Chun v. Lopez, 2:11-cv-1480 MCE EFB P
Decision Date | 29 March 2013 |
Docket Number | No. 2:11-cv-1480 MCE EFB P,2:11-cv-1480 MCE EFB P |
Parties | SARUN CHUN, Petitioner, v. RAUL LOPEZ, Respondent. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
Petitioner is a state prisoner with counsel proceeding with an application for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges a 2004 judgment of conviction entered against him in the San Joaquin County Superior Court on charges of second degree murder and street terrorism, with sentence enhancements for possession of a firearm and acting in furtherance of a street gang. He seeks relief on the grounds that: (1) the trial court violated his Fifth Amendment rights in failing to suppress his statements to the police; and (2) the trial court violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process in giving a jury instruction on second degree felony murder. Upon careful consideration of the record and the applicable law, the undersigned recommends that petitioner's application for habeas corpus relief be denied.
In a published opinion affirming petitioner's judgment of conviction, the California Supreme Court provided the following factual summary:
People v. Sarun Chun, 45 Cal.4th 1172, 1178-80 (2009). Petitioner was sentenced to 55 years to life in state prison and ordered to pay $65,091.30 in victim restitution. Dckt. 1 at 5-6.
Petitioner appealed his judgment of conviction to the California Court of Appeal. Resp't's Lodg. Doc. 1 (Appellant's Opening Brief). The result of that appeal was summarized by the California Supreme Court as follows:
The Court of Appeal, in an opinion authored by Justice Morrison, reversed the murder conviction and otherwise affirmed the judgment. It found two errors in the case. It held the trial court had properly admitted defendant's first statement that he had been in the car but that the court should have excluded his subsequent statement that he had fired a gun. It concluded that the latter statement was procured by a false promise of leniency. It found this error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt "as a pure evidentiary matter." But, partly due to this error, the Court of Appeal also held the trial court erred in instructing the jury on second degree felony murder. It found this error was prejudicial and reversed the murder conviction.
People v. Sarun Chun, 45 Cal.4th at 1180. See also People v. Chun, 65 Cal.Rptr.3d 738, 741-42 (Cal.App. 3 Dist. 2007) ( ).
After the California Court of Appeal issued its ruling reversing petitioner's second degree murder conviction, respondent filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court. Resp't's Lodg. Doc. 7 (Petition for Review). That petition was granted. Resp't's Lodg. Doc. 9 (Grant of Review). Upon review, the Supreme Court addressed only the issue of whether thetrial court erred in instructing the jury on second degree murder and whether that error was prejudicial. Sarun Chun, 45 Cal.4th at 1205. The Supreme Court did not address whether the trial court prejudicially erred in admitting petitioner's statement to police that he fired a gun from the Honda. Id.
The California Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeal that the trial court erred in instructing petitioner's jury on second degree felony murder. Id. at 1201. Unlike the Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court found that this error was, "by itself, harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 1205. However, because the Court of Appeal had identified a second error by the trial court; namely, the admission of evidence that petitioner confessed he fired a gun, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeal for a determination of whether these two errors, in combination, were prejudicial. Id.
On remand, the California Court of Appeal concluded that the cumulative effect of the two errors was not prejudicial. Resp't's Lodg. Doc. 14 (Order After Remand). Accordingly, petitioner's second degree murder conviction was reinstated. Id. Petitioner filed a petition for review of this decision, which was summarily denied. Resp't's Lodg. Docs. 15, 16.
Petitioner filed his federal habeas petition in this court on May 29, 2011.
An application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody under a judgment of a state court can be granted only for violations of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). A federal writ is not available for alleged error in the interpretation or application of state law. See Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. ___, ___, 131 S. Ct. 13, 16 (2010); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000).
Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) sets forth the following standards for granting federal habeas corpus relief:
For purposes of applying § 2254(d)(1), "clearly established federal law" consists of holdings of the United States Supreme Court at the time of the state court decision. Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 859 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)). Nonetheless, "circuit court precedent may be persuasive in determining what law is clearly established and whether a state court applied that law unreasonably." Stanley, 633 F.3d at 859 (quoting Maxwell v. Roe, 606 F.3d 561, 567 (9th Cir. 2010)).
A state court decision is "contrary to" clearly established federal law if it applies a rule contradicting a holding of the Supreme Court or reaches a result different from Supreme Court precedent on "materially indistinguishable" facts. Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 640 (2003). Under the "unreasonable application" clause of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the Supreme Court's decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.1 Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003); Williams, 529 U.S. at 413; Chia v. Cambra, 360 F.3d 997, 1002 (9th Cir. 2004). In...
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