Christos v. Manos

• Decision Date: 11 May 1931
• Docket Number: 13,762
• Citation: 16 La.App. 512,134 So. 713
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US
• Parties: CHRISTOS v. MANOS

134 So. 713

16 La.App. 512

CHRISTOS v. MANOS

No. 13,762

Court of Appeals of Louisiana, Orleans

May 11, 1931

Rehearing Refused May 25, 1931.

Writs of Certiorari and Review Refused by Supreme Court June 22 1931.

Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans, Division "D". Hon. W. A. Gleason, Judge.

Action by Mr. and Mrs. Stratos Christos against B. C. Manos.

There was judgment for defendant, and plaintiffs appealed.

Judgment reversed.

Michel Provosty and Oliver P. Carriere, of New Orleans, attorneys for plaintiffs, appellants.

Milner & Porteous, Wm. A. Porteous, Jr., of New Orleans, attorneys for defendant, appellee.

OPINION

JANVIER J.

Mrs Christos, one of the plaintiffs, was a guest passenger in the automobile owned and driven by defendant. She received injuries when that automobile ran into a truck which was proceeding along the road in the opposite direction.

It is conceded by all parties that the truck was not at fault, since it was proceeding slowly--probably at a speed of about ten miles per hour--and was on the proper side of the road.

It is charged that defendant is liable because of the speed at which his car was being driven, and primarily because, when it became apparent that something was wrong with the car, he did not at once, according to the allegations of plaintiffs' petition, do everything within his power to bring it to a stop.

The trial court rendered judgment in favor of defendant, dismissing plaintiffs' suit.

In the matter of speed we are convinced that defendant was not at fault. The spot at which the accident occurred was in the open country, the road was comparatively straight, and there was no reason why the car should not have been driven at any speed permitted by law. The state statute permitted a speed of forty-five miles per hour, and no effort is made to prove that limit was exceeded. On the contrary, defendant fixed the speed at about forty miles per hour, and no witness attempts to contradict him on this point.

The attention of those in the car was first directed to the fact that something was wrong by the sudden swerving from side to side.

It is claimed by plaintiffs that one of the rear tires of defendant's car became slowly deflated, and that this caused the swerving, and it is argued that defendant, immediately upon becoming aware of this condition, should have brought his car to a stop.

It is maintained, however, by defendant's counsel that the deflation did not occur slowly, but was the result of a sudden "blow-out" of a tire, and that when this occurred the immediate result was the swerving, and that the crash occurred before there was time or opportunity to avert it. In a statement made shortly after the accident and in his testimony on the witness stand, defendant said that he had noticed the swerving from one-half to one block before the spot at which the collision occurred, and, if his estimate of the distance is correct, it would seem that within that distance he should have been able to stop. But in both instances his statement was followed immediately by an explanation that he had at once applied the brakes and had brought the car to a stop as soon as it was humanly possible to do so. Counsel for defendant contends that the estimate of the distance was merely a guess and that it should yield to the fact that the brakes were immediately applied and yet the car could not be stopped.

That the brakes were in good condition is not denied, and is evidenced by the condition of the deflated tire which we have examined and from which it is apparent that the brakes were unusually effective, because in two places in the sidewall of the tire, opposite to each other, appear holes plainly caused by the dragging of the tire against an abrasive surface such as gravel.

It is also conceded that the tire which seems to have been primarily responsible for the accident was of good make and apparently was in good condition. It had run only 1,500 miles, and there was no reason to suppose that there was anything defective about it.

It is true that one who invites a friend to ride with him is not an insurer of the safety of the friend. He owes to the friend the duty of making reasonably certain that there is nothing defective in his automobile, and he also undertakes to drive with reasonable safety under all circumstances, but, if he...