Christopherson v. St. Vincent Hosp.

• Decision Date: 04 August 2016
• Docket Number: NO. 33,784,33,784
• Citation: 384 P.3d 1098
• Parties: Joseph Lee Christopherson, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Mercedes Louise Christopherson, and Joseph Lee Christopherson, individually, Plaintiffs–Appellees, v. St. Vincent Hospital, a New Mexico Non–Profit Corporation d/b/a Christus St. Vincent Regional Medical Center, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico

384 P.3d 1098

Joseph Lee Christopherson, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Mercedes Louise Christopherson, and Joseph Lee Christopherson, individually, Plaintiffs–Appellees,

v.St. Vincent Hospital, a New Mexico Non–Profit Corporation d/b/a Christus St. Vincent Regional Medical Center, Defendant–Appellant.

NO. 33,784

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

Filing Date: August 4, 2016

Certiorari Denied, October 4, 2016, No. S-1-SC-36078

Law Office of Jane B. Yohalem, Jane B. Yohalem, Santa Fe, NM, Katherine W. Hall PC, Katherine W. Hall, Santa Fe, NM, The Zamora Law Firm, LLC, D. Diego Zamora, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellees.

Modrall, Sperling, Roehl, Harris & Sisk, Tim L. Fields, Emil J. Kiehne, Susan M. Bisong, Elizabeth A. Martinez, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant.

OPINION

BUSTAMANTE, Judge.

{1}Joseph Lee Christopherson, individually and as personal representative of the estate of his daughter, Mercedes Louise Christopherson, filed a complaint for medical negligence leading to Mercedes Christopherson's death in 2008.A jury found St. Vincent Hospital negligent, but hung on the issue of causation.A second trial, limited to causation, resulted in a verdict in favor of St. Vincent Hospital.The district court ordered a third trial on causation based on defense counsel's misconduct during the second trial.The final trial ended in a $2.25 million verdict against St. Vincent Hospital.St. Vincent Hospital appeals.

I.BACKGROUND

{2} In November 2008 twenty-year-old Mercedes Christopherson(Mercedes) was hospitalized at Presbyterian Hospital in Albuquerque for acute pain in her abdomen.After approximately one week, she was discharged on November 21, 2008, and returned to Santa Fe, where she lived.However, on November 25, 2008, Mercedes was still in pain and went to the emergency room at St. Vincent Hospital where she was admitted.

{3} At St. Vincent Hospital, Mercedes was treated for pancreatitis and several possible types of infection, including an intra-abdominal infection.After a few days Mercedes started to improve, but then, on December 6, developed a fever, increased pulse, and hypoxia (insufficient oxygen).Between December 6 and December 8, Mercedes' pain medication and antibiotics were adjusted, more tests were performed to identify whether she had one or more types of infection, and she was given oxygen to address the hypoxia.

{4} Mercedes was discharged from St. Vincent Hospital on December 8, 2008.At the time of discharge, she had a temperature of 100.9 and slightly elevated heart rate of 107.Mercedes was advised not to drink alcohol because of possible interaction with the pain medication she was taking and to contact the hospital if she had a temperature over 101 degrees, shortness of breath, nausea, vomiting, or sudden severe weakness.She spent the evening with her girlfriend, Adrianna Bustos, and the Bustos family.According to family members, she spent “a quiet evening, eating a small meal and then going to sleep.”At ten o'clock the next morning, Mrs. Bustos, Adrianna's mother, checked on Mercedes and found that she was not breathing and that there was drool or bile around her mouth.Mrs. Bustos called 911 and another person in the house began CPR.Emergency medical technicians arrived and took Mercedes to the hospital, where she was put on life support.She died the next day.

{5} In December 2009 Mercedes' father, PlaintiffJoseph Lee Christopherson, filed suit against St. Vincent Hospital for medical negligence.An eleven-day jury trial was held.The jury found that St. Vincent Hospital was negligent, but hung on the question of whether St. Vincent Hospital's negligence caused Mercedes' death.The district court ordered a partial retrial on the issue of causation only.

{6} The second trial—limited to causation—started in late July 2012.After a five-day trial, the jury found that St. Vincent Hospital's negligence was not the cause of Mercedes' death.Plaintiff moved for a new trial on the ground that “[t]he jury verdict was induced by misconduct of defense counsel consisting [of] statements which were intentional, irrelevant, inadmissible, unethical[,] and prejudicial.”The district court granted the motion for a new trial.

{7} A third partial trial was held in December 2013.Before trial, St. Vincent Hospital moved for a full retrial of both negligence and causation, on the ground that, in order to “render a proper verdict on causation, the [t]hird [j]ury needs to know the grounds on which the [f]irst [j]ury found St. Vincent [Hospital] to be negligent, but that is not possible.”The district court denied the motion, stating that “the issues of negligence, causation [,] and damages in this case are separate and distinct as defined by Buffett v. Vargas , 1996–NMSC–[012], 121 N.M. 507, 914 P.2d 1004.”At the conclusion of the third trial, the jury found that St. Vincent Hospital's negligence was the cause of Mercedes' death and awarded $2,250,000 in compensatory damages.St. Vincent Hospital appealed.

II.DISCUSSION

{8} St. Vincent Hospital's appeal presents three questions.First, whether the district court erred in limiting the second or third trials to causation only.Second, whether the district court erred in ordering a third partial trial based on defense counsel's conduct in the second trial.Third, whether a new, full retrial is necessary because the district court erred by excluding expert testimony concerning the role of Xanax and marijuana in Mercedes' death.We address these arguments in turn.

A.The District Court Did Not Improperly Limit Retrial to Causation

{9}“The grant or denial of a new trial is a matter resting within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the reviewing court will not reverse absent a manifest abuse of that discretion.”Martinez v. Ponderosa Prods., Inc. , 1988–NMCA–115, ¶ 4, 108 N.M. 385, 772 P.2d 1308.Under Rule 1–059(A) NMRA, the district court may order a new trial on “all or part of the issues in an action in which there has been a trial by jury, for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted.”Cf.Rule 1–042(B) NMRA(“The court ... may order a separate trial of any claim, ... or of any separate issue or of any number of claims, ... or issues, always preserving the right of trial by jury given to any party as a constitutional right.”).

{10} Generally speaking, whether a partial trial is appropriate depends on whether the issue is “entirely separate and distinct from” the other issues already decided and whether “such single issue can be determined without reference to other issues and without prejudice to either party.”Sanchez v. Dale Bellamah Homes of N.M., Inc. , 1966–NMSC–040, ¶ 12, 76 N.M. 526, 417 P.2d 25;seeBuffett , 1996–NMSC–012, ¶ 32, 121 N.M. 507, 914 P.2d 1004(stating that a partial retrial as to a single party is appropriate when “there is a clear showing that the issues in the case are so distinct and separable that a party may be excluded without prejudice” and that “[t]his test is the same as New Mexico's test for determining whether a partial retrial is appropriate as to some issues but not others”(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).The test derives from a United States Supreme Court decision, Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., which held that “a partial retrial may not properly be resorted to unless it clearly appears that the issue to be retried is so distinct and separable from the others that a trial of it alone may be had without injustice.”283 U.S. 494, 500, 51 S.Ct. 513, 75 L.Ed. 1188(1931).Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on which our Rule 1–059 is based, was “written in the light of the Gasoline Products case and of state practices allowing a partial new trial.”The Late Charles Alan Wright, et al., Partial New Trial , 11 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2814 (3d ed. 2016);Martinez v. Friede , 2004–NMSC–006, ¶ 12, 135 N.M. 171, 86 P.3d 596(stating that “our Rule 1–059 is substantially the same as its federal counterpart with one ... exception,” which has since been superseded by rule), superseded by rule on other grounds as stated in State v. Moreland , 2008–NMSC–031, ¶ 11, 144 N.M. 192, 185 P.3d 363.

{11} St. Vincent Hospital's argument is that “a full retrial was required ... because the question of causation was not ‘distinct and separable’ from that of negligence.”Negligence and causation are not distinct, it argues, because there was no way for the second or third jury to know which conduct the first jury found negligent.In the first trial, the jury was instructed that “[t]o establish medical negligence on the part of ... St. Vincent Hospital, ... Plaintiff has the burden of proving that St. Vincent Hospital ... failed to use the skill and care required in at least one of [seven] ways[.]”The “seven ways” were:

[ (1) ] By failing to properly communicate observations and concerns about Mercedes['] ... condition among Dr. Kovnat, Dr. Palestine[,] Nurse Gallagher or other nurses; or

[ (2) ] By failing to rule out intra-abdominal infection as the cause of Mercedes['] ... blood stream infection; or

[ (3) ] By inadequately treating Mercedes['] ... blood stream infection; or

[ (4) ] By failing to assess and evaluate Mercedes['] ... hypoxia before discharging her without supplemental oxygen; or

[ (5) ] By failing to assess and evaluate Mercedes ... for oversedation before discharging her; or

[ (6) ] By failing to obtain pertinent medical information, including the December 8, 2008[,] blood culture results, prior to discharging Mercedes ... home on December 8, 2008; or

[ (7) ] By discharging Mercedes ... home on December 8, 2008, without ongoing antibiotics.

{12} The verdict form, however, did not require the jurors to indicate which conduct was the basis for negligence.Instead, it merely asked whether St. Vincent Hospital was negligent.St. Vincent Hospital concludes that because the finding of negligence could have been based on any one of the seven identified...