Chung v. Legacy Corp., 95-197

• Decision Date: 22 May 1996
• Docket Number: No. 95-197,95-197
• Citation: 548 N.W.2d 147
• Parties: Tat Man CHUNG, Appellee, v. LEGACY CORP. and Dennis James Gray, Defendants, and Kip Donavan Karns, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 147

548 N.W.2d 147

Tat Man CHUNG, Appellee, v. LEGACY CORP. and Dennis James Gray, Defendants and Kip Donavan Karns, Appellant.

No. 95-197.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

May 22, 1996.

James C. Ellefson of Welp, Harrison, Brennecke & Moore, Marshalltown, for appellant.

Lad Grove, Ames, for appellee.

Considered by HARRIS, P.J., and LARSON, CARTER, SNELL, and TERNUS, JJ.

TERNUS, Justice.

Appellee, Tat Man Chung, was injured when the vehicle he was driving collided with a vehicle operated by appellant, Kip Donavan Karns. In this personal injury action brought by Chung to recover damages for his injuries, Chung alleged that Karns was negligent "in operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol." Karns denied this allegation in his answer.

Chung subsequently filed an application for the court's permission to take the deposition of the physician who treated Karns in the hospital emergency room immediately following the accident; Chung also sought production of Karns' medical records "to show [Karns'] condition and particularly his state of intoxication." Karns resisted, contending that the physician-patient privilege in Iowa Code section 622.10 (1993) protected this evidence from disclosure to third parties. The district court granted Chung's application, allowing the discovery.

We granted Karns' request to take this interlocutory appeal and now reverse the district court's ruling. We conclude a plaintiff cannot effect a waiver of the defendant's physician-patient privilege by making the defendant's medical condition an element or factor of the plaintiff's case.

I. Physician-Patient Privilege.

The ultimate objective of a majority of the rules of evidence is the elucidation of truth by excluding unreliable or prejudicial evidence. 1 Kenneth S. Braun et al., McCormick on Evidence § 72, at 268-69 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992) (hereinafter "McCormick on Evidence"). The rules of privilege, however, have a different goal. They are not designed to facilitate the fact-finding process; they exist to promote an interest in protecting "certain communications from disclosure even though the confidences may otherwise be admissible." 7 James A. Adams & Kasey W. Kincaid, Iowa Practice: Evidence § 501.1, at 186 (1988) (hereinafter "Iowa Practice"); see also McCormick on Evidence § 72, at 269.

The physician-patient privilege was unknown to the common law; however, it has been part of a testimonial privilege recognized in Iowa's statutes since the 1851 Iowa Code. Iowa Practice § 504.2, at 218. This statutory privilege is contained in Iowa Code section 622.10:

A practicing ... physician ..., who obtains information by reason of the person's employment, ... shall not be allowed, in giving testimony, to disclose any confidential communications properly entrusted to the person in the person's professional capacity, and necessary and proper to enable the person to discharge the functions of the person's office according to the usual course of practice or discipline. The prohibition does not apply to cases where the person in whose favor the prohibition is made waives the rights conferred; nor does the prohibition apply to physicians ... in a civil action in which the condition of the person in whose favor the prohibition is made is an element or factor of the claim or defense of the person or of any party claiming through or under the person. The evidence is admissible upon trial of the action only as it relates to the condition alleged.

Iowa Code § 622.10 (1993). The statutory rule of testimonial exclusion has been extended by rule to the discovery of confidential communications. See Iowa R.Civ.P. 122(a) (excluding privileged materials from the scope of permissible discovery); Squealer Feeds v. Pickering, 530 N.W.2d 678, 683 (Iowa 1995).

Section 622.10 is intended to promote uninhibited and full communication between a patient and his doctor so the doctor will obtain the information necessary to competently diagnose and treat the patient. State v. Deases, 518 N.W.2d 784, 787 (Iowa 1994); State v. Bedel, 193 N.W.2d 121, 124 (Iowa 1971). Some courts and commentators have suggested the physician-patient privilege is also supportable on the basis that certain communications may fall within a protected zone of privacy. E.g., Pritchard v. SwedishAmerican Hosp., 191 Ill.App.3d 388, 138 Ill.Dec. 658, 666, 547 N.E.2d 1279, 1287 (" 'To casually allow public disclosure of [psychotherapy records] would desecrate any notion of an individual's right to privacy.' ") (quoting Laurent v. Brelji, 74 Ill.App.3d 214, 30 Ill.Dec. 164, 166, 392 N.E.2d 929, 931 (1979)), appeal denied, 127 Ill.2d 640, 136 Ill.Dec. 605, 545 N.E.2d 129 (1989); Dillenbeck v. Hess, 73 N.Y.2d 278, 539 N.Y.S.2d 707, 711, 536 N.E.2d 1126, 1130 (1989) (noting one rationale supporting the privilege "is premised on the need to protect the privacy expectations of patients"); McCormick on Evidence § 105, at 391; 2 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence p 504, at 504-12 to 504-13 (1994).

The parties do not dispute the requested testimony and documents fall within the physician-patient privilege. See State v. Eldrenkamp, 541 N.W.2d 877, 881 (Iowa 1995) (the privilege extends to hospital records and to information placed in them to the same extent such information, if communicated to the physician by the patient, would be privileged). ¹ The fighting issue is the applicability of the second exception to the rule prohibiting disclosure:

nor does the prohibition apply to physicians ... in a civil action in which the condition of the person in whose favor the prohibition is made is an element or factor of the claim or defense of the person or of any party claiming through or under the person.

Iowa Code § 622.10 (1993) (emphasis added). The question we must decide is whether Karns' alleged intoxication is "an element or factor of [Karns' ] defense"? For the reasons that follow we hold that although Karns' intoxication may be an element or factor of Chung's claim against Karns, it is not an element or factor of Karns' defense of that claim.

II. Scope of Review.

We review the trial court's interpretation of section 622.10 for errors of law. Deases, 518 N.W.2d at 787. Moreover, we have consistently interpreted this statute liberally to accomplish its goal of fostering candid communications between doctor and patient. E.g., id.; State v. Tornquist, 254 Iowa 1135, 1154, 120 N.W.2d 483, 494 (1963); Newman v. Blom, 249 Iowa 836, 844, 89 N.W.2d 349, 355 (1958); see Iowa Practice § 504.3, at 219. This approach is consistent with the overriding principle in statutory construction: we look to the object to be accomplished and give the statute a meaning that will effectuate, rather than defeat, that object. Thompson v. State, 524 N.W.2d 160, 162 (Iowa 1994); see Wellsburg-Steamboat Rock Community Sch. Dist. v. Iowa Dep't of Educ., 523 N.W.2d 749, 751 (Iowa 1994) ("In interpreting statutes, the ultimate goal is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature.").

III. Patient-Litigant Exception.

Chung argues the exception abrogates the physician-patient privilege "when the condition of a party is in issue." The statute's plain language, as well as its underlying purpose, oppose Chung's interpretation.

The statute requires the condition be an element or factor of the claim or defense of the person claiming the privilege. The denial of an element or factor of one's opponent's case does not make that element or factor part of the case of the person making the denial. In other words, even though Karns denied he was intoxicated, his intoxication remains an element or factor in Chung's claim. We can state with confidence that if Karns' intoxication were not an element or factor in Chung's claim, it would not be an issue in the case; Karns would have no reason to make it a factor or element in his case. Therefore, the mere act of denying the existence of an element or factor of an adversary's claim does not fall within the statutory language. Peisach v. Antuna, 539 So.2d 544, 546 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989) (statute waives privilege when "patient introduces his mental condition as an element of his claim or defense"; holding a party's "denial of allegations of mental instability does not operate as a waiver of the patient-psychotherapist privilege"); Pritchard, 547 N.E.2d at 1287-88 (statute allowing disclosure when patient "introduces his mental condition ... as an element of his claim or defense" interpreted as requiring patient to affirmatively place communication at issue); State v. George, 223 Kan. 507, 575 P.2d 511, 517 (1978) (same statutory language as Iowa; holding not guilty plea does not place condition of patient at issue); Merhige v. Gubbles, 657 So.2d 1098, 1101 (La.App.1995) (statute allowing disclosure when patient "relies upon condition as an element of his claim or defense"; held answer not sufficient to place health at issue); Shamburger v. Behrens, 380 N.W.2d 659, 662 (S.D.1986) (statute waives privilege when patient "relies upon the condition as an element of his claim or defense"; held simple denial did not waive privilege); In re K.S., 137 Wis.2d 570, 405 N.W.2d 78, 82 (1987) (statute waives privilege when patient "relies upon the condition as an element of his claim or defense"; held not waived by objecting to guardianship proceedings); see Carlton v. Superior Ct., 261 Cal.App.2d 282, 67 Cal.Rptr. 568, 573 (1968) (defendant's denial of plaintiff's allegation that defendant was intoxicated at time of accident is not a "tender" of that issue so as to abrogate the physician-patient privilege under California statute); Muller v. Rogers, 534 N.W.2d 724, 726 (Minn.App.1995) ("A straightforward denial of liability by a defendant does not constitute a waiver of medical privilege."); McCormick on Evidence § 103, at 385 ("With respect to defenses, a distinction is clearly to be seen between the allegation of a physical or...