Chrysler Workers Ass'n v. Chrysler Corp.

Decision Date19 January 1988
Docket NumberNo. 86-3361,86-3361
Parties126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3223, 107 Lab.Cas. P 10,235 CHRYSLER WORKERS ASSOCIATION, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION; International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America--UAW Locals # 371, # 1331, # 1435, ## 2075 & # 2147, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Dennis P. Strong, argued, Michael N. Vaporis, Bayford, Senerius, Vaporis & Strong, Toledo, Ohio, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Thomas L. Dalrymple, argued, Charles R. Leech, Jr., Fuller & Henry, Joan Torzewski, Gerald B. Lackey, John G. Mattimoe, Toledo, Ohio, Jordan Rossen, Leonard Page, argued, Detroit, Mich., for defendants-appellees.

Before MARTIN, WELLFORD and NELSON, Circuit Judges.

WELLFORD, Circuit Judge.

The individual plaintiffs are now employees at the General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. (GDLS), Lima, Ohio, tank manufacturing plant. Formerly, they worked for Chrysler Defense, Inc. (a wholly owned subsidiary of Chrysler formed to manufacture defense products rather than automobiles). This is an appeal from the district court's order granting summary judgment to the defendants, Chrysler, the United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement Workers of America International Union (UAW), several UAW locals and GDLS. The suit stems from the plaintiffs' attempts to return to their "home" plants, in which they were employed before transferring to the Lima, Ohio, tank plant pursuant to a work opportunity provision in their collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with Chrysler. The plaintiffs claim that UAW violated its duty of fairly representing them and pursuing their grievances. They claim Chrysler breached the CBA by not transferring them back to their "home" plants. (Plaintiff Chrysler Workers Association is simply an organization formed by individual plaintiffs to advance their interests.)

We consider first whether the district court erred by holding that the defendants are entitled to summary judgment because the plaintiffs' causes of action were barred by the applicable six month statute of limitations.

During an economic recession Chrysler indefinitely laid off thousands of workers at Chrysler plants, including, in 1981 and 1982, these plaintiffs who worked in Perrysburg, Ohio, Van Wert, Ohio, and New Castle, Indiana (hereafter referred to as "home" plants). Chrysler Defense, Inc., on the other hand, was then expanding, so, under the provisions of a CBA between Chrysler and the UAW and all its locals, the plaintiffs took advantage of an opportunity to transfer to the Lima, Ohio tank manufacturing plant operated by Chrysler Defense, Inc. This work opportunity provision of the CBA (# 65) afforded the transferring employees an opportunity to return to their home plants under certain conditions. 1 The plaintiffs could also return to their home plants in two other ways: (1) under the provisions of the "Ohio Letter," a subsequent agreement modifying the CBA, which provided that plaintiffs could opt to return if their home plants hired new employees and if the return did not adversely affect either plant's operations, or (2) under the provisions of the so-called "Sadie Hawkins Day" term, a special provision whereby, once each year on a selected date, work opportunity employees, such as plaintiffs, who are not indefinitely laid off from the work opportunity plant, were afforded an opportunity to sign up to return to their home plant (but only in a situation where the home plant would have otherwise hired a new employee, and provided such transfer would "not affect adversely the efficiency of the operations at the plant or plants involved").

Since none of the plaintiffs were indefinitely laid off from the GDLS tank plant, their conditional opportunity to return to their home plants was limited to the Ohio Letter or the "Sadie Hawkins Day" terms. Plaintiffs attempted to exercise a transfer option under these two provisions, but Chrysler did not permit transfer. 2 The plaintiffs want this return for two reasons: to retain their old Chrysler seniority, and because these plants are closer to their homes than the Lima tank plant.

In early 1982, Chrysler planned to sell its defense industry operations. The UAW learned that General Dynamics Corporation (GD) would buy Chrysler Defense, Inc., so it began negotiations with GD. The parties essentially agreed, by March of 1982, that GD would abide by the 1979 Chrysler-UAW CBA terms until the existing CBA termination date of September 14, 1982. Chrysler Defense, Inc., after being sold to GD, was renamed GDLS. Plaintiffs became employees of GDLS, not Chrysler, since Chrysler no longer had any connection with the Lima tank plant. The statute of limitations dispute revolves about the question whether and when plaintiffs were notified, or put on notice, that the sale affected their recall rights to Chrysler. Apparently, however, both corporate and Union officials had some question about the plaintiffs' status at the time; as a consequence, two "letters of understanding" or "letter agreements" were issued.

The first letter agreement from GD to the UAW was dated May 18, 1982. Marc Stepp, Vice President of the UAW, "accepted" this letter. 3 The second letter to the UAW, dated June 7, 1982, was from Chrysler Corporation, and the same UAW official "accepted" this letter. The latter states Chrysler's understanding of the plaintiffs' rights to return to their home Chrysler plants, and the UAW's agreement thereto:

1. An employee of CDI (now GDLS) who would otherwise qualify for the right to return to a Chrysler Corporation plant based on Section 54(c) or Section 65(b) of the applicable Chrysler-UAW agreements, may exercise the opportunity to return to his former plant if indefinitely laid off by GDLS according to the provisions of said agreements, on or before September 14, 1982. Unless indefinitely laid off by that date, any such employee shall lose any right to return to Chrysler. (Emphasis added).

Twice in July of 1982 the UAW held a meeting to explain to Union members the effect of the Chrysler sale to GD. The plaintiffs allege that "no mention was made of" the May and June 1982 letters of understanding and that "no one informed the Plaintiffs that their seniority rights at their home plants or their ability to return to their home plants had been in any way altered as a result of the sale." 4 Local Union president, Darrell Cole, testified that he did not recall telling the Union members about the letter agreements or that their recall rights would terminate on September 14, 1982, nor did he recall any other Union representative explaining this to the Union workers. Stepp testified that he "doubted very much" that the June 7, 1982, letter agreement "was reproduced and sent to the members", and that, as far as he knew, the letter agreements were never furnished to the plaintiffs. 5 Homer Jolly, a UAW Chrysler Department official, testified that he did not know if the letter agreements were ever given to the plaintiffs or posted for them to see. Jolly did testify that he discussed their recall rights with the plaintiffs, but this, again, is a source of controversy.

In September of 1982, the UAW again held a meeting, this time to inform the membership of the terms and conditions of a proposed new CBA between the UAW and GDLS. The plaintiffs assert that they were not then told about the effect on their opportunity to return to their Chrysler home plants. Jolly stated that no Chrysler worker ever asked about returning or was told that he could return to his home plant. Plaintiffs' affidavits do not dispute this testimony. They simply assert that plaintiffs did not know that Chrysler and the Union considered their opportunity to return to "home" plants then to be at an end.

The UAW and GDLS bargained for a new CBA after September 14, 1982, and within two weeks UAW and GDLS agreed to a new CBA, to expire September 14, 1985. The new CBA had no provisions relating to Chrysler or former Chrysler employees, and the membership, including the plaintiffs, ratified the new CBA.

Whether the 1979 CBA expired on September 14, 1982, is contested. The termination provision, section (119), states that the 1979 CBA remains in effect until September 14, 1982, but may renew from year to year thereafter unless either party gives notice to "modify, amend or terminate" the agreement sixty days before the termination date. There is no evidence that either party gave the notice. The parties agreed to "change" section (119) of the 1979 CBA on September 5, 1983 (one year later). Some witnesses "assumed" termination or amendment of the 1979 CBA had occurred. The question of the September 14, 1982, termination is involved in the statute of limitations issue.

On the other hand, that the 1979 CBA terms expired on September 14, 1982, as between the UAW and GDLS, cannot seriously be questioned. On March 11, 1982, GDLS agreed to follow the terms of the 1979 CBA between Chrysler and the UAW only until September 14, 1982. Clearly, after September 14, 1982, GDLS was not bound by the 1979 CBA. After a short strike and subsequent negotiations, a UAW-GDLS CBA effective September 27, 1982, was executed.

There is no dispute but that Chrysler and the UAW twice amended the 1979 CBA, once on December 10, 1982, and again on September 5, 1983. By September 14, 1982, none of the plaintiffs had been indefinitely laid off by GDLS. The district court determined that:

Sometime subsequent to the aforesaid sale of Chrysler Defense, Inc. to General Dynamics, Chrysler, due to improved economic factors, began to expand its work force at certain of its plants, after which time plaintiffs sought to return from GDLS's Lima tank plant to their "home" Chrysler plants. Such attempts of plaintiffs were unsuccessful. In 1983 and 1984,...

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