Chvala v. DC Transit System, Inc.
Decision Date | 08 June 1961 |
Docket Number | 15950.,No. 15949,15949 |
Citation | 110 US App. DC 331,293 F.2d 519 |
Parties | Viola CHVALA, Appellant v. D. C. TRANSIT SYSTEM, INC., Appellee. Ann BAKER, Appellant v. D. C. TRANSIT SYSTEM, INC., Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
Mr. Francis J. Ortman, Washington, D. C., with whom Mr. Arthur E. Neuman, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellants.
Mr. Frank F. Roberson, Washington, D. C., with whom Mr. Jeremiah C. Collins, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellee. Mr. John P. Arness, Rockville, Md., also entered an appearance for appellee.
Before FAHY, WASHINGTON and DANAHER, Circuit Judges.
On January 12, 1957, an automobile owned by Ernesto Regalado and driven by Carlos Sauma collided with a streetcar loading platform on Wisconsin Avenue in the District of Columbia, veered off, and crashed into a tree. One of the passengers, Victoria Krizman, was killed; another passenger, Ann Baker, was seriously injured. Action was brought in the District Court by Baker and by Krizman's administratrix against Regalado, Sauma and D. C. Transit System, Incorporated. A default judgment was entered against the defendant Sauma. Defendant Transit — the sole appellee here — moved for and was granted a directed verdict, on the ground that the loading platform, though used by its vehicles, was not its responsibility to maintain. Plaintiffs then secured a mistrial as to the remaining defendant, Regalado, and brought the instant appeals from the verdict and judgment in favor of Transit.1 The action against Regalado is still pending.
A motion to dismiss the appeals was made by appellee upon the ground that the appeals are premature, no orders having been entered by the District Court in conformity with Fed.R.Civ.P. 54 (b).2
We think Rule 54(b) is applicable and that the appeals must be dismissed for the reason that the judgment in favor of Transit is not final and appealable in the absence of the express determination and direction referred to in the Rule. We first considered Rule 54(b) in David v. District of Columbia, 88 U.S.App.D.C. 92, 187 F.2d 204. Though we did not there hold that "more than one claim for relief" existed when a claim was against more than one party based on injuries alleged to be attributable to their negligence, that is, against joint tortfeasors, we left the door open to such a construction. In Felder v. D. Loughran Co., 88 U.S.App.D.C. 139, 188 F.2d 623, redecided on second appeal at 90 U.S.App. D.C. 324, 196 F.2d 239, we did hold the Rule applicable to such a situation. And see Vale v. Bonnett, 89 U.S.App.D.C. 116, 191 F.2d 334; Williams v. Protestant Episcopal Theological Seminary, 91 U.S. App.D.C. 69, 198 F.2d 595; Pabellon v. Grace Line, Inc., 2 Cir., 1951, 191 F.2d 169. In Gold Seal Co. v. Weeks, 93 U.S. App.D.C. 249, 209 F.2d 802, however, this court used language which in its context might be read as construing the Rule not to be applicable in such a factual situation. It was there indicated that such a case presented but one claim within the meaning of the Rule. This view has found favor in several circuits.3
That our application of the Rule in Felder was correct is, we think, now made clear by the Amendments to Rule 54(b) adopted by the Supreme Court April 17, 1961. These Amendments were prepared by the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules and reported to the Court by the Judicial Conference of the United States. They are now pending before the Congress pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1958), and are proposed to become effective July 19, 1961. The Amendments would cause the Rule to read as follows:
While the Amendments thus adopted by the Supreme Court do not conclusively demonstrate that the Court intended the Rule to be applied in its original terms as we applied it in Felder, the Amendments, and the Advisory Committee's Note accompanying them, are on the whole sufficiently indicative of such an intention to lead us to adhere to Felder.
As we said in dismissing the appeal in Southern Parkway Corp. v. Lakewood Park Corp., 106 U.S.App.D.C. 372, 373, 273 F.2d 107, 108, for lack of jurisdiction due to the absence of the express determination and direction required by Rule 54(b):
See, also, Pons v. Republic of Cuba, 110 U.S.App.D.C. 67, 288 F.2d 879; Roberts v. American Newspaper Guild, 88 U.S.App.D.C. 231, 188 F.2d 650.
In adopting the above procedure we notice in the Advisory Committee's Note accompanying the Amendments to Rule 54(b) the Committee's reference to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), added in 1958, permitting certain interlocutory appeals. The reference is as follows:
...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Novak v. Capital Management and Development Corp.
...basis of the briefs and record previously submitted and on the oral argument previously heard." Id. at *2; see Chvala v. D.C. Transit Sys., Inc., 293 F.2d 519, 521 (D.C.Cir. 1961); Pons v. Republic of Cuba, 288 F.2d 879, 880 (D.C.Cir.1961); see also 10 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER ......
-
Turtle v. Institute for Resource Management, Inc.
...the litigation with respect to less than all of the claims or parties involved must be dismissed. Chvala v. D. C. Transit System, Inc., 110 U.S.App.D.C. 331, 293 F.2d 519 (1961), judgment rev'd, 113 U.S.App.D.C. 171, 306 F.2d 778 (D.C.Cir. 1962) ; Southern Parkway Corp. v. Lakewood Park Cor......
-
Sass v. District of Columbia
...F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1960), we think the better practice is to make application under Rule 54(b). In Chvala v. D. C. Transit System, Inc., 110 U.S.App.D.C. 331, 334, 293 F.2d 519, 522 (1961), we quoted from the Advisory Committee's Note accompanying the Amendments to Rule 54(b), adopted April ......
-
Chvala v. DC Transit System, Inc.
...1 For prior history of this case, not pertinent to this appeal except to help explain the time lapse, see Chvala v. D.C. Transit Sys., Inc., 110 U.S.App.D.C. 331, 293 F.2d 519. 2 "a permanent type of platform may be constructed from appropriations contained in this Act for street improvemen......