Chrysler Corporation v. Malloy

• Decision Date: 30 December 1968
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 5352.
• Citation: 294 F. Supp. 524
• Parties: CHRYSLER CORPORATION and Chrysler Motors Corporation v. James E. MALLOY, Commissioner of Motor Vehicles and Raymond E. Grout, Deputy Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, State of Vermont.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Vermont

294 F. Supp. 524

CHRYSLER CORPORATION and Chrysler Motors Corporation v. James E. MALLOY, Commissioner of Motor Vehicles and Raymond E. Grout, Deputy Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, State of Vermont.

Civ. A. No. 5352.

United States District Court D. Vermont.

December 30, 1968.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

John M. Dinse, Wick, Dinse & Allen, Burlington, Vt., Robert L. Ackerly, Sellers, Conner & Cuneo, Washington, D. C., for plaintiffs.

William T. Keefe, Asst. Atty. Gen., Montpelier, Vt., for defendants.

A brief of amicus curiae supporting plaintiffs' position was filed by Clarke A. Gravel, Gravel, Bing & Shea, Burlington, Vt., John H. Pickering, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, Washington, D. C., for the Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc.

Briefs of amici curiae supporting defendants' position were filed by Gerald H. Cohen, Civil Div., Dept. of Justice, for U. S. Dept. of Transportation, and by Kenneth A. Roberts, Washington, D. C., for Vehicle Equipment Safety Commission.

OPINION

LEDDY, District Judge.

This is an action brought by Chrysler Corporation and Chrysler Motors Corporation, both Delaware corporations, against the Vermont State Commissioner of Motor Vehicles and his Deputy Commissioner for an injunction restraining the Commissioner from requiring approval of an auxiliary headlamp known as "Super Lite", mounted in certain 1969 Dodge automobiles and from interfering with the sale of such automobiles within the State of Vermont. Plaintiffs contend that the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1425 (Supp. II 1966), has pre-empted regulation by the Commissioner in regard to the sale of motor vehicles equipped with "Super Lite."

The complaint alleges that "Super Lite" is an auxiliary headlamp mounted in the grille of a motor vehicle. It is intended to be used in conjunction with low beam headlights to increase the strength of the headlamp system without producing the glare effects associated with high beams. Plaintiffs installed "Super Lite" as optional equipment on certain 1969 model Dodge automobiles and scheduled September 19, 1968, as the date of introduction of the new 1969 model Dodges into the State of Vermont.

Sometime prior to the introduction date, the Vermont Commissioner of Motor Vehicles learned that Chrysler intended to sell Dodge automobiles equipped with "Super Lite" in Vermont. In conversations with representatives of Chrysler, the Commissioner took the position that unless Chrysler submitted "Super Lite" to the Department for testing and approval, cars equipped with the "Super Lite" would not be allowed to pass inspection in Vermont. The Commissioner has since tested the light and has decided that operation with the light installed may create a safety hazard under some driving conditions. Chrysler contends that the Commissioner does not have the power to require submission of the light for testing or to deny approval and refuse to pass in inspection vehicles equipped with the light because of the pre-emptive effect of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 and regulations issued pursuant to the Act.

On September 19, 1968, the plaintiffs brought this action seeking an injunction against the Commissioner's interference with the sale and distribution of plaintiffs' 1969 automobiles equipped with "Super Lite." A temporary restraining order was issued on the following day. Subsequently, a hearing was held on a final injunction and briefs were submitted by the parties and by the Vehicle Equipment Safety Commission, the United States Department of Transportation and the Automobile Manufacturers Association who were allowed to enter as amici curiae.

I. JURISDICTION

Before the merits can be reached, certain objections to jurisdiction must be disposed of. The Commissioner has contended that this action may not be maintained because (1) it is a suit against the State without its consent barred by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution and (2) the amount in controversy does not exceed ten thousand dollars.

The first ground may be disposed of summarily. Where the claim is that the statute pursuant to which a state officer is acting is unconstitutional, the suit is deemed to be against the officer in his individual capacity. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908). This general principle applies where the State statute is alleged to be unconstitutional because it has been pre-empted by Federal law. Clover Leaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 116 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1940), rev'd on other grounds, 315 U.S. 148, 62 S.Ct. 491, 86 L.Ed. 754 (1942).

The second contention is also without merit. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1964) the United States District Courts have jurisdiction over "any civil action or proceeding arising under any Act of Congress regulating commerce * * *" irrespective of the amount in controversy. In this case, plaintiffs have claimed that the statute under which defendants have acted is pre-empted by the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966. This Act is one which regulates commerce within the meaning of the statute. See 15 U.S.C. § 1397 (Supp. II 1966); Murphy v. Colonial Federal Savings and Loan Assoc., 388 F.2d 609, 614-615 (2d Cir. 1967). Where the claim is that an act which regulates commerce pre-empts a state statute, the case arises out of that act for purposes of section 1337. See American Federation of Labor v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582, 591, 66 S.Ct. 761, 90 L.Ed. 873 (1946). As a result, this Court has jurisdiction of this case regardless of the amount in controversy.

II. MERITS OF PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM

The issue in this case is whether or not the State of Vermont may enforce its headlight performance standards against the plaintiffs' auxiliary light in view of the existence of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 and the regulations issued pursuant thereto. The decision on this question requires, first, an examination of the pertinent Federal and state statutes.

Under 23 V.S.A. § 1247(a), the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles is given the power to test motor vehicle headlights that are submitted by a manufacturer for approval. A person may not operate on the roads of the State of Vermont any motor vehicle which is equipped with a lighting device in excess of four candle power unless it is approved by the Commissioner. 23 V.S.A. § 1246. Although the Vermont statutes do not expressly state this, it can be safely assumed that the Commissioner has the power to refuse to pass in the periodic motor vehicle inspections any motor vehicle that is equipped in violation of section 1246. See 23 V.S.A. §§ 1001, 1222.

The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1425 (Supp. II 1966) has the following purpose:

Congress hereby declares that the purpose of this chapter is to reduce traffic accidents and deaths and injuries to persons resulting from traffic accidents. Therefore, Congress determines that it is necessary to establish motor vehicle safety standards for motor vehicles and equipment in interstate commerce; to undertake and support necessary safety research and development; and to expand the national driver register.

15 U.S.C. § 1381 (Supp. II 1966).

Under this Act, the Secretary of Commerce is charged with the duty of promulgating federal motor vehicle safety standards for new motor vehicles. 15 U.S.C. § 1392(a) (Supp. II 1966). The burden of complying with these standards falls squarely on the manufacturer or distributor. The manufacturer or distributor is required to certify that each motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment sold conforms to all applicable federal standards. 15 U.S.C. § 1403 (Supp. II 1966). Any manufacturer or distributor who sells a new motor vehicle that does not meet federal standards or who does not certify that it meets federal standards, may be enjoined from sale in violation of the Act and may be subject to a civil penalty. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1397-1399 (Supp. II 1966). If a motor vehicle or an item of motor vehicle equipment is found not to conform to federal standards, the manufacturer or distributor is required to repurchase the motor vehicle or equipment or furnish conforming parts to correct the defect. 15 U.S.C. § 1400 (Supp. II 1966). Only the performance of a motor vehicle or item of equipment when sold is covered by the Act. The operation of the vehicle by its owner is not so covered.

The Act has a number of provisions relating to the role of the states in motor vehicle safety. State representatives form part of the membership of a commission whose duty is to advise the Secretary of Commerce on motor vehicle safety standards. 15 U.S.C. § 1393 (Supp. II 1966). In addition, the Secretary is authorized to consult with the states in promulgating standards and development of inspection methods. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1392(f), 1396 (Supp. II 1966).

The Act specifically states that compliance with federal standards does not exempt one from common law liability. 15 U.S.C. § 1397(c) (Supp. II 1966). It also states that federal standards are not intended to apply to used motor vehicles at the present time. 15 U.S.C. § 1397(b)(1) (Supp. II 1966). Finally, the Act defines the role of the states with respect to new motor vehicles:

(d) Whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard established under this subchapter is in effect, no State or political subdivision of a State shall have any authority either to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect to any motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment any safety standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of such vehicle or item of equipment which is not identical to the Federal standard. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the Federal Government or the government of any State or political subdivision thereof from establishing a safety requirement applicable to motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment procured for its own use if such

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