Ciarlelli v. Hamden

Citation8 A.3d 1093,299 Conn. 265
Decision Date21 December 2010
Docket NumberNo. 18201.,18201.
CourtSupreme Court of Connecticut
PartiesDavid CIARLELLI v. TOWN OF HAMDEN et al.

Andrew J. Morrissey, Naugatuck, with whom was Jill Morrissey, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Jason M. Dodge, with whom was Heather K. Porto, Glastonbury, for the appellees (defendants).

ROGERS, C.J., and NORCOTT, KATZ, PALMER and ZARELLA, Js.*

PALMER, J.

This appeal requires us to determine when the one year limitation period of General Statutes § 31-294c (a) 1 begins to run on a claim for hypertension benefits under General Statutes § 7-433c. 2 The plaintiff,David Ciarlelli, appeals 3 from the decision of the compensation review board (board), which affirmed the decision of the workers' compensation commissioner for the third district (commissioner) dismissing the plaintiff's claim for hypertension benefits under § 7-433c as untimely because the plaintiff had failed to file his claim within one year of what the commissioner characterized as "documented, elevated hypertensive blood pressure readings...." The plaintiff contends that, for purposes of determining when the one year limitation period of § 31-294c commenced, the board improperly treated his hypertension as an accidental injury definitely located in time and place, a claim for which must be filed within one year of that date, rather than a repetitive trauma injury,a claim for which generally need not be brought until one year from the last day of the claimant's employment. The plaintiff further contends that the board incorrectly concluded that aclaimant seeking benefits for hypertension under § 7-433c must file a notice of claim within one year from the date that the claimant knew or should have known that he had symptoms of hypertension, rather than within one year from the date that he was informed by a medical professional that he suffers from hypertension. Although we reject the plaintiff's first claim, we agree with his second claim and, accordingly, reverse the decision of the board.

The record reveals the following undisputed facts and procedural history. The plaintiff was hired by the named defendant, the town of Hamden,4 as a police officer in 1982, and he remained a regular member of the Hamden police department until his retirement in August, 2004. When he was hired, the plaintiff passed a preemployment physical that did not reveal any evidence of hypertension or heart disease. In 1996, after the death of his treating physician, the plaintiff began seeing another physician, Paul Monaco, who remained his physician until the plaintiff's retirement in 2004. Between 1996 and 2004, the plaintiff visited Monaco on numerous occasions, and Monaco usually measured the plaintiff's blood pressure at those visits. According to Monaco, the plaintiff's blood pressure frequently was either normal or "borderline" for hypertension.5 Theplaintiff's highest readings were associated with particularly stressful situations, either work-related or otherwise. For example, in February, 1999, the plaintiff was sprayed with pepper spray during a training exercise at work and, thereafter, registered a blood pressure reading of 220/130; on another occasion in March, 2002, the plaintiff discovered a lump in his groin and registered a blood pressure reading of 160/100.6 Beginning in late 2000, Monaco advised theplaintiff to monitor his blood pressure at home and to watch his weight and to diet. When the plaintiff measured his own blood pressure at home, his readings usually were in the normal range, leading Monaco to conclude that the plaintiff suffered from "white coat effect," a term used to describe a patient's elevated blood pressure readings, when those readings are taken at a physician's office, due to the patient's anxiety about being seen by a physician. In early May, 2004, the plaintiff developed a severe headache and sought treatment at a hospital emergency department. His blood pressure at that time was abnormally high, and it remained elevated the next day when he visited Monaco's office. At that point, Monaco decided to put the plaintiff on Monopril, a prescription antihypertensive medication.

The plaintiff filed a notice of claim for hypertension benefits on May 20, 2004. A hearing on his claim washeld on November 29, 2005, at which the plaintiff introduced into evidence the deposition testimony of Monaco, who stated that he did not consider the plaintiff to be hypertensive until May 11, 2004, because, prior to that date, the plaintiff's blood pressure never was "consistently elevated...." The plaintiff testified at the hearing that Monaco never had informed him, prior to May 11, 2004, that he was hypertensive. The plaintiff further testified that he never had noted any consistently high blood pressure readings when he took his own blood pressure at home. When the plaintiff was asked if he had been aware of the Heart and Hypertension Act 7 during his tenure as a police officer, he responded in the affirmative. When questioned why, given that awareness, he had not filed a notice of claim prior to May 11, 2004, the plaintiff responded: "I'm not a doctor. I have to put my trust in my doctor and [in] what he tells me. He never told me I was hypertensive, and I don't have the schooling to dispute him otherwise." Finally, the plaintiff testified that, when Monaco recommended that he lose weight or make changes to his diet, Monaco did not mention high blood pressure as the reason for the recommendation.

The defendant introduced into evidence the deposition testimony of Martin Krauthamer, a cardiologist whom the defendant had retained to review the plaintiff's medical file. Krauthamer testified that, in his medical opinion, the plaintiff had documented hypertensive blood pressure readings in December, 2000, January, 2001, March, 2002, and March, 2003. On the basis of Krauthamer's testimony, the commissioner dismissed the plaintiff's claim as untimely because the plaintiff had failed to file a notice of claim for benefits within one year of the hypertensive blood pressure readings identified by Krauthamer.

Following the commissioner's decision, the plaintiff filed a motion to correct the commissioner's findings and a motion for articulation. In his motion to correct, the plaintiff requested, inter alia, that the commissioner supplement his decision to include a finding that, although Monaco had discussed the plaintiff's blood pressure with him prior to May, 2004, the term "hypertension" did not appear anywhere in the plaintiff's medical records prior to May 11, 2004, and, further, that there was no evidence that Monaco ever had communicated a diagnosis of hypertension to the plaintiff before that date. The plaintiff also requested a finding that Krauthamer's medical opinions cannot be imputed to the plaintiff retroactively so as to constitute notice to him that he was suffering from hypertension prior to May 11, 2004. Thecommissioner denied the plaintiff's motion to correct.

In his motion for articulation, the plaintiff sought an explanation of whether, for purposes of applying the one year limitation period of § 31-294c, the commissioner had considered the plaintiff's hypertension to be an "accidental injury [that] may be definitely located in time and place" or a "repetitive trauma" injury.8 The plaintiff also sought an articulation of whether the commissioner had found that, prior to May 11, 2004, the plaintiff was aware of an actual diagnosis of hypertension, or merely was aware of symptoms indicative of a potential diagnosis in the future.

In response to the plaintiff's motion for articulation, the commissioner made the following articulation: "The[plaintiff] received repeated advice from his treating physician that he had elevated and/or borderline blood pressure readings in December, 2000, January, 2001, March, 2002, September, 2002, and March 2003.... Monaco had advised the [plaintiff] several times between December, 2000, and March, 2003, about watching his diet, losing weight, monitoring his blood pressure at home and making lifestyle changes. The [plaintiff] had, therefore, been alerted by ... Monaco of a potential claim for hypertension benefits which, under ... [§] 7-433c, requires the claimant to notify the employer of a potential claim under [General Statutes § ] 31-294b and to file a notice of claim under ... [§] 31-294c.

"The repeated elevated blood pressure readings between December, 2000, and March, 2003, makes the notice of claim in May, 2004, untimely because it is more than one year after the claim should have been filed.

"[Krauthamer's] expert opinion as a cardiologist was acknowledged to verify the finding that the multiple, elevated blood pressure readings by ... Monaco should have alerted the [plaintiff] to file a potential claim for hypertension benefits."

The plaintiff appealed from the decision of the commissioner to the board, which, in a split decision, affirmed the commissioner's decision. In so doing, the board surveyed the relevant case law pertaining to when a notice of claim under § 7-433c must be filed. The board acknowledged that its perspective on the issue had changed over time and that, until several years ago, a claimant generally was required to file a notice of claim only when the disease became "disabling," which was defined by the need for medical care, including prescription medication. The board noted, however, that, in Pearce v. New Haven, 76 Conn.App. 441, 450, 819 A.2d 878, cert. denied,264 Conn. 913, 826 A.2d 1155 2003), the Appellate Court had endorsed an approach that requires a claimant to file a notice of claim when he becomes aware that he has symptoms of hypertension. The board further noted that, in Arborio v. Windham Police Dept., 103 Conn.App. 172, 177, 928 A.2d 616 (2007), the Appellate Court, although reversing the decision of the board in that case, nevertheless purported to reaffirm the standard that it had applied in Pearce. The board thus concluded: ...

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28 cases
  • Staurovsky v. City of Milford Police Dep't, 37670.
    • United States
    • Appellate Court of Connecticut
    • March 29, 2016
    ......191 subject to the one year limitation period set forth in General Statutes § 31–294c (a). Ciarlelli v. Hamden, 299 Conn. 265, 278, 8 A.3d 1093 (2010). Section 31–294c (a) provides in relevant part that "[n]o proceedings for compensation under the ......
  • O'Dell v. Kozee
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Connecticut
    • September 28, 2012
    ...thus raising the question of whether the doctrine of legislative acquiescence applies to the holding in Hayes. See Ciarlelli v. Hamden, 299 Conn. 265, 285, 8 A.3d 1093 (2010) (“we have characterized the failure of the legislature to take corrective action as manifesting the legislature's ac......
  • Brennan v. City of Waterbury, SC 19937
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Connecticut
    • May 14, 2019
    ......684 and their dependents, but the Workers' Compensation Act dictates the substance of and the procedure for obtaining such benefits. See Ciarlelli v. Hamden , 299 Conn. 265, 276–77, 8 A.3d 1093 (2010) ; Genesky v. East Lyme , 275 Conn. 246, 252 n.9, 881 A.2d 114 (2005). Because of this ......
  • State v. Flemke
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Connecticut
    • February 10, 2015
    ...... jurisprudential limitation on our own authority to reconsider the merits of our earlier decision.”(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ciarlelli v. Hamden, 299 Conn. 265, 285 n. 12, 8 A.3d 1093 (2010). Davis was decided nearly fourteen years ago, a significant enough period of time to give ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • Workers' Compensation Developments 2010-2012
    • United States
    • Connecticut Bar Association Connecticut Bar Journal No. 86, 2012
    • Invalid date
    ...Conn. at 405. 195. Id. at 409. 196. Id. at 413. 197. Id. 198. 301 Conn. 405, 21 A.3d 444 (2011). 199. Id. at 412-415 and nn. 5-7. 200. 299 Conn. 265, 8 A.3d 1093 (2010). 201. Id. at 302-03. 202. Id. at 287, 299, 300-01. 203. Id. at 301 and n. 18. Since Ciarlelli several appellate cases have......

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