. ¹

Before receiving site development approval, the County required the Partnership to make adequate provisions for the disposal of storm water. ² The County empowered the Department of Highways and Traffic (the "Department") to create specifications for the disposal of storm water. ³ The Department promulgated Design Criteria 5.800:

SINKHOLES.--The following shall be included and/or observed:

1. An Engineering Report shall be submitted indicating the existing sinkhole conditions, intended use and proposed treatment to be accomplished as part of the development.

2. A sinkhole can be used as a point of drainage, provided that an adequately sized outfall pipe is provided to an existing natural discharge point, such as a ditch, creek, river, etc.

3. Where required sinkholes within a development shall be treated by approved methods.

Id. (emphasis added).

The County's application of Design Criteria 5.800(2) (the "Criteria") required the Partnership to provide a drainage system from the sinkholes on its property to the sinkholes on neighboring properties, and eventually leading to a natural discharge point. In this case, the "natural discharge point" was the Meramec River. The Partnership complained that the Criteria's requirements of an "adequately sized outfall pipe" to a "natural discharge point" resulted in it being forced to purchase a drainage system for the entire watershed area. ⁴

The Partnership submitted site development plans for Waterford Estates and Christopher Lake Estates, but the County, through the Department, denied the plans for noncompliance with the Criteria. The Partnership then requested the County to grant hardship relief from the Criteria's requirements, and the County referred the matter to its Public Improvements Committee (the "PIC"). ⁵

At a hearing before the PIC on March 12, 1987, the Partnership suggested, among other proposed solutions to the drainage problem, ⁶ that it only be required to bear a proportionate share of the construction costs required by its compliance with the Criteria. At this hearing the Department Director stated, "[w]e're not asking [the Partnership] to bear the full cost. We're saying 'you bear the full cost upfront but you may recover.' ... [the Partnership] builds the system upfront and [it] deserves reimbursement from the others in this drainage area."

After the PIC hearing, the County approved the site development plan for Christopher Lake Estates and agreed to accept $27,600.00 ($4000 per acre) in escrow toward the future construction of a drainage system. The Partnership attempted to arrange a similar escrow account for Waterford Estates; however, the County declined to accept the funds and refused to approve the Waterford Estates' plan until the drainage system was completed. ⁷ Finally, in January 1988, the Partnership obtained the necessary easements from the neighboring land owners and constructed a $465,500 drainage system. After the construction was completed, the County approved the Waterford Estates site development plan.

B. Procedural History

The Partnership's first lawsuit against the County focused on three claims: (1) the County discriminated against the Partnership in violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, (2) the County took the Partnership's property without just compensation in violation of Article 1, Sec. 26 of the Missouri Constitution, ⁸ and, alternatively, (3) the County discriminated against the Partnership in violation of the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. The district court determined that the Partnership had failed to obtain the County's final decision on the Criteria's application and dismissed the complaint because it was not ripe for adjudication. ⁹ (Christopher Lake I ).

The Partnership then notified the County Director of Planning, the County Executive, and each member of the County Council that it sought a "variance" or exception from the hardship of its compliance with the Criteria. As potential sources for reimbursement, the Partnership suggested: government funds dedicated to drainage construction; contributions from future developers in the same area; and revenues from the imposition of a special tax. The County decided that because the drainage system was already completed, the Partnership's requests for hardship relief should be denied.

The Partnership filed a second lawsuit against the County and repeated its previous allegations. The Partnership's amended complaint also averred that the Criteria were facially unconstitutional. The County argued that the as applied claims were not ripe and could never be ripe because the Partnership's construction of the storm water relief system precluded the County from ever reaching a final decision on the Criteria's application. The County also suggested that the Partnership's facial claim was actually a challenge to the Criteria's application. The court dismissed the applied challenges as unripe and dismissed the facial challenge for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. (Christopher Lake II ). The Partnership appeals.

II. DISCUSSION

A. The "As Applied" Claims

1. Ripeness

In order to establish that a claim is ripe for judicial review, a plaintiff must meet two requirements. First, it must demonstrate a sufficiently concrete case or controversy within the meaning of Article III of the Constitution. ¹⁰ Bob's Home Service, Inc. v. Warren County, 755 F.2d 625, 627 (8th Cir.1985). Second, prudential considerations must justify the present exercise of judicial power. Id. See Taylor Inv., Ltd. v. Upper Darby Township, 983 F.2d 1285, 1289-90 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 304, 126 L.Ed.2d 252 (1993) (recognizing that the ripeness doctrine is grounded in both prudential considerations and the case or controversy requirement). The concept of ripeness is particularly important in cases challenging land use regulations and results in a fact-sensitive inquiry. See Eide v. Sarasota County, 908 F.2d 716, 720-24 (11th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1120, 111 S.Ct. 1073, 112 L.Ed.2d 1179 (1991) (providing a detailed discussion of the differing ripeness analyses depending on the constitutional theories involved and the remedies that a plaintiff is seeking).

The Partnership has alleged that the County's approval for its development of Waterford Estates was conditioned on the Partnership's construction of a comprehensive drainage system for the entire watershed area. The Partnership claims that the County's unconstitutional application of the Criteria violated its rights to equal protection under the fourteenth amendment and took the Partnership's property without due process in violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. ¹¹ The district court relied on Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 193, 105 S.Ct. 3108, 3120, 87 L.Ed.2d 126 (1985), in concluding that the County did not arrive "at a definitive position on the issue that inflicts an actual, concrete injury." Because the court did not consider matters outside the pleadings, we review its dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo. Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 730 (8th Cir.1990) (discussing the varying standards of review under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1)).

"[A] claim that the application of government regulations effects a taking of a property interest is not ripe until the government entity charged with implementing the regulations has reached a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue." Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 186, 105 S.Ct. at 3116. Although we recognize that Williamson County involved claims that the denial of a zoning permit resulted in a taking without just compensation in violation of the fifth amendment and a fourteenth amendment deprivation of property without due process of law,...