Churukian v. La Gest

• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: EDWARDS; DETHMERS, C. J., and CARR, KELLY, BLACK, VOELKER, and KAVANAGH, JJ., concurred with EDWARDS; SMITH; BLACK and VOELKER, JJ., concurred with SMITH
• Citation: Churukian v. La Gest, 357 Mich. 173, 97 N.W.2d 832 (Mich. 1959)
• Decision Date: 14 July 1959
• Docket Number: No. 21,J,21
• Parties: Mary CHURUKIAN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Clayton LA GEST, Defendant and Appellee. anuary term.

Page 832

97 N.W.2d 832

357 Mich. 173

Mary CHURUKIAN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Clayton LA GEST, Defendant and Appellee.

No. 21, January term.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

July 14, 1959.

Davidow & Davidow, Detroit, for appellant.

Patterson, Patterson & Barrett, Pontiac, for appellee.

Before the Entire Bench.

EDWARDS, Justice.

Plaintiff suffered severe injuries in an auomobile accident which occurred Sunday, June 20, 1954, at approximately 1:30 a. m., at the intersection of Chicago boulevard and Telegraph road. She sued the owner of the other automobile involved in the collision, in Oakland county circuit court under the owner liability act (C.L.S.1956, § 257.401 [Stat.Ann.1952 Rev. § 9.2101]). After the completion of plaintiff's proofs the judge directed a verdict for defendant on the grounds of plaintiff's contributory negligence.

On appeal to this Court in such a situation we have repeatedly emphasized that we view the facts from the point of view favorable to plaintiff which a jury might have taken of them. Gapske v. Hatch, 347 Mich. 648, 81 N.W.2d 337; Hopkins v. Lake, 348 Mich. 382, 83 N.W.2d 262.

These then are the facts for purposes of this appeal:

Plaintiff was returning from a graduation party at a married sister's home. With her in the car were her mother, her sister and a friend. There had been no drinking.

Plaintiff's testimony concerning the crucial facts of the accident is as follows:

'A. * * * As I approached Telegraph, I slowed. I could see the flasher from far away and I slowed down slowly. I didn't come to an abrupt stop. I came to a stop at Telegraph road. There was a red blinker light there. I came to a complete stop. After I stopped--Chicago is 2 lanes, like this, and then there is a cement part where you can turn, it widens out and I was in the second lane and I stopped and looked to my right and then I looked to my left for approaching traffic and I saw nothing.

'Q. Did you see any traffic on your right when you looked? A. No, there were no cars that way.

'Q. When you looked to your left was there any traffic approaching from your left? A. No.

'Q. Then what did you do? A. I put my car in motion and again I thought I better look to the right again and I looked and I saw some lights, it had been raining that day and it was misty outside and I could see some lights far away. I thought I had plenty of time to get through.

'Having looked to my right an to my left, I saw nothing at that time and of course I thought I should start up, I couldn't sit there all night and I started up. I couldn't tell you how far away those lights were. I could just see them. I couldn't see what they were, just some lights. And I thought I had plenty of time to get through. If I stopped there might be traffic coming from the left. I had made a complete stop and I had observed and upon not seeing anything, I thought I could cross. * * * I saw the lights but I didn't know what they were at the time or how close they were to me and that is the only thing I knew about it.

'Q. Have you any recollection of a collision? A. No, sir.

'Q. What is the last you remember that night? A. Putting the car in motion and observing the lights and then the lights in the hospital.'

And on cross-examination:

'Q. Now, could you give me an estimate as to how fast your car was traveling at that time in miles per hour, whether 10 miles an hour or 5 or 15? A. Might I ask, previous to stopping or after?

'Q. Perhaps I didn't ask it correctly. At the time you made the observation you just described, how fast would you say you were going at that time? A. I had started up from a standstill, I wouldn't say more than 5 miles an hour.

'Q. Approximately 5 miles an hour? A. Yes, not any more.

'Q. Then you looked to the south at that time and I believe you said you saw some lights, is that correct? A. At that time I saw some lights, yes.

'Q. Were they south of this dip you referred to or had they come over this rise? Where were those lights? A. I have no idea how far away they were. They were at my right.

'Q. You didn't form any judgment as to the distance they were away? A. No, I didn't. They just seemed far away.

'Q. But you had formulated at that time no judgment how far away they were? A. It looked to me that they were far enough away so I could safely go across.'

The dip in Telegraph road referred to above is identified by other testimony as 600 feet from Chicago boulevard.

The driver of the other automobile was called by plaintiff to testify under the statute. He was 1 of 6 young service men returning home from Fort Knox, Kentucky, on a 42-hour leave. One of the young men was also the son of the owner of the car, the defendant here.

The driver testified that he had gotten up on Saturday at 5:30 a. m. but had had 'at the most' three hours' sleep, in the car. He also testified that there had been no drinking amongst the occupants of the car.

The defendant's car was proceeding north on Telegraph road--a main four-lane highway. Approaching Chicago boulevard, while still 1/2 mile away the driver saw a yellow flasher confronting him, and a red flasher light confronting cross-traffic on Chicago. He was familiar with the intersection. He testified his speed was 30 to 35 miles per hour. The speed limit at that point on Telegraph was 45 miles per hour.

Concerning his observations immediately before the crash, the driver of defendant's car testified:

'A. I don't recall making a definite observation to the left but I recall as I approached the intersection I could see a car coming or stopped in the intersection.'

He also testified that he was looking to his right immediately prior to the accident and only saw the plaintiff's car just before the impact. As to the accident itself, he testified:

'Q. * * * Now, do you mean to say that the front of her car struck the side of your car the way you made the drawing? A. Yes, sir, the front left fender and door was all damaged and I was thrown through the window and struck my shoulder on the door like that, so the impact was at the front fender.

'Q. You say it was the side of your car that came in contact with the Ford? A. The very point of the left front fender.

'Q. Of the Ford? A. Of our car.

'Q. The left front fender of your car came in contact with the side of the Ford, is that right? A. No, sir, the front of the Ford.'

On this same point, plaintiff testified that she did not know what portion of her car came in contact with defendant's.

The trial judge summarized the crucial testimony thus just prior to granting the motion for a directed verdict:

'The Court: I have the factual situation in mind. Taking the case in its most favorable light, here she is, stopped at a red flasher. Next she starts out. There is nothing in view. All of a sudden she sees lights. She did not form any judgment where they were and the best we can say is that when she saw lights she kept on going because she thought she had time to make it.'

This Court has in recent years frequently reiterated that it must be a very clear case to justify a trial judge in taking a negligence action from the jury on grounds of contributory negligence. Kaminski v. Grand Trunk Western Railroad Co., 347 Mich. 417, 79 N.W.2d 899; Ware v. Nelson, 351 Mich. 390, 88 N.W.2d 524.

See, also, Detroit & Milwaukee Railroad Co. v. Van Steinburg, 17 Mich. 99.

This seems to us to be such a case.

Plaintiff was traveling on a subordinate street, approaching a main through highway. She had a plain duty to stop, signaled by a red flasher light. C.L.S.1956, § 257.614 (Stat.Ann.1952 Rev. § 9.2314); C.L.S.1956, § 257.651 (Stat.Ann.1952 Rev. § 9.2351). She had the duty likewise to yield the right of way to traffic lawfully approaching on the through highway. The purpose of the statute in requiring the driver on the inferior road to stop is plainly to require him to yield the right of way to traffic lawfully approaching on the main highway. Shoniker v. English, 254 Mich. 76, 235 N.W. 866; Leader v. Straver, 278 Mich. 234, 270 N.W. 280; Breker v. Rosema, 301 Mich. 685, 4 N.W.2d 57, 141 A.L.R. 867; Krause v. Ryan, 344 Mich. 428, 74 N.W.2d 20. On the facts in this case stated in the light most favorable to her, plaintiff obviously failed to perform this duty.

Plaintiff seems to present her case on the basis of an understanding that once she had stopped for the red flasher as required, she had discharged her statutory obligation, and that she then had equal rights at the crossing with cars on the main highway. This is not our concept of the intent and purpose of the statute. Her duty to yield the right of way continued, and it was her obligation to know that traffic on the main highway was clear before she undertook to cross. While this duty might not continue ad infinitum under extreme traffic conditions, no such extreme traffic conditions on Telegraph road at 1:30 a. m. on the morning in question are indicated in this record.

In McGuire v. Rabaut, 354 Mich. 230, at pages 238, 239, 92 N.W.2d 299, 303, this Court said:

'* * * the purpose of the through highway is to move great volumes of traffic at relatively high speeds. Such purpose cannot be accomplished if our application of the standard of due care does not take into account the unique function of the arterial highway. Thus it was that we said in Arnold v. Krug, 279 Mich. 702, 707, 273 N.W. 322, 324, that, 'The right of way accorded to a driver upon a trunk line highway is something more than the privilege of going through the intersection in advance of a car which reaches it at the same time.''

The defendant in this case was traveling on one of the busiest of Michigan's great arterial highways. He was the favored driver. The undisputed facts make it obvious that the plaintiff, in this case the subordinate driver, failed to yield the right of way. If we seek for excuse for her failure in this record, we find none. She could not depend on the defendant's driver stopping. He...