Cicero v. Olgiati
Decision Date | 17 March 1976 |
Docket Number | No. 75 Civ. 2059.,75 Civ. 2059. |
Citation | 410 F. Supp. 1080 |
Parties | Paula CICERO et al., Plaintiffs, v. Ennis J. OLGIATI, individually and as Chairman of the New York State Board of Parole, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
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David Rudenstine, Project on Sentencing and Parole, New York Civil Liberties Union, New York City, for plaintiffs.
Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen., New York City, for defendants; Jules E. Orenstein, Mineola, N. Y., of counsel.
This suit by prisoners in New York State correctional facilities challenges the standards and methods by which the New York State Board of Parole (Parole Board) grants or denies parole on the ground that they are so arbitrary as to violate the requirements of due process. At issue is the constitutionality of the statute (on its face and as applied) which specifies the basis for parole release, New York Correction Law § 213. Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that § 213 is unconstitutional on its face because it is "incapable of being applied rationally, fairly, consistently and nonarbitrarily," (¶ 31, Amended Complaint) and that the Parole Board in practice "unfairly discriminates among prisoners" (¶ 35) and fails "to make parole release decisions which are rational, fair, consistent and non-arbitrary from case to case." (¶ 34)
The plaintiffs are prisoners who have either been denied parole or who will soon become eligible for parole consideration. Defendants are the Chairman and members of the Parole Board, and the Commissioner of the New York State Department of Correctional Services, under whom the Board serves.
The defendants move to dismiss the amended complaint. Plaintiffs seek a class action determination.
New York Correction Law § 213, which sets forth the grounds for granting parole release, reads:
Plaintiffs attack the facial validity of § 213 not only on the ground that the language authorizing release on parole — "if the board of parole is of opinion that there is reasonable probability that, if such prisoner is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society" — is so vague as to vest unbridled discretion in the Parole Board, but also because it requires the Board to make predictions regarding an inmate's future conduct upon release that are claimed to lie beyond the grasp of human knowledge and expertise. The amended complaint also alleges that the Parole Board "unreasonably and unfairly discriminates among prisoners . . . because of race, class and ethnic prejudices" (¶ 35) and fails to make decisions "which are rational, fair, consistent and non-arbitrary from case to case." (¶ 34) Plaintiffs assert that those decisions are based on inaccurate and insufficient data and are hastily and carelessly determined.
Defendants move to dismiss the amended complaint on a variety of grounds: That plaintiffs' exclusive remedy is a habeas corpus petition, not a civil rights action; that this court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction to allow state courts to deal with the issues presented; that action by this court would offend principles of comity; that a declaratory judgment would unduly interfere with state proceedings; that plaintiffs' claims should be determined solely on a case by case analysis; that the due process clause is inapplicable to the parole release system; that Correction Law § 213 is not unconstitutionally vague and overbroad; that the allegation that the Parole Board's decisions are arbitrary is fatally deficient because the amended complaint does not allege that the decisions are unsupported by the evidence; and that the allegation of racially discriminatory conduct by the Board is unsupported and conclusory. Prolific as these assertions may be, they fall analytically into two categories: first, that a federal court does not have jurisdiction of the subject matter, or if it does, should decline to exercise jurisdiction; and second, that the amended complaint fails to state a cognizable constitutional claim.
Plaintiffs sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which empowers federal courts to consider alleged violations of constitutional rights by those acting "under color of state law" without requiring a plaintiff first to seek redress in a state forum. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183, 81 S.Ct. 473, 481-82, 5 L.Ed.2d 492, 502-03 (1961). However, recognition of the potential tension between the powers accorded federal courts under the Civil Rights Act and respect for the ability of state courts to safeguard constitutional guarantees has prompted the Supreme Court in certain circumstances to narrow the scope of federal court action in cases alleging § 1983 claims. The Court has also specified the circumstances in which no jurisdiction exists under § 1983.
the sole available remedy is a writ of habeas corpus which requires that a plaintiff first exhaust state remedies under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). Id. at 500, 93 S.Ct. at 1841-42, 36 L.Ed.2d at 456-57. Preiser ruled that where the action is "close to the core" of habeas corpus, Congress' "specific determination" that habeas petitioners initially exhaust state judicial remedies must be respected despite a plaintiff's choice of jurisdictional base. Id. at 489, 490, 93 S.Ct. at 1836-37, 36 L.Ed.2d at 450-51.
The State characterizes the complaint here as seeking a "wholesale reform of the New York parole system" and argues that the remedy sought fits the Preiser definition of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We disagree. Although plaintiffs admittedly seek a close examination of the criteria and methods used in making parole release determinations, they do not claim that they or any members of the class they wish to represent are entitled to immediate release or that they have a right to parole at all. Moreover, they seek neither an earlier nor a speedier hearing at which they will be considered for parole. In short, plaintiffs do not ask for release from state custody, and their claims do not fall under the habeas corpus statute.
Our view is consistent with post-Preiser rulings in this and other circuits that attacks by prisoners on the manner of parole decision making as distinct from its outcome are not subject to the exhaustion requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). Haymes v. Regan, 525 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1975); Leonard v. Mississippi State Probation & Parole Board, 509 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1975); Bradford v. Weinstein, 519 F.2d 728 (4th Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded as moot sub nom., Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 96 S.Ct. 347, 46 L.Ed.2d 350 (1975); U. S. ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman, New York State Board of Parole, 500 F.2d 925 (2d Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded as moot sub. nom., Regan v. Johnson, 419 U.S. 1015, 95 S.Ct. 488, 42 L.Ed.2d 289 (1974). Accord, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 554-55, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2973-74, 41 L.Ed.2d 935, 949-50 (1974) ( ).2
The authorities cited by the defendants are not to the contrary. None deals with a complaint restricted to a prayer for declaratory judgment that the parole statute and process are unconstitutional. The closest to the mark is Baskins v. Moore, 362 F.Supp. 187 (D.S.C.1973) which involved parole release proceedings. While the Baskins petitioners did seek a declaration that the procedures by which they were denied parole were unconstitutional, they also sought the relief of new parole hearings. We may agree or disagree with Baskins that prayer for such relief constituted a habeas corpus action as defined in Preiser, but the plaintiffs in the case at hand do not seek a new hearing, and this suit accordingly is not ". . . within the core of habeas corpus in attacking the very duration of their physical confinement itself." Preiser v. Rodriguez, supra, 411 U.S. at 487-88, 93 S.Ct. at 1835, 36 L.Ed.2d at 449.
The other cases cited by defendants are equally inapplicable. Mason v. Askew, 484 F.2d 642 (5th Cir. 1973) involved a complaint in which the petitioner sought actual release. The inmates in United States ex rel. Dereczynski v. Longo, 368 F.Supp. 682 (N.D.Ill.1973) asked not only for an injunction requiring procedural due process in parole revocation procedures, but also for "immediate and more speedy hearings" to determine whether they were entitled to release.
Defendants argue that the court should invoke the doctrine of abstention because plaintif...
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