Ciardella v. Carson City School Dist.
| Decision Date | 14 October 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. Civil R-85-347 BRT.,Civil R-85-347 BRT. |
| Parties | Mary Jane CIARDELLA, Plaintiff, v. CARSON CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT: Carson City School District Board of Trustees; Harry Dickson, Superintendent, individually and in representative capacity; Mike de la Torre, Trustee; Marsha Grismer, Trustee; Rick Hanson, Trustee; Carl Swain, Trustee; Bill Furlong, Trustee; Frank Mathews, Trustee; Robey Willis, Trustee, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Nevada |
Lawrence J. Semenza, Reno, Nev., for plaintiff.
Bruce R. Laxalt, Reno, Nev., for defendants.
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The defendants Carson City School District, et al., have moved for summary judgment against the plaintiff Mary Jane Ciardella. The plaintiff is proceeding against the defendants on the basis of 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff began her employment with the Carson City School District (CCSD) on August 21, 1972, as a school bus driver. In December of 1973, she was transferred to the CCSD accounting office and assumed the duties of an account clerk trainee. After a period of one year she became an account clerk, and on July 1, 1975 she assumed the responsibilities of a senior account clerk. On July 1, 1977, she became a principal account clerk. On May 1, 1980, she was promoted to a newly created position of "Coordinator of Business and Finance." She held that position until her retirement on February 29, 1984. At the time of plaintiff's retirement, her salary was $22,996.00. At the time of her retirement, and for several years previously, plaintiff was the highest paid classified employee in the CCSD.
The plaintiff's dissatisfaction stems from the fact that, upon plaintiff's retirement, the position of Coordinator of Business and Finance was filled by a male, Mr. Doug Sever, at a salary of $34,000.00 per year. The plaintiff maintains that the disparity between Mr. Sever's salary and her own reflects sex discrimination against her.
It is undisputed that on May 6, 1982, plaintiff directed a memorandum to Superintendent Dickson in which she spoke of her anticipated retirement in February, 1983 (subsequently postponed to February, 1984). In this memorandum plaintiff stated, inter alia:
With this in mind, I have long felt that I have been under-compensated for the amount of work and responsibility with which I have been charged. I have not said too much about this in the past because I realized the economic problems of the district and because I have been concerned with keeping costs down also. However, if it is necessary now to bring in a replacement, it will not be possible to find the caliber of person that has been mentioned for my salary of $21,312.00. It would therefore be my suggestion to budget at least $32,000 for this position for the coming year.
In November, 1983, plaintiff prepared a written job description of her position as Coordinator of Business and Finance. This detailed the duties and responsibilities of the position and was used in the Position Announcement published and circulated by the CCSD to solicit applications for the position being vacated by plaintiff. The terms of employment stated a salary range of $30,000 to $34,000 annually. Forty-three applicants responded. Preliminary screening eliminated all but nine, who took a written examination. Thereupon, three withdrew leaving six candidates, five men, including Sever, and one woman. These six were interviewed by a five-member interview panel. Plaintiff was one of the five. She rated Sever as her first choice and explained her rating of the female candidate in fourth place on the basis that she did not have the "maturity" and "presence" required to fill the position.
The position of Coordinator of Business and Finance in the CCSD is unique and sui generis. There is no other similar position in the establishment with which it may be compared.
The Equal Pay Act (29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)) reads:
No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees are employed, between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex; ...
This statute is written in the present tense and on the face of it applies to employees employed simultaneously in the same establishment. Nevertheless, there is substantial precedent which countenances the application of the law to successive employees in the same position. Peltier v. City of Fargo, 533 F.2d 374 (8th Cir.1976); Pearce v. Wichita County, 590 F.2d 128 (5th Cir.1979); Hodgson v. Behrens Drug Co., 475 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir.1973); Gosa v. Bryce Hospital, 780 F.2d 917 (11th Cir. 1986); Brunetti v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 525 F.Supp. 1363 (E.D.Ark.1981); Francoeur v. Corron & Black Co., 552 F.Supp. 403 (S.D.N.Y.1982).
None of the cited cases, however, presents undisputed facts remotely similar to the present case.
The pretrial order entered in this case states the following, among others, as issues of fact:
These are the principle issues for our consideration in resolving the motion for summary judgment.
The parties have spent a great deal of time arguing the evidence on the first issue. On the basis of the evidence at hand the court would hold that the evidence preponderates in favor of the CCSD. It is quite likely that the trier of fact would find that the job performed by Sever required additional skills and substantial additional duties and responsibilities as compared with the skills and duties and responsibilities required of plaintiff. We cannot forget, however, that this is a motion for summary judgment. We recognize that the Equal Pay Act compares the actual duties involved and does not turn on differences in job descriptions, prior training or other factors. Spaulding v. University of Washington, 740 F.2d 686 (9th Cir.1984); Patkus v. Sangamon-Cass, 769 F.2d 1251 (7th Cir.1985); EEOC v. Mercy Hospital and Medical Center, 709 F.2d 1195 (7th Cir.1983); 29 C.F.R. (1983) § 800.121. But this is a rule of decision, not of evidence. The evidence is that Sever applied for a job that required the same job requirements and performance that plaintiff had fulfilled for three and a half years. This creates a genuine disputed issue of material fact. The trier of fact may conclude that this was the job Sever did and that the evidence of claimed additional substantial responsibilities is either insignificant or pretextual.
On the other hand, the evidence on the sixth factual issue is undisputed and dispositive. The fourth exception in the Equal Pay Act is a payment "differential based on any other factor other than sex." The regulations treat of these exceptions. The examples given are intended to be illustrative, not exclusive. (29 C.F.R. (1983) § 800.145). The recognition of the "red circle principle" as permitting a wage differential (§§ 800.146 and 800.147) is particularly illuminating for its acknowledgement of job market conditions and economic facts as justifications. The red circle principle was involved in Gosa v. Bryce Hospital, 780 F.2d 917 (11th Cir.1986), and the...
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Knight v. GW Plastics, Inc.
...a changed marketplace provides a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for differential pay. See, e.g., Ciardella v. Carson City School District, 671 F.Supp. 699, 702 (D.Nev. 1987). However, "the employees whose pay is the subject of comparison may hold jobs in succession as well as simulta......