Chung Mee Rest. Co. v. Healy

• Citation: 171 A. 263
• Parties: CHUNG MEE RESTAURANT CO. v. HEALY.
• Decision Date: 06 February 1934
• Court: Supreme Court of New Hampshire

171 A. 263

CHUNG MEE RESTAURANT CO.

v. HEALY.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire. Hillsborough.

Feb. 6, 1934.

Transferred from Superior Court, Hillsborough County; Woodbury, Judge.

Petition for a declaratory judgment by the Chung Mee Restaurant Company against Michael J. Healy. Transferred without a ruling.

Case discharged.

Petition for a declaratory judgment under Laws of 1929, c. 86.

The petitioner is a New Hampshire corporation operating a Chinese restaurant in Manchester. The defendant is the chief of police of that city.

The petitioner has recently moved to new quarters in the city of Manchester, and at the new place of business has converted part of the floor of the main dining room into an open space suitable for dancing. The petitioner intends to hire an orchestra to play dance music during meal hours for the entertainment of its patrons, to broadcast over the radio, and to provide music for those of its patrons who desire to make use of the open space for dancing.

An ordinance of the city of Manchester provides that: "No person, firm or corporation shall keep a hall for dancing in the city of Manchester except for private use unless a license therefor shall first be obtained from the board of mayor and aldermen."

Public Laws, c. 363, § 9, requires that one who conducts a public dance, carnival, or circus must procure and pay for police attendance at the same. A penalty is provided for violation of either the ordinance or the statute.

The question of whether or not the petitioner is required to obtain a license and provide a police officer was transferred without a ruling by Woodbury, J.

Doyle & Doyle, of Manchester, for plaintiff. Cyprien J. Belanger, City Sol., of Manchester, for defendant.

WOODBURY, Justice.

The above enactments are not designed for the production of revenue for the state or municipality. The statute is designed to regulate the conduct of persons who attend public dances; the ordinance, to regulate the places where such functions are held.

Only two questions are here presented: First, have the state and municipality authority to regulate such matters? and, second, is the sort of function which the petitioner proposes to conduct within the meaning of the enactments? We are of the opinion that both of these questions must be answered in the affirmative.

Under the police power the state has authority to legislate for the protection and preservation of the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of its citizens. It is peculiarly the province of the Legislature to determine what rules and regulations are needed to achieve the above ends. State v. Ramseyer, 73 N. H. 31, 36, 58 A. 958, 6 Ann. Cas. 445. And enactments under this power are only to be set aside as unconstitutional when it clearly appears to the court that there is no relation between the enactment and the object sought to be attained. State v. Roberts, 74 N. H. 476, 478, 69 A. 722, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1115; State v. Normand, 76 N. H. 541, 544, 85 A. 899, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 996. It seems to us so clear as to render comment unnecessary that the enactments here under discussion have a direct connection with, and tendency to promote, the public health, safety, morals, and general welfare. We have no hesitation in declaring the acts constitutional, Chicago v. Drake Hotel Co., 274 Hi. 408, 113 N. E. 718, L. R. A. 1917A, 1170, to the contrary notwithstanding.

The authority of the city to enact the ordinance above quoted is to be found in P. L. c. 42, § 30.

The principal question is whether the petitioner is conducting a public dance within the meaning of P. L. e. 363, §...