Church Mut. Ins. Co. v. Metro. Christian Worship Ctr. of St. Louis, Case No. 4:19-cv-00903-MTS
| Decision Date | 15 October 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 4:19-cv-00903-MTS |
| Parties | CHURCH MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. THE METROPOLITAN CHRISTIAN WORSHIP CENTER OF ST. LOUIS, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Church Mutual Insurance Company's Motion for Summary Judgment against Defendant The Metropolitan Christian Worship Center of St. Louis. The Motion is fully briefed and ready for adjudication. For the reasons stated herein, the Court will deny the Motion.
In January 2016, Plaintiff Church Mutual Insurance Company issued an insurance policy to Defendant The Metropolitan Christian Worship Center of St. Louis covering its church building located in St. Louis, Missouri through January 2019. Doc. [29] ¶3. On May 10, 2017, Defendant submitted a claim to Plaintiff for wind damage to the property with a date of loss of February 28, 2017. Doc. [24-6]. Based on the assigned adjusting company's investigation and the policy details, Plaintiff issued payment to Defendant for the actual cash value of the "covered wind damage to the roof and gutters" in the amount of $20,209.39 on September 20, 2017.1 Doc.[29] ¶¶45, 47.
About nine months later, in July 2018, Defendant, through counsel, sent Plaintiff a letter claiming that Plaintiff "woefully failed to properly investigate, evaluate and pay policy proceeds" to Defendant. Doc. [24-11]. In October 2018, Defendant submitted a Sworn Statement in Proof of Loss along with an estimate from a contractor that estimated the "reasonable cost of repair for the damages caused by the wind/hail event that occurred on or about February 28, 2017" to be $359,444.08. Doc. [29-1]. That estimate did not contain a figure reflecting depreciation or the actual cash value.
After investigating the facts and circumstances surrounding the loss and the claim, Plaintiff concluded there was no coverage for the damages Defendant claimed for three reasons. First, Plaintiff argues that the policy is void because Defendant made misrepresentations by presenting only a replacement cost amount and by representing that all the damage occurred on February 28, 2017. Doc. [29] ¶91. Second, Plaintiff argues that Defendant "failed to comply" with the conditions of the policy and "failed to cooperate and comply with its duties after a loss." Doc. [1] ¶¶32-34. Lastly, even if Defendant's actions did not void the policy, Plaintiff maintains the claimed damage was not related to any storm or a "Covered Cause of Loss." Doc. [1] ¶30.
Plaintiff brought this suit against Defendant seeking a declaratory judgment to determine the rights and obligations of the parties under the insurance policy and has moved for summary judgment on its declaratory judgment. Defendant has two remaining counterclaims against Plaintiff, breach of contract and vexatious refusal to pay. Defendant did not move for summary judgment and Plaintiff did not seek summary judgment on Defendant's counterclaims, though it points out that a ruling in favor of Plaintiff on the declaratory judgment would mean the counterclaims fail as a matter of law.
"A court must grant a motion for summary judgment if the moving party shows that there are no genuine disputes of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Bedford v. Doe, 880 F.3d 993, 996 (8th Cir. 2018) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). "The movant bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion and must identify the portions of the record that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact." Id. at 996; accord Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986).
"Only after the moving party fulfills its duty is the nonmoving party obliged to proffer evidence that contradicts the moving party's showing and that proves the existence of a genuine issue of material fact." Handeen v. Lemaire, 112 F.3d 1339, 1346 (8th Cir. 1997) (internal quotations omitted); accord Leffall v. City of Elsberry, Mo., No. 4:15-cv-398 SPM, 2016 WL 2866422, at *2 (E.D. Mo. May 17, 2016) (). "Mere allegations, unsupported by specific facts or evidence beyond the nonmoving party's own conclusions, are insufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment." Thomas v. Corwin, 483 F.3d 516, 526-27 (8th Cir. 2007).
Plaintiff has put forward three independent reasons why it does not owe Defendant for the property damage Defendant claims: (1) material misrepresentations by the Defendant, (2) Defendant's failure to cooperate and comply with policy provisions, and (3) that the damage wasnot from a covered cause of loss. The Court takes each argument in turn.
Plaintiff argues that Defendant's policy is void because Defendant made misrepresentations of material fact regarding its claim. First, Plaintiff contends that Defendant made a misrepresentation when it provided only a replacement value of the alleged damage in its Sworn Statement in Proof of Loss since the policy would entitle Defendant only to an actual cash value. Second, Plaintiff maintains that Defendant made a misrepresentation when it submitted that all the claimed damage occurred on February 28, 2017.
Missouri law recognizes the validity of provisions in insurance contracts that void the policy in the event of misrepresentations of material fact. See Cedar Hill Hardware & Const. Supply, Inc. v. Ins. Corp. of Hannover, 563 F.3d 329, 346 (8th Cir. 2009) (citing Shirkey v. Guarantee Trust Life & Ins. Co., 141 S.W.3d 62, 67 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004)). The policy here contained such a provision. Under the heading "CONCEALMENT, MISREPRESENTATION OR FRAUD," the policy provides that:
Doc. [29] at 19.
Plaintiff maintains that "even if the representations are innocently made, the insurer may still void the insurance policy."2 That may be the case if the language within the policy soprovides, but here it does not. Missouri law accords the terms of an insurance policy "the meaning which would be attached by an ordinary person of average understanding." Seeck v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., 212 S.W.3d 129, 132 (Mo. banc 2007). By a plain reading of the policy section, "intentionally" modifies both "conceal" and "misrepresent" and thus requires an intentional misrepresentation. See, e.g., United States v. Gumbs, 964 F.3d 1340, 1347 (11th Cir. 2020) (); United States v. Godin, 534 F.3d 51, 56 (1st Cir. 2008) (); In re Perkins, 117 S.W.2d 686, 692 (Mo. Ct. App. 1938) (); see also Cedar Hill Hardware & Const. Supply, Inc. v. Ins. Corp. of Hannover, 563 F.3d 329, 346 (8th Cir. 2009) ().3
Plaintiff has not provided sufficient evidence to show that Defendant intentionally made a misrepresentation when it provided a replacement value amount—with no actual cash value amount, which is what the policy covered—on its Sworn Statement in Proof of Loss. Irrespectiveof intentionality, it is a stretch that Defendant's action was a misrepresentation at all. In the estimate attached to its Sworn Statement in Proof of Loss, Defendant plainly identified the amount it listed as the replacement cost. Multiple times it noted that the amount was the cost of repair, and it explicitly stated it was the cost to repair the damage with new materials. It then detailed the cost breakdown of the estimate and noted that the amount it provided, $359,444.08, was the "Replacement Cost Value." If the submittal of only the replacement cost was a misrepresentation, Plaintiff has pointed to no evidence in the record that Defendant made it intentionally. Indeed, it would be nonsensical to intentionally misrepresent something while also plainly noting, numerous times, that the information intentionally misrepresented was for a valuation the policy did not use.
Plaintiff also argues that Defendant misrepresented the date of loss as February 28, 2017 because, Plaintiff asserts, not all the damage occurred on that date. Defendant, through its expert, represented that the $359,444.08 worth of damage occurred "on or about" February 28, 2017 as the result of a "wind/hail event." Theodore Boldin, who oversees building maintenance for Defendant, testified that it had been raining around February 28th for "three or four or five days[.]" Doc. [24-1] at 57. He testified further that there was "a lot of wind and stuff" on February 28th and that there was "water and plaster falling" within the building that day. Doc. [24-1] at 55. In contrast, Plaintiff has evidence that tends to show all the damage to the church did not occur...
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