Cicchetti v. Lucey, Civ. A. No. 73-3185-F.

• Decision Date: 21 May 1974
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 73-3185-F.
• Citation: 377 F. Supp. 215
• Parties: John B. CICCHETTI, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v. David J. LUCEY, Registrar of Motor Vehicles.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

377 F. Supp. 215

John B. CICCHETTI, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v. David J. LUCEY, Registrar of Motor Vehicles.

Civ. A. No. 73-3185-F.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

May 21, 1974.

Robert W. Hagopian, Wrentham, Mass., for plaintiff.

Asst. Atty. Gen. Christopher Worthington, Boston, Mass., for defendant.

OPINION

FREEDMAN, District Judge.

This class action allegedly arises under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff seeks to have Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 90C, Section 4, declared unconstitutional on its face or as applied to plaintiff, and asks that the Court enjoin defendant from acting pursuant to that statute. The statute reads as follows:

If any person summoned to appear before a court for an automobile law violation fails without good cause to appear at the time and place specified on said summons, and has failed to comply with the provisions of section four A, the clerk of court to which said summons was returnable shall immediately notify the registrar who shall suspend any motor vehicle license issued to such person, and such person shall not be eligible for reinstatement of his license until he shall have appeared before said court and answered to the charge made against him.

Plaintiff originally brought this action in his own behalf only. In an amended complaint, allowed by the Court, plaintiff sought to sue on behalf of a class of plaintiffs similarly situated. By order of the Court, dated May 21, 1974, the following class has been certified:

All those persons whose Massachusetts License to Operate Motor Vehicles has been suspended by the defendant or his predecessors or successors in office pursuant to Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 90C, Section 4, prior to an opportunity for hearing on such suspension.

Plaintiff requests a three-judge panel be convened to hear this action. Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31 at 33, 82 S.Ct. 549, 7 L.Ed.2d 512 (1962), states that a three-judge court is not required where the constitutional claim had been settled by prior binding precedent. It is this Court's opinion, as will be elaborated upon, that Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971), constitutes prior binding precedent as to the issues raised in the case at bar and renders the constitutional question herein insubstantial. The necessity for a three-judge court is thus foreclosed.

Defendant has moved to dismiss the action and plaintiff has moved for summary judgment. Oral arguments on both motions were heard on April 1, 1974. The facts, as alleged, are not contested. Defendant has not denied the factual allegations of the complaint and the parties assumed the same set of facts upon arguing their respective motions. There is no dispute as to any genuine issue of material fact. The relevant facts are as follows:

On April 23, 1973, a Boston Police Officer issued a citation to the plaintiff for a motor vehicle violation. On the same day a complaint issued from the District Court. Plaintiff appeared at the designated time, but the case was continued until July 13, 1973. On that date plaintiff appeared, was tried, and was found not guilty. Erroneously, the clerk of the District Court forwarded an abstract of its records to the Registry of Motor Vehicles, showing that the plaintiff had failed to appear at court and was defaulted on July 6, 1973. There was no such default. Upon receipt of the notification from the court, the defendant, pursuant to M.G.L. c. 90C, § 4, suspended the plaintiff's operators license without a hearing. In a short period of time the error was corrected and plaintiff's operators license returned to him. Mootness is not an issue as this action is brought on behalf of a class. On a related matter, see 7A Wright & Miller § 1776 (1972 Edition). The Court will address the motions individually.

Defendant urges dismissal on the grounds that: (1) the complaint fails to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) that the matters contained in the complaint do not involve a constitutionally protected right, thus the Court is without jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343; and (3) that plaintiff has failed to exhaust available administrative and statutory remedies. The Court rejects these arguments. Defendant asserts that the statute does not violate due process because the Commonwealth has an "overriding interest in assuring proper response to criminal complaints arising out of motor vehicle violations." If there is such an "overriding interest," the Court fails to see how affording an opportunity to be heard creates an obstacle which interferes with that interest. As was stated recently by the Court of Appeals for this Circuit, ". . . if the state can accomplish its purpose just as well by observing some measure of due process as by not observing it, it should tread the former path." Palmigiano v. Baxter, 487 F.2d 1280, 1287 (1st Cir., 1973). It would certainly not be overburdensome to send one notice advising an operator that within a specified number of days his or her license would be suspended if he or she did not take advantage of a given opportunity to be heard.

Nor is the Court impressed by defendant's argument that a constitutionally protected right is not involved. It is too well settled to warrant extensive...