Chugach Natives, Inc. v. Doyon, Ltd.
| Decision Date | 26 December 1978 |
| Docket Number | 77-2751,Nos. 77-1963,s. 77-1963 |
| Citation | 588 F.2d 723 |
| Parties | CHUGACH NATIVES, INC., Sealaska Corp., the Aleut Corp., Koniag, Inc. and Ahtna, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. DOYON, LTD., Defendant-Appellant, and Bristol Bay Native Corp., Inc., Arctic Slope Regional Corp., Bering Straits Native Corp., et al., Defendants. The ALEUT CORP., Sealaska Corp., Koniag, Inc., Chugach Natives, Inc., Ahtna, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. BERING STRAITS NATIVE CORP., Defendant-Appellant, and Arctic Slope Regional Corp., Bristol Bay Native Corp., Inc., Cook Inlet Native Inc., Doyon, Ltd., and Nana Regional Corp., Inc., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Arthur Lazarus, Jr., Washington, D. C., and Allen McGrath, Anchorage, Alaska, Francis J. O'Toole (argued), Washington, D. C., and Edward G. Burton (argued), Anchorage, Alaska, for defendants-appellants.
James Atwood, Edward Weinberg, Washington, D. C., Michael M. Holmes (argued), Juneau, Alaska, for plaintiffs-appellees.
Nancy Firestone, Edward Shawker, U. S. Dept. of Justice, and Sanford Sagalkin, Acting Asst. Atty. Gen., Washington, D. C., on brief as amicus curiae.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Alaska.
Before WRIGHT, GOODWIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
The single issue is whether sand and gravel are part of the surface or subsurface estate under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601, Et seq. (West Supp.1978) (ANCSA or Claims Act). The district court decided this question by partial summary judgment and properly certified the order for an interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976). Having granted leave to appeal, we affirm in part and reverse in part and hold that, under ANCSA, sand and gravel are part of the subsurface estate.
The purpose of the Claims Act is to settle equitably the aboriginal claims made by Alaska Natives through a combination grant of land and money. Twelve Regional and 220 Village Corporations have been organized to represent Natives in geographic areas and to manage the property and funds received from the federal government. 1
Sections 12 and 14 of the Claims Act, 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1611, 1613 (West Supp.1978), 2 patent to the Village Corporations the surface estate in a total of 22 million acres, with the subsurface estate patented to the Regional Corporations. 3 The Regional Corporations also receive both the surface and subsurface estates in an additional 16 million acres. 4
Section 7(i) of ANCSA, 43 U.S.C.A. § 1606(i) (West Supp.1978), 5 provides that 70% Of all revenues received by each Regional Corporation from timber and subsurface estate resources must be divided among all 12 Regional Corporations in proportion to the number of Natives enrolled in each region. At least 50% Of the revenues so received must be redistributed among the Village Corporations. ANCSA § 7(j).
This action was brought originally by Aleut Regional Corporation against the Arctic Slope Regional Corporation on April 4, 1975. Following numerous cross-motions, all Regional Corporations were joined. 6 Plaintiffs seek a declaration of their rights and obligations under ANCSA § 7(i) and an accounting of timber and subsurface resource revenues received by defendants. Many of the issues below regarding the meaning and application of the revenue sharing formula under ANCSA § 7(i) either have been determined by the district court by interlocutory order or continue to be litigated. See Aleut Corp. v. Arctic Slope Regional Corp., 410 F.Supp. 1196, 417 F.Supp. 900, 421 F.Supp. 862, 424 F.Supp. 397 (D.Alaska 1976).
The question here is whether sand and gravel are part of the surface or subsurface estate. The district court held that, in those lands in which the fee is divided between Regional and Village Corporations, sand and gravel are part of the surface estate belonging to the Village Corporations. In lands held entirely by the Regional Corporations, however, the district court concluded that sand and gravel are part of the subsurface estate and subject to § 7(i) revenue sharing. After proper certification by the district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976), this appeal followed. 7
The district court reached what it conceded to be a "somewhat anomalous" result in construing ANCSA § 7(i). It interpreted the term "subsurface estate" to have one meaning when a Village Corporation holds the surface estate and exactly the opposite meaning when the surface estate is owned by a Regional Corporation.
An accepted rule of statutory construction is that the same words or phrases are presumed to have the same meaning when used in different parts of a statute. United States v. Gertz, 249 F.2d 662, 665 (9th Cir. 1957); Sampsell v. Straub, 194 F.2d 228, 230 (9th Cir. 1951), Cert. denied, 343 U.S. 927, 72 S.Ct. 761, 96 L.Ed. 1338 (1952).
This presumption may be rebutted if the same words or phrases are used "in such dissimilar connections as to warrant the conclusion that they were employed in the different parts of the act with different intent." Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Application of Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank and Atlantic Cleaners here does not overcome the general presumption. Those cases provide only that the presumption may be rebutted if the same words or phrases are used in Different parts of the statute with manifestly different intent. The district court did not find that "subsurface estate" has different meanings when used in ANCSA §§ 7(i), 12, and 14. It concluded that the term, used only once in the Same section, ANCSA § 7(i), has opposite meanings depending upon whether a Village or Regional Corporation holds title to the surface estate.
Bank, 293 U.S. 84, 87, 55 S.Ct. 50, 51, 79 L.Ed. 211 (1934). See also Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433, 52 S.Ct. 607, 76 L.Ed. 1204 (1932). 8
No party argued for this result below. All maintain that, following proper principles of statutory construction, the interpretation of "subsurface estate" must be the same regardless of who owns the surface estate. We agree. We therefore must determine if sand and gravel are part of the surface or subsurface estate for all purposes under the Claims Act.
Congress did not define "subsurface estate" in the Claims Act. Thus it is necessary to reconstruct what Congress intended to be included in the term.
The term "subsurface estate" did not appear in the original drafts of the Claims Act. 9 H.R. 7039 provided that the Regional Corporations should receive patents to "all minerals covered by the mining and mineral leasing laws." Alaska Native Land Claims: Hearings on H.R. 3100, H.R. 7039, and H.R. 7432 Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1971), (House Hearings). H.R. 7432, S. 835, and S. 35 contained similar language. 10
Soon after the final hearings on the House bills concluded, counsel for the Alaska Natives submitted certain amendments to their bill, H.R. 7039. One of these, suggesting the adoption of the "surface/subsurface" language, was intended "To Clarify Intent That the Regional Corporations Receive Title to the Entire Subsurface Estate, Including All Mineral Interests." House Hearings at 377. Apparently accepting the suggestion of counsel, the House subcommittee drafted a clean bill, melding many of the provisions of H.R. 3100 and H.R. 7039, and included the "surface/subsurface" language. This bill, designated H.R. 10367, was modified only slightly by the full committee and passed by the House.
The next day the Senate passed S. 35, which still described the Regional Corporations' land grant in terms of "Minerals . . . covered by the Federal mineral leasing laws." S.Rep.No. 92-405, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1971). Later, the Senate considered H.R. 10367, struck all after the enacting clause, substituted the provisions of S. 35, and passed it.
The differing House and Senate versions of H.R. 10367 went to a conference committee which adopted the "surface/subsurface" language in the final draft of the bill that became the Claims Act.
1. Significance of the Language Change.
The parties differ on the significance they assign to this language change. Those
corporations arguing that sand and gravel are part of the surface estate (Surface Proponents) assert that the change was a mere "technical amendment" to the original language without substantive importance. The other corporations (Subsurface Proponents) maintain that the change demonstrated congressional intent to include sand and gravel as subsurface resources.
Doyon asserts that the legislative history establishes that Congress intended "subsurface estate" to be coextensive with "mineral estate." 11 Since neither term is defined in the Claims Act, Doyon urges that the common law definition of mineral estate should govern. See 2A C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 50.01 (4th ed. 1973). The case law of the various states cited by Doyon generally holds that sand and gravel are not part of the mineral estate. 12
After reviewing the cited cases and their underlying rationales for holding that sand and gravel are part of the surface estate, we agree with the district court that "the main identifying feature of these cases as well as those to the contrary is that they turn on their own peculiar facts and circumstances rather than on any controlling legal principles." 421 F.Supp. at 865. 13
Koniag does not dispute that "subsurface estate" includes "mineral estate," but it maintains that the common law is not helpful in defining either term. It urges us to look instead to federal public land and mineral development law in defining subsurface...
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