Chrysler Corporation v. Tofany, 13 and 73
| Decision Date | 07 November 1969 |
| Docket Number | No. 13 and 73,Dockets 33497 and 33509.,13 and 73 |
| Citation | 419 F.2d 499 |
| Parties | CHRYSLER CORPORATION and Chrysler Motors Corporation, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Vincent L. TOFANY and William E. Kirwan, Defendants-Appellants. CHRYSLER CORPORATION and Chrysler Motors Corporation, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. James E. MALLOY and Raymond E. Grout, Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
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Robert L. Ackerly, Washington, D. C. (W. Stanfield Johnson, Sellers, Conner & Cuneo, Washington, D. C., Francis S. Bensel, Robert M. Davidson, Kelley, Drye, Newhall, Maginnes & Warren, New York, N. Y., on the brief), for plaintiffs-appellees Chrysler Corporation and Chrysler Motors Corporation.
Jeremiah Jochnowitz, Albany, N. Y. , for defendants-appellants, Vincent L. Tofany and William E. Kirwan.
Leonard Schaitman, Atty., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C. (William D. Ruckelshaus, Asst. Atty. Gen., Morton Hollander, Atty., Washington, D. C., on the brief), for the United States as amicus curiae.
William T. Keefe, Burlington, Vt., for the State of Vermont.
John H. Pickering, William R. Perlik, Timothy B. Dyk, Michael R. Klein, Washington, D. C.; Allen F. Maulsby, Cravath, Swaine & Moore, New York City, on the brief, for Automobile Manufacturers Association, Inc., as amicus curiae.
Before LUMBARD, Chief Judge, and FRIENDLY and KAUFMAN, Circuit Judges.
These consolidated appeals by public officials of the states of Vermont and New York arise from declaratory judgments and accompanying orders in favor of Chrysler Corporation and Chrysler Motors Corporation ("Chrysler") entered by the United States District Courts for the District of Vermont and the Northern District of New York. Both district courts held that state regulation of Super Lite, an extra headlamp offered as an optional accessory on some of Chrysler's 1969 Dodge automobiles, is preempted by the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1425 (Supp. III 1966) (the "Act"), and Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108, 49 C.F.R. § 371.21 (1969)1 ("Standard No. 108"), issued pursuant to the federal statute. The Vermont district court entered judgment for Chrysler after a trial and the New York district court granted plaintiff Chrysler's motion for summary judgment. Both courts enjoined the defendant state officials from attempting to regulate Chrysler's sale of automobiles equipped with Super Lite. Since we disagree with the district courts on the issue of federal preemption, we reverse both judgments.
Chrysler designed and installed the additional headlamp called Super Lite as optional equipment on certain models in its 1969 Dodge line of automobiles. According to Chrysler, the purpose of Super Lite is to produce additional forward visibility by supplementing the regular low-beam headlamps with a controlled, rectangular beam of light produced by a new type of bulb and a new optical principle. The 1969 Dodge line was introduced nationally on September 19, 1968, but even before that date Chrysler's troubles with Super Lite began.
Prior to the introduction date, defendants Malloy and Grout, officials of the state of Vermont,2 required Chrysler to submit Super Lite to them for presale approval under the applicable Vermont statutes.3 Just prior to September 19th, the Vermont officials advised Chrysler that the sale of cars equipped with Super Lite without the approval of the Vermont Commissioner of Motor Vehicles would violate state law. Since approval had not been granted, on September 19, 1968, Chrysler filed a complaint in the district court in Vermont seeking a declaratory judgment that the attempted state regulation of Super Lite was preempted by the federal Act and Standard No. 108. The complaint also sought a temporary restraining order and a permanent injunction against state restrictions on the sale of Dodges equipped with Super Lite.
In mid-October, 1968, defendants Tofany and Kirwan, officials of the State of New York,4 orally advised Chrysler that 1969 Dodges with Super Lite did not comply with the requirements of the New York State Motor Vehicle Code.5 Chrysler promptly sought declaratory and ancillary injunctive relief in the Northern District of New York.
Chrysler's complaint in the New York action stated that Super Lite "provides the driver of the vehicle with additional night visibility, primarily to permit safe driving on high speed highways without the glaring effects of high beam headlamps on other drivers on the highway." The record before us indicates that both the New York and Vermont officials were quite concerned about the effect on other drivers of the glare which Super Lite produced when used on hilly or winding two-lane roads.6 Since Vermont and many areas of New York have a predominance of such roads, unlike the mid-western, prairie or southwestern states, this finding was of special importance. In addition, officials of both states expressed some concern that the new Chrysler option emitted a blue glow which appeared at times to flash. Since both states reserve the use of blue signal lights for certain emergency vehicles, this was a further reason for prohibiting the sale of Super Lite.7 The propriety of these conclusions by state officials is not before us on these appeals; we are faced with only the narrow legal question of federal preemption.
Meanwhile, state officials in New Hampshire expressed similar concern about Super Lite. On September 18, 1968, they wrote a letter to all automobile dealers in the state which declared, in effect, that Super Lite had not been approved by the New Hampshire Division of Motor Vehicles and that cars equipped with the extra light would therefore "not be able to be inspected" as required by state law. Chrysler sought declaratory and injunctive relief in federal district court in New Hampshire on September 19, 1968.
Before any of the states had attempted to ban Super Lite, Chrysler was in contact with the Federal Highway Administration, the agency within the Department of Transportation charged with administering the federal Act. On September 11, 1968, Chrysler's "Federal Safety Coordinator" wrote to the National Highway Safety Bureau, an arm of the Federal Highway Administration. Chrysler included with its letter technical data for Super Lite, and it stated that it intended to offer the extra headlamp as an option on some of its 1969 models. Dr. William Haddon, Jr., Director of the Bureau, replied in a letter dated September 17, 1968, which made clear the agency's position on the issue of federal and state regulation of Super Lite. Dr. Haddon stated, in part:
You are correct in your understanding that a supplemental light of this type is not required by Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108. Standard No. 108 does, however, specify, in Paragraph S3.1.2, that no additional lamp, reflective device, or associated equipment shall be installed if it impairs the effectiveness of the required equipment. On the basis of our review of your technical literature on the Super Lite and our observation of limited field demonstrations of the light, it does not appear that the Super Lite will impair the effectiveness of the lighting equipment required by Standard No. 108. It should be noted, however that, while the incorporation of this lamp in your 1969 automobiles would not be precluded by the Federal Standard, the various states may interpose restrictions as to this lamp.8
All three federal districts courts granted Chrysler's requests for temporary injunctive relief. On December 5, 1968, however, Judge Bownes of the District of New Hampshire rendered a final decision in favor of the defendant New Hampshire officials. Chrysler Corporation v. Rhodes, 294 F.Supp. 665 (D.N.H. 1968). This decision was affirmed by the First Circuit, 416 F.2d 319 (1st Cir. June 26, 1968), and Chrysler's petition for a rehearing was denied. 416 F.2d 324 (1st Cir. July 25, 1968).
However, in the Vermont action, Judge Leddy held for the plaintiff Chrysler on December 30, 1968. Chrysler Corporation v. Malloy, 294 F.Supp. 524 (D.Vt. 1968). Over two months later, Judge Foley of the Northern District of New York, relying heavily on Judge Leddy's opinion, granted Chrysler's motion for summary judgment. Chrysler Corporation v. Tofany, 305 F.Supp. 971 (N.D. N.Y. March 13, 1969).
The Act directs the Department of Transportation to establish Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, 15 U.S.C. § 1392(a). Each standard is to be a "minimum standard for motor vehicle performance, or motor vehicle equipment performance, which is practicable, which meets the need for motor vehicle safety and which provides objective criteria." In issuing a standard, the Department must consider whether the proposal is "reasonable, practicable and appropriate for the particular type of motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment for which it is prescribed" and the extent to which it "will contribute to carrying out the purposes of" the Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1392(f) (3), 1392(f) (4). The Department is also to consult with other public agencies and to consider other relevant motor vehicle safety data when it deems it appropriate. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1392(f) (1), 1392(f) (2). The Department must, when issuing standards, comply with the rulemaking provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1392(b).
Once standards have been promulgated, each automobile manufacturer must certify that "each such vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment conforms to all applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standards." 15 U.S.C. § 1403. The Act provides for civil penalties, and the United States is also permitted to seek injunctive relief in federal district courts to restrain...
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