Church v. Maryland

• Citation: 180 F.Supp.2d 708
• Decision Date: 17 January 2002
• Docket Number: Civ. No. AMD 00-3209.
• Parties: Rita CHURCH, Plaintiff, v. State of MARYLAND and Ronald Baldwin, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

180 F.Supp.2d 708

Rita CHURCH, Plaintiff, v. State of MARYLAND and Ronald Baldwin, Defendants.

Civ. No. AMD 00-3209.

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

January 17, 2002.

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Robin R. Cockey, Cockey, Brennan and Maloney, Salisbury, MD, for Rita M. Church.

Michele Joan McDonald, Glenn T. Marrow, Office of the Attorney General, Dept. of Public Safety and Corr. Services, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Office of the Attorney General, for State of Maryland.

Morton Edelstein, Baltimore, MD, for Ronald Baldwin.

MEMORANDUM

DAVIS, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

The plaintiff, Rita M. Church ("Church"), instituted this employment discrimination suit against her former employer, the State of Maryland ("the State"), where she worked for three years as a correctional officer, alleging hostile work environment/sexual harassment and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Church also joined as a defendant a former coworker, Ronald Baldwin ("Baldwin"). Church alleges that Baldwin violated her rights under several federal and state constitutional provisions, including: (1) her rights to free association, due process and equal protection, as guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, in claims asserted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (2) her right not to be subjected to gender-based discrimination as guaranteed by the Equal Rights Amendment of the Maryland Constitution. Church also asserted two state common law claims against Baldwin: (1) intentional infliction of emotional distress and (2) invasion of privacy.

I granted, in substantial part, an earlier motion to dismiss filed by the State; discovery has been concluded. Now pending are separate motions for summary judgment filed by each defendant, which Church has opposed. I have given careful attention to the parties' memoranda and exhibits, and a hearing is not needed. Local Rule 105.6. For the reasons explained below, even assuming the truth of Church's uncorroborated testimony that Baldwin carried on an unrelenting two year campaign of sexual harassment against her, the record here establishes, as a matter of law under controlling Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit precedent, that Baldwin's acts are not imputable to the State and that, in any event, the State has established, again as a matter of law, its affirmative defense of reasonable care to avoid harm to employees such as Church from harassment. Furthermore, because a final judgment "in favor of [Baldwin] for costs" was entered in a prior state court lawsuit filed by Church against Baldwin, her present claims against Baldwin are barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion. Accordingly, I shall grant the defendants' motions for summary judgment and enter judgment in favor of defendants as to all remaining claims.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS

Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A fact is material for purposes of summary judgment, if when applied to the substantive law, it affects the outcome of the litigation. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Summary judgment is also appropriate when a party "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment bears the burden of establishing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49, 106 S.Ct. 2505. "When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in [Rule 56], an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse party's response, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in [Rule 56] must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); see Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Shealy v. Winston, 929 F.2d 1009, 1012 (4th Cir.1991). Of course, the facts, as well as justifiable inferences to be drawn therefrom, must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The court, however, has an affirmative obligation to prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding to trial. Felty v. Graves-Humphreys Co., 818 F.2d 1126, 1128 (4th Cir.1987).

III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In this section, I shall set forth, in unavoidable detail, the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to Church (the nonmovant), out of which the claims in this case arise. I shall also describe the procedural history of the case and the related state court litigation.

A. Church is Hired by the State

In 1997, Church began her employment for the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services. After completing her training to become a correctional officer at the Maryland Correctional Training Academy ("Academy"), in June 1997, Church was assigned to the Division of Pretrial Detention Services. Church Dep., May 30, 2001, at 9-14 (hereinafter Church Dep. I). While at the Academy, Church received training on the State's sexual harassment policy, which included identifying on-the-job behavior that constitutes sexual harassment, and the procedure for filing complaints. Church Dep. I at 103-05, Ex. 2. Church testified that she did not receive a copy of the sexual harassment policy but she admitted that she was trained on the policy and on the reporting of sexual harassment. Id. at 104. Church seemed to suggest on deposition that the policy was not taken seriously; she claimed that "[the instructors] ... mentioned that the institution doesn't do things by the book." Id. at 105.

The Division of Pretrial Detention Services has two pretrial detention facilities: the Baltimore Central Booking and Intake Center ("BCBIC"), located at 300 E. Madison Street in Baltimore, and the nearby Baltimore City Detention Center ("BCDC"), located at 401 E. Eager Street, formerly known as the Baltimore City Jail. BCDC is comprised of several housing units, located in separate buildings, identified as the Men's Detention Center ("MDC"), the Women's Detention Center ("WDC"), the O'Brien House, the Graves Street facility, the Annex building, the Jail Industries Building, and the Wyatt building. The MDC, the WDC, the Annex, and the Wyatt building may be accessed through the entrance at 401 E. Eager Street. The Jail Industries Building is located at 531 E. Madison Street.

Church was initially assigned to the Jail Industries Building but was then transferred to the MDC, on the 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. shift. Church Dep. I at 16. Initially, at the MDC, Church did not receive "assignments" but rotated through different posts. Church Dep. I at 18-19. She was then assigned to Main Control, described as the central area through which civilians and officers enter the MDC, as a radio dispatcher. Id. at 19-20. The shift commander was Major Anthony Jordan and then Major Naomi Williams. Id. at 20. According to Church, defendant Baldwin, who is today a corrections lieutenant, but was in 1997 a sergeant, served as Church's "immediate supervisor, performing [her] evaluations and generally serving in all respects as [her] `boss.'" Church Aff. ¶ 2; see Church Dep. I at 17, 21. (As discussed infra, section IV.A.2., the contention that Baldwin was Church's supervisor is demonstrably untrue and must be rejected as a matter of law.)

B. Church's Work-Related Injuries Cause Her to Remain Off the Job for Extended Periods of Time

On April 16, 1998, while working at the MDC, Church sustained a knee injury as the result of being hit with a hand truck being pushed by an inmate. Church Dep. I at 22-30. She re-injured her knee on July 2, 1998, in a second on-the-job mishap, which required her to undergo surgery. Id. at 31-33. According to her employee time records, Church took at least 72 days of accident leave as a result of her knee injuries, between November 18, 1998, and February 28, 1999. Moreover, by May 28, 1999, Church had exhausted her accrued sick leave, and by June 22, 1999, she had exhausted her personal, compensatory, and annual leave. Church received 50 days donated sick leave, which was used from July 3 through July 11, 1999; July 23 through September 7, 1999; and October 6 through October 19, 1999. After exhausting the donated leave, Church remained on leave without pay from October 20, 1999, until she returned to work on March 1, 2000.

A recurring theme throughout the period of Church's employment after her 1998 injuries centered on issues of leave, related medical issues and fitness for duty, worker's compensation issues, work assignments and Church's on-going grievances and appeals therefrom (at least one of which was successful), most if not all of which were related to the above issues. As addressed in greater detail infra sections III.G. and III.H., Church's employment ultimately was terminated, inter alia, for her failure to document the legitimacy of her absences from work.

C. Church is Victimized by Baldwin's Harassing Behavior at Work

According to Church, from the very commencement of her employment in 1997 through 1999, Baldwin carried out an unrelenting campaign of verbal and, on at least two or...