Cichos v. State, 30482

• Decision Date: 01 October 1965
• Docket Number: No. 30482,30482
• Citation: 210 N.E.2d 363,246 Ind. 680
• Parties: Ronald Richard CICHOS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 363

210 N.E.2d 363

246 Ind. 680

Ronald Richard CICHOS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Indiana, Appellee.

No. 30482.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Oct. 1, 1965.

Warren Buchanan, John B. McFaddin, Rockville, for appellant.

John J. Dillon, Atty. Gen., James Manahan, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellee.

ACHOR, Judge.

Appellant has filed a petition for rehearing in which he asserts that this court, in its opinion as written, erred in two particulars.

First: That this court failed to comply with the requirements of Art. 7, Sec. 5 of the Indiana Constitution by failing to 'give a statement in writing of each question arising in the record of such case, and the decision of the Court thereon.' It is not that this court has presumed to disregard this constitutional provision, but since the provision is merely directive and does not involve any substantive rights of the litigants involved, we have given it a reasonable construction consistent with the obviously intended purpose thereof. Accordingly we have limited our discussion to the principal contentions in the case which, incidentally, were the issues discussed in oral argument. We intentionally omitted from our discussion those 'questions arising in the record' which seemed frivolous, were not supported by substantial argument in the briefs or were so patently contrary to the well-established law of the state since a discussion thereof would merely constitute an unjustifiable encumberance of the reported decisions of the state without making any contribution to the general body of the law.

Strong precedent has been established supporting the position that this constitutional provision is to be given reasonable rather than a literal construction. As stated by this court in State ex rel. Sluss v. Appellate Court of Indiana (1938), 214 Ind. 686, at 691-692, 17 N.E.2d 824, at 826:

'The constitutional provision quoted above [Art. 7, Sec. 5] must have, however, a reasonable interpretation as well as a practical application. It is not to be presumed that the framers of that document intended that this court should be required to exhaust every subject that might be raised on an appeal, without regard to its importance in the determination of the cause.

'In the case of Willets v. Ridgway, 1857, 9 Ind. 367, 369, 370, Perkins, J., speaking for this court, said:

'It is true that the constitution, by an unwise provision, requires that this Court shall give a written opinion upon every point arising in the record of every case--a provision which, if literally followed, tends to fill our Reports with repetitions of decisions upon settled, as well as frivolous, points and often introduce into them, in the great press of business, premature and not well considered opinions, upon points only slightly argued; yet it is a provision not to be disregarded, though merely directory, like that requiring the legislature to use good English. But though the provision is not to be disregarded, it is to be observed according to some construction, and should receive such a one as to obviate its inconvenience and objectionable character, as far as consistently can be done." [Our emphasis.]

Furthermore, in a more recent case, when confronted with circumstances very similar to those existing in the present case, this court in appelby v. State (1943), 221 Ind. 544, at pp. 549-550, 48 N.E.2d 646, at p. 648 [reh. den. 49 N.E.2d 533], stated:

'The appellants' motion for a new trial occupies forty-five (45) of the six hundred sixty-eight (668) pages of their printed brief. Sixty-six (66) separate and distinct legal propositions are presented for our determination. We cannot bring ourselves to believe that the framers of our State Constitution had any such situation in mind when they enjoined upon us the obligation to 'give a statement in writing to each question arising in the record' Art. 7, Sec. 5, or when they imposed upon the General Assembly the duty to provide for 'the speedy publication of the decisions' of this court. Art. 7, Sec. 6. At the risk of being charged with failing to meet our responsibilities, we feel obliged to limit our consideration of this case to what appear to be the principal contentions. We have pointed out in the past that one prejudicial error clearly presented is enough to accomplish a reversal by this court. Weer v. State, 1941, 219 Ind. 217, 36 N.E.2d 787, 37 N.E.2d 537.' [Our italics.]

In other instances this court has applied the rule of reason to the above constitutional directive by providing that the court need not give a statement in writing of each question arising in the record, unless the parties have filed briefs and therein presented substantial argument regarding the issue so as to aid the court in making its decision regarding the questions presented by the record in such case. Furthermore, as above noted we have held that in reversing a case we need only discuss a single issue arising in the case which sustains the decision of this court.

In this case we have limited our consideration to those issues which we considered to be substantial questions and this we have endeavored to do in a comprehensive manner.

To demonstrate our reason for not discussing the other many specifications assigned as error, we make the following comment with regard to a few of such specifications, which are illustrative of those asserted in appellant's petition for rehearing. Appellant's Proposition II, Point 1, urges that the trial court committed prejudicial error by permitting State's Exhibit No. 3 to be admitted in evidence. Appellant claims that...