Church of God in Christ, Inc. v. Graham, 94-2803

• Citation: 54 F.3d 522
• Decision Date: 15 May 1995
• Docket Number: No. 94-2803,94-2803
• Parties: CHURCH OF GOD IN CHRIST, INC., Appellant, v. Willie GRAHAM; Faith Mission Church of God in Christ, Inc., a Missouri Corporation, Appellees.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)

Page 522

54 F.3d 522

CHURCH OF GOD IN CHRIST, INC., Appellant, v. Willie GRAHAM; Faith Mission Church of God in Christ, Inc.,

a Missouri Corporation, Appellees.

No. 94-2803.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Jan. 9, 1995.

Decided May 15, 1995.

Ronald C. Spradley, Kansas City, MO, argued (Douglas D. Silvius, on the brief), for appellant.

Douglas L. Carter, Kansas City, MO, argued (David A.E. Barnes, on the brief), for appellee.

Before BOWMAN, Circuit Judge, JOHN R. GIBSON, Senior Circuit Judge, and WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

The Church of God in Christ, Inc. ("Church") appeals from the district court's ¹ grant of judgment for Willie Graham and the Faith Mission Church of God in Christ, Inc. ("Faith Mission") on the Church's claims seeking control over Faith Mission's property and pulpit. We affirm.

I.

The Church is a large religious organization headquartered in Memphis, Tennessee. The Church's charter provides that local affiliates shall title their property in trust for the Memphis organization. Jurisdictional bishops are responsible for ensuring local compliance with the Church's doctrinal and other policies and are empowered to appoint and remove pastors for the local churches within their jurisdiction. Bishop E. Harris Moore is the jurisdictional bishop responsible for the western district of Missouri, which embraces Faith Mission.

Faith Mission was founded in Kansas City, Missouri, in the 1960s and became a non-profit religious corporation in June 1971 under the leadership of its founding pastor, Hubert Lambert. Lambert was a credentialed Church minister and paid the annual assessments necessary to retain those credentials. Faith Mission contributed money to the Church, as well as to other organizations, in response to requests to support certain organized activities, and some of the Faith Mission members occasionally held administrative positions with the Church.

Despite the spiritual relation between the two institutions, Lambert never acknowledged that Faith Mission was subject to any regulatory oversight by the Church. Additionally whenever Faith Mission purchased property, it took title in its own name. Faith Mission's articles of incorporation also explicitly declare its independence, stating in part that "it is expressly understood that this corporation is not bound by or subject to oversight by any other ecclesiastical body." Similarly, Faith Mission's by-laws state that "the corporation is not under the authority or jurisdiction of any bishop or any other person affiliated with the Church of God in Christ."

Faith Mission elected Graham pastor in March 1991, following Lambert's death. Several months later Moore installed Graham in that position in accord with Church practice. In 1992, as a result of the controversy over Faith Mission's relationship to the Church, Moore issued a directive revoking Graham's credentials and purporting to remove him from the pulpit. In March 1993, the Church filed suit, seeking injunctive relief requiring Graham to vacate the pulpit, a declaration of the Church's interest in Faith Mission property, and reformation of Faith Mission documents so that the property would properly reflect the Church's interest in accord with the Church's constitution and charter. Following a three-day bench trial, the district court found that Faith Mission was independent of the Church and that it should retain its property free of any claims of the Church.

II.

As an initial matter, Faith Mission challenges this court's jurisdiction because Moore testified at trial that the Church was interested in the souls of the congregation rather than in Faith Mission's property. Inasmuch as this dispute relates to the contested property rights, however, the Church properly alleged a legitimate dispute in its complaint. The Church has consistently asserted its desire to settle the property issues as well as to have the courts grant its prayer for specific performance of its ecclesiastical decrees. The involvement of ecclesiastical authorities does not deny us jurisdiction to resolve the underlying property issues. Additionally, the nature of the churches' relationship must be decided to determine if we may exercise jurisdiction over any of the other matters raised by the parties.

The parties agree that Missouri law governs resolution of their property dispute. They disagree as to the district court's application of Missouri law and the proper constraints placed on that law by the First Amendment. We review the district court's application of Missouri law de novo, see Ruwitch v. William Penn Life Assur. Co. of America, 966 F.2d 1234, 1236 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 331, 121 L.Ed.2d 249 (1992), but defer to its factual determinations unless they are clearly erroneous. This clear error standard also applies to the district court's interpretation of the parties' documentary evidence. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511-12, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985); Taylor v. Turner, 884 F.2d 1088, 1090 (8th Cir.1989).

The Church asserts that the district court ignored the Church's ecclesiastical decree relating to a purely non-secular relationship between itself and Faith Mission. According to the Church, its decree governs the property issue and failure to defer to that disposition would alter its polity, thereby violating the First Amendment and contravening the mandate of Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 724-25, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 2387-88, 49 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976). This argument, however, ignores the state's interest in resolving the underlying property issues. "The State has an obvious and legitimate interest in the peaceful resolution of property disputes, and in providing a civil forum where the ownership of church property can be determined conclusively." Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602, 99 S.Ct. 3020, 3025, 61 L.Ed.2d 775 (1979).

Although neither the courts of Missouri nor this court can resolve property disputes "on the basis of religious doctrine and practice," id.; see Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 724-25, 96 S.Ct. at 2387-88, the property issues may be settled by applying "neutral principles of law." Jones, 443 U.S. at 602, 99 S.Ct. at 3025. Application of "objective, well-established concepts of trust and property law" in religious property disputes does not run afoul of the First Amendment because it "entail[s] 'no inquiry into religious doctrine.' " Id. at 603, 99 S.Ct. at 3025 (quoting Maryland & Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v. The Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 368, 90 S.Ct. 499, 500, 24 L.Ed.2d 582 (1970)). Accordingly, the states are not required to defer to an ecclesiastical determination of property ownership where no "doctrinal controversy is involved." Id. at 605, 99 S.Ct. at 3026.

Missouri has adopted the neutral principles approach as its exclusive means of resolving religious property disputes. Presbytery of Elijah Parish Lovejoy v. Jaeggi, 682 S.W.2d 465, 467 (Mo. banc 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1117, 105 S.Ct. 2361, 86 L.Ed.2d 262 (1985). Missouri courts look to a number of neutral factors for guidance, including the language of the local church's charter and by-laws. Id. at 473; Boatmen's First Nat'l Bank v. Southern Mo. Dist. Council of the Assemblies of God, 806 S.W.2d 706, 712 (Mo.App.1991); Reorganized Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v. Thomas, 758 S.W.2d 726, 729-31 (Mo.App.1988). Also to be considered under Missouri law are relevant state statutes, deeds, and other evidence relating to who controls and contributed to the acquisition of the contested property. Elijah Parish, 682 S.W.2d at 473-74; see Thomas, 758 S.W.2d at 730-31 (viewing surrounding circumstances to resolve latent ambiguity in deeds).

We agree with the Church that its charter and constitution must also be considered to properly assess the claim under recognized neutral principles of Missouri law. See Elijah Parish, 682 S.W.2d at 473-74. Although such evidence is probative--and makes this a closer case than Elijah Parish itself--it is not dispositive. Here, much as in Elijah Parish, the national Church does not claim that any state statutes create a trust in its favor. Additionally, the national organization contributed nothing to the acquisition of the property, and the local congregation exercised complete control over the property without any interference from the Church. Particularly damaging to the Church's claims are Faith Mission's articles of incorporation, which explicitly declare its independence, and the language of the deeds vesting title and control over the property in the hands of the local congregation. See Jones, 443 U.S. at 603 n. 3, 99 S.Ct. at 3025 n. 3 (recognizing that express terms of property instruments must be enforced); Boatmen's First Nat'l Bank, 806 S.W.2d at 714-15 (summary judgment on the basis of local church by-laws is appropriate only if their meaning is apparent); see also Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 723, 96 S.Ct. at 2387 (diocesan constitutional provisions were "not so express" as to require enforcement). The Church does not argue that these instruments are themselves ambiguous, merely that the district court disregarded the Church constitution in interpreting them. Further, the district court specifically found that there was "no reason for Faith Mission members to believe their property was held in trust for [the Church]." Any reliance of the Church on its charter and constitution is severely diluted by this finding. The Church did not automatically provide local pastors with a copy of its manual, nor was it distributed generally to Faith Mission's members. To require the Faith Mission congregation to hold its property in trust for another without proper notice as to that requirement would too severely distort the application of neutral principles of Missouri law. With only its charter and constit...