Chrysafis v. Marks

• Decision Date: 12 August 2021
• Docket Number: No. 21A8,21A8
• Citation: 141 S.Ct. 2482
• Parties: Pantelis CHRYSAFIS, et al. v. Lawrence K. MARKS
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

141 S.Ct. 2482

Pantelis CHRYSAFIS, et al.

v.Lawrence K. MARKS

No. 21A8

Supreme Court of the United States.

August 12, 2021

The application for injunctive relief presented to Justice SOTOMAYOR and by her referred to the Court is granted pending disposition of the appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and disposition of the petition for a writ of certiorari, if such writ is timely sought. Should the petition for a writ of certiorari be denied, this order shall terminate automatically. In the event the petition for a writ of certiorari is granted, the order shall terminate upon the sending down of the judgment of this Court.

This order enjoins the enforcement of only Part A of the COVID Emergency Eviction and Foreclosure Prevention Act (CEEFPA). 2020 N. Y. Laws ch. 381. That is the only relief applicants seek. See Case No. 2:21-cv-02516, ECF No. 1 at 9; Emergency Application for Writ of Injunction 7, 40. If a tenant self-certifies financial hardship, Part A of CEEFPA generally precludes a landlord from contesting that certification and denies the landlord a hearing. This scheme violates the Court's longstanding teaching that ordinarily "no man can be a judge in his own case" consistent with the Due Process Clause. In re Murchison , 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S.Ct. 623, 99 L.Ed. 942 (1955) ; see United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property , 510 U.S. 43, 53, 114 S.Ct. 492, 126 L.Ed.2d 490 (1993) (due process generally requires a hearing).

This order does not enjoin the enforcement of the Tenant Safe Harbor Act (TSHA), which applicants do not challenge. 2020 N. Y. Laws ch. 127, §§ 1, 2(2)(a). Among other things, TSHA instructs New York courts to entertain a COVID-related hardship defense in eviction proceedings, assessing a tenant's income prior to COVID, income during COVID, liquid assets, and ability to obtain government assistance. § 2(2)(b). If the court finds the tenant "has suffered a financial hardship" during a statutorily-prescribed period, then it "shall [not] issue a warrant of eviction or judgment of possession." § 2(1).

Justice BREYER, with whom Justice SOTOMAYOR and Justice KAGAN join, dissenting from grant of application for injunctive relief.

The New York Legislature has passed two laws regulating evictions during the COVID–19 pandemic. The first is the Tenant Safe Harbor Act, which provides tenants who have "suffered a financial hardship during the COVID–19 covered period" with a defense in eviction proceedings. 2020 N. Y. Laws ch. 127, § 2.2.(a) (McKinney). The second is the COVID–19 Emergency Eviction and Foreclosure Prevention Act of 2020 (CEEFPA). CEEFPA simplifies the process for tenants to invoke financial hardship during the pandemic as a defense to eviction. Tenants who wish to assert the defense must provide a sworn attestation stating that they are experiencing financial hardship or health impacts as a result of the pandemic. 2020 N. Y. Laws ch. 381, pt. A, § 4. The attestation pauses eviction proceedings until the time that CEEFPA expires, namely the end of August 2021. §§ 2, 4, 6, 8; 2021 N. Y. Laws ch. 104 (establishing CEEFPA's August 31, 2021, expiration date). Pending eviction proceedings are stayed, new eviction proceedings cannot be filed, and outstanding eviction warrants cannot be executed until that date. 2020 N. Y. Laws ch. 381, pt. A, §§ 2, 4, 6, 8. Eviction proceedings may resume after August 31, 2021.

Only CEEFPA is before us. Applicants, five New York landlords and one landlords’ association, seek an "extraordinary" form of relief: "an injunction against enforcement of a presumptively constitutional state legislative act," Respect Maine PAC v. McKee , 562 U.S. 996, 131 S.Ct. 445, 178 L.Ed.2d 346 (2010), in circumstances where the request for an injunction was denied in the lower courts, and the court of appeals has yet to issue a substantive ruling. Moreover, the challenged law will expire in less than three weeks. Under these circumstances, such drastic relief would only be appropriate if "the legal rights at issue [we]re indisputably clear and, even then, sparingly and only in the most critical and exigent circumstances." South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom , 590 U.S. ––––, ––––, 140 S.Ct. 1613, 1613, 207 L.Ed.2d 154 (2020) (ROBERTS, C. J., concurring)(internal quotation marks omitted). I conclude that this strict standard is not met here, for three reasons.

First, the legal rights at issue in this case are not "indisputably clear." Applicants argue that CEEFPA denies landlords due process of law because once a tenant submits an attestation of financial hardship, evictions cannot proceed and the landlord cannot challenge the tenant's claim of hardship, for example, in court. Respondent argues, however, that the law is best viewed not as a deprivation of the right to challenge a tenant's hardship claim but as simply delaying the exercise of that right—as of now for less than three weeks until the law expires. After August 31, New York's eviction proceedings will be conducted exactly as they were before CEEFPA's enactment. Our precedents do not make it "indisputably clear" that this delay violates the Constitution. See Sosna v. Iowa , 419 U.S. 393, 410, 95 S.Ct. 553, 42 L.Ed.2d 532 (1975) (due process is not offended when "the gravamen of [the] claim is not total deprivation ... but only delay").

Applicants also argue that CEEFPA violates their First Amendment right against compelled...