Churchfield v. First Nat. Bank of Sheridan
| Decision Date | 19 October 1966 |
| Docket Number | No. 3528,3528 |
| Citation | 418 P.2d 1001 |
| Parties | Martin CHURCHFIELD, Leo Churchfield, Philip Churchfield, Mary Churchfield Titus and Catherine Churchfield Palmer, heirs and as members of the class of the heirs at law of Katherine Elizabeth Hughes, deceased, Appellants (Defendants below), Thomas Hammond, Edith Dawdy, Josephine House and Geraldine Vandenberg, legatees and devisees under the Last Will and Testament of Katherine Elizabeth Hughes, deceased, Appellees (Defendants below), v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF SHERIDAN, Wyoming, Executor of the Estate of Katherine Elizabeth Hughes, deceased, (Plaintiff below). |
| Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Halsey, Whitley & Liamos, by Edward S. Halsey, Newcastle, for appellants.
Henry A. Burgess by Robert J. Oberst, Sheridan, for appellees.
Before PARKER, C. J., and HARNSBERGER, GRAY and McINTYRE, JJ.
This appeal involves the interpretation to be given certain clauses of a will where the testament, after devising and bequeathing the whole estate to the spouse, provided:
'THIRD: In the event my husband, Thomas W. Hughes, predeceases me, or dies on the same occasion with me, then I give, devise and bequeath the residue and remainder of my estate as follows:
'(a) One-fifth thereof to my brother, Joe Conlin, and my sister, Agnes Donovan, and to the survivor thereof.
'(b) The remainder thereof in equal shares to my nephew and nieces by marriage, namely, Thomas Hammond, Edith Dawdy, Josephine House and Geraldine Vandenberg, or the survivors or survivor thereof.'
As the husband of the testatrix predeceased her, this paragraph THIRD of the will became applicable.
The legatees named in (b) above claim that due to the absence of any other provision covering that contingency, the one-fifth of the distributable estate dealt with by clause (a) must pass to them as the named residuary legatees.
Appellants, however, insist that there being absent from the testament any provision for disposition of the one-fifth of the estate upon the failure of the bequest thereof by reason of the death of its beneficiaries, that undisposed one-fifth must pass under the statutory laws of descent and distribution as in cases of intestacy and consequently would entitle appellants to participate therein.
The trial court decided in favor of the legatees named in clause (b) and against the heirs at law of the deceased who were stipulated to be Martin Churchfield, Leo Churchfield, Philip Churchfield, Mary Churchfield Titus and Catherine Churchfield Palmer, all of whom have appealed.
The rules of law heretofore announced by this court which are applicable in a circumstance of this kind and govern the construction and interpretation of the provisions of the last will and testament in this matter include the following:
1. '* * * the intent of the testator must be ascertained alone from the meaning of the words used by him in the purported will. * * *
2. 'The statute requiring wills to be in writing precludes ascribing to the testator any intention which he did not express in the instrument itself. * * *' In re Boyd's Estate, Wyo. 366 P.2d 336, 337.
3. '* * * If testator has omitted to provide for the state of affairs which actually has come to pass, the court cannot make the assumption that testator would probably have had a given intention if he had thought of the state of facts which actually existed, and give effect to such probable intention.' 4 Page on Wills, Bowe-Parker Revision, § 30.7, pp. 49-50.
So it is that to ascertain the testator's intention we may not read into the will something which the deceased did not write therein, but we can glean only decedent's purpose from what his testament says. 95 C.J.S. Wills § 591, pp. 765, 766.
With respect to the bequests over in the event the husband predeceased the testatrix, the only differences between the provisions in clause (a) and (b) were: (1) Clause (a) disposed of one-fifth of the estate, while clause (b) disposed of the remainder of the estate or the other four-fifths; and (2) Clause (a)...
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