Church v. Carolina

• Decision Date: 13 June 2018
• Docket Number: 2018-UP-250
• Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals
• Parties: Morningstar Fellowship Church, Appellant/Respondent, v. York County, South Carolina, Respondent/Appellant. Appellate Case No. 2015-002460

Morningstar Fellowship Church, Appellant/Respondent, v. York County, South Carolina, Respondent/Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2015-002460

No. 2018-UP-250

Court of Appeals of South Carolina

June 13, 2018

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

Submitted March 1, 2018

Appeal From York County S. Jackson Kimball, III, Circuit Court Judge Daniel Dewitt Hall, Circuit Court Judge

Richard B. Fennell, of James, McElroy & Diehl, P.A., and Donald M. Brown, Jr., of Brown & Associates, PLLC, both of Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant/Respondent.

W Keith Martens, of Hamilton Martens, LLC, of Rock Hill; and Michael K. Kendree, Sr., of York County Government, of York for Respondent/Appellant.

PER CURIAM.

In this civil matter, Morningstar Fellowship Church (Morningstar) appeals the circuit court's orders granting partial summary judgment to York County, York County's motion to exclude damages and motion in limine, and York County's motion for entry of judgment on Morningstar's breach of contract claim. Morningstar argues the circuit court erred by (1) limiting Morningstar's presentation of its breach of contract claim at trial in the court's order granting partial summary judgment, (2) excluding evidence of Morningstar's damages and evidence of York County's breach of contract, and (3) entering judgment on Morningstar's breach of contract claim. On cross-appeal York County argues the circuit court erred by denying full summary judgment to York County because (1) sufficiency of the notice given to Morningstar was a question of law and (2) Morningstar had actual notice of approval of the commercial site plan. We affirm.

1. First, we find it was within the purview of the circuit court to limit the issues in the order granting partial summary judgment to York County, which also denied York County's motion for summary judgment on Morningstar's breach of contract claim, when the facts regarding breach of contract required further clarification. "Summary judgment is not appropriate whe[n] further inquiry into the facts of the case is desirable to clarify the application of the law." Baril v. Aiken Reg'l Med. Ctrs., 352 S.C. 271, 280, 573 S.E.2d 830, 835 (Ct. App. 2002); see also Rule 56(c), SCRCP (providing the circuit court may grant summary judgment only when the evidence shows "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law"). Although the circuit court is not required to make findings of fact and conclusions of law on decisions of motions under Rule 56, SCRCP, "it is better practice-and in most cases common practice-as well as beneficial to the judicial process for a [circuit court] to articulate relevant findings and conclusions of law in an order granting summary judgment." Woodson v. DLI Props., LLC, 406 S.C. 517, 527, 753 S.E.2d 428, 433 (2014).

2. Next, we find the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in granting York County's motion to exclude evidence and motion in limine. See Vaught v. A.O. Hardee & Sons, Inc., 366 S.C. 475, 480, 623 S.E.2d 373, 375 (2005) ("The admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the [circuit court], and absent a clear abuse of discretion amounting to an error of law, the [circuit] court's ruling will not be disturbed on appeal."); id. ("An abuse of discretion occurs when the ruling is based on an error of law or a factual conclusion without evidentiary support."); Vortex Sports & Entm't, Inc. v. Ware, 378 S.C. 197, 209, 662 S.E.2d 444, 451 (Ct. App. 2008) (finding the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitting a party's alleged damages of lost revenue).

Specifically, Morningstar argues the circuit court erred in excluding the following damages it suffered as the result of York County's declaration of default on the agreement with Morningstar concerning Heritage Tower: (1) $11, 889, 719 for the loss of value of Heritage Tower; (2) $819, 460.89 for the cost of engineering, marketing, architectural, legal, and development of Heritage Tower; and (3) $7, 187, 421 for the lost income from reservation holders at Heritage Tower over the next five years. "In a breach of contract action, damages serve to place the nonbreaching party in the position he would have enjoyed had the contract been performed." S.C. Fed. Sav. Bank v. Thornton-Crosby Dev. Co., 303 S.C. 74, 77, 399 S.E.2d 8, 10 (Ct. App. 1990). "[D]amages recoverable for breach of contract must either flow as a natural consequence of the breach or must have been reasonably within the parties' contemplation at the time of the contract." Hawkins v. Greenwood Dev. Corp., 328 S.C. 585, 595, 493 S.E.2d 875, 880 (Ct. App. 1997). While a party need not prove the amount of damages with mathematical certainty, the evidence should be such as to enable the court to determine the amount of damages with reasonable certainty or accuracy. Gray v. S. Facilities, Inc., 256 S.C. 558, 570-71, 183 S.E.2d 438, 444 (1971). Moreover, for a plaintiff to recover lost profits, he must prove (1) it is reasonably certain that such profits would have been realized except for the defendant's conduct and (2) such lost profits can be ascertained and measured from the evidence with reasonable certainty. Vortex Sports, 378 S.C. at 208, 662 S.E.2d at 450.

We find the evidence supports the circuit court's determination that the value of Heritage Tower was not based on reasonable certainty, including the testimony of Morningstar's president providing he did not know the amount it would cost to complete construction of the building. Additionally, we find the evidence supports the circuit court's finding that Morningstar based its calculation of damages on conjecture and speculation because Morningstar failed to establish with reasonable certainty the engineering marketing, architectural, legal, or developmental costs it would incur due to York County's noncompliance with the Heritage Tower agreement. See Gray, 256 S.C. at 570-71, 183 S.E.2d at 444 ("Neither the existence, causation[, ] nor amount of damages can be left to conjecture, guess[, ] or speculation."). Further, we find the lack of evidence supports the circuit court's ruling that Morningstar was not entitled to lost profits because Morningstar could not present any evidence showing a reservation holder at Heritage Tower withdrew his or her reservation due to York County's declaration of default or showing the cost to complete construction of Heritage Tower. See Drews Co. v. Ledwith-Wolfe Assocs., 296 S.C. 207, 214, 371 S.E.2d 532, 536 (1988) (finding a new business owner's expectations, unsupported by any particular standard or fixed method for...