Cima v. Rhoades
Decision Date | 01 October 2013 |
Docket Number | No. ED 97813.,ED 97813. |
Citation | 416 S.W.3d 320 |
Parties | Rosalie J. CIMA, et al., Appellants, v. Randy L. RHOADES, et al., Respondents. |
Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Jill R. Jackson, Columbia, MO, for appellants.
Louis Leonatti, Randall Baker, Mexico, MO, for respondents.
Appellants appeal the trial court's judgment upholding a revocable trust and an amendment thereto, executed by Betty Virginia Rhoades. Appellants argue the overwhelming weight of the evidence established that the documents were the result of undue influence. We affirm.
Appellants Rosalie Cima, Donald Rhoades, Charles Rhoades, Dennis Rhoades, and Kenneth Rhoades, are children of Betty Virginia Rhoades (Mrs. Rhoades). Respondents are Mrs. Rhoades' remaining three children 1: Randy Rhoades (Rhoades), Betty Sue Herron (Herron), and Beverly Kibler. This case centers on a will and revocable trust Mrs. Rhoades executed in 2000 and amended in 2001, which replaced a 1982 will Mrs. Rhoades and her late husband had created. The revocable trust, executed on July 15, 2000, named all of Mrs. Rhoades' children as beneficiaries of the trust, except Respondent Beverly Kibler “for valid reasons not necessary to recite here.” The trust also named Rhoades and Herron as successor trustees to Mrs. Rhoades and executors of Mrs. Rhoades' will. The trust assets consisted of three tracts of real estate as well as personal property of Mrs. Rhoades including bank accounts, stocks, bonds, and an automobile. Rhoades and Herron were also named Mrs. Rhoades' agents under a durable power of attorney executed by Mrs. Rhoades at the same time she created the trust.
On August 20, 2001, Mrs. Rhoades amended the trust to omit Appellants from inheriting any of the real estate or personal property assets of the trust. A provision allowing Appellant Dennis Rhoades an option to purchase certain real estate assets of the trust was also removed by this amendment.
Late in 2002, Mrs. Rhoades moved into a residential care facility. In 2003, Mrs. Rhoades underwent memory impairment testing and was diagnosed by her primary physician, Dr. Justin Jones, with Alzheimer's.
In 2007, Appellants filed a petition to set aside the 2000 revocable trust and the 2001 amendment thereto and to find a constructive trust for Appellants. Appellants argued that Mrs. Rhoades lacked mental capacity to execute the amendment, both because she was mentally incompetent and because she was unduly influenced by Rhoades and Herron. Appellants additionally argued that Rhoades and Herron had violated their fiduciary duties in the management of trust assets and requested an accounting of the trust and removal of Rhoades and Herron as trustees.
At trial in 2011, Appellants presented evidence that during the year of 2000, they became concerned about Mrs. Rhoades' ability to drive and to handle her finances. In July of 2000, Rhoades took a copy of Mrs. Rhoades' existing will to James Beavers, an attorney, and let him know Rhoades and Mrs. Rhoades would come to see him about drafting a revocable trust. Mr. Beavers drafted the documents, and Mrs. Rhoades executed them on July 15, 2000. Appellants presented evidence that Rhoades and Herron then moved Mrs. Rhoades from Illinois to Missouri in September of 2000 and would not provide any contact information for their mother to the rest of their siblings. Herron testified that this was at Mrs. Rhoades' request. Herron provided daily assistance to Mrs. Rhoades, including cleaning her apartment, handling her finances, and taking her to doctors' appointments.
In October of 2000, Appellants, excluding Kenneth Rhoades, filed a petition in Illinois to be appointed guardians of their mother. Mrs. Rhoades was upset about this, and in February of 2001, attorney Brad Brett sent a letter on behalf of Mrs. Rhoades asking her children to dismiss the guardianship petition and promising they would all be treated equitably in her estate if they did so. The guardianship petition was later dismissed, but Mr. Brett testified Mrs. Rhoades never received an apology from her children who filed the petition.
Respondents presented testimony from Dr. Jones, who testified that based on his visits with Mrs. Rhoades in 2000 and 2001, in his opinion she was mentally competent to execute her estate documents on August 20, 2001. Respondents also presented testimony from two attorneys: Mr. James Beaver, who drafted Mrs. Rhoades' 2000 estate documents, and Mr. Brett, who drafted the 2001 amendment to the trust. Both testified they believed Mrs. Rhoades to be mentally competent at the time she executed the documents they prepared. Mr. Brett also had his assistant, Lois Keith, sit in on his meeting with Mrs. Rhoades and prepare a memorandum of her observations of Mrs. Rhoades. Ms. Keith noted that Mrs. Rhoades was able to name all of her children and their ages, and Mrs. Rhoades understood she was disinheriting some of her children and was able to name which ones. She was dressed appropriately, spoke clearly, and had very good handwriting. Ms. Keith believed Mrs. Rhoades understood what she was signing and observed that when Mrs. Rhoades asked Rhoades and Herron afterward how they felt about what she had done, they told her it was her decision and whatever she wanted to do was fine with them.
Appellants presented evidence from Dr. Simon Horenstein, a neurologist who reviewed Mrs. Rhoades' medical records. He opined that Mrs. Rhoades suffered from dementia as early as 1999, and therefore that she was not mentally competent to execute her estate documents in 2000 or 2001.
The trial court made its own findings and also adopted the findings of Mrs. Rhoades' Guardian ad Litem (GAL). These findings were that Respondents established with substantial evidence that Mrs. Rhoades had sufficient mental capacity to execute the amendment to the trust in 2001. The trial court further found that Appellants had presented no credible evidence of undue influence, and the GAL agreed Appellants did not meet their burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that Mrs. Rhoades' will was overborne when she executed her estate documents in 2000 and 2001. The trial court denied Appellants' request for relief and granted Respondents their reasonable attorney's fees. This appeal follows.
We will affirm the judgment in a court-tried case unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law. Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976). We accept as true evidence and reasonable inferences favorable to the prevailing party and disregard contrary evidence and inferences. In re Wax, 63 S.W.3d 668, 670 (Mo.App. E.D.2001). We also defer to the trial court's resolution of conflicting evidence and its credibility determinations. Watermann v. Eleanor E. Fitzpatrick Revocable Living Trust, 369 S.W.3d 69, 75 (Mo.App. E.D.2012).
Appellants raise one point on appeal. They argue that the trial court erred by failing to apply a presumption of undue influence and therefore the judgment is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. We disagree.
In a suit challenging the validity of a trust due to lack of mental capacity to execute such a document, the proponents of the document have the burden to establish a prima facie case of due execution and of sound mind of the person executing the trust at the time it was executed. See Dorsey v. Dorsey, 156 S.W.3d 442, 446 (Mo.App. E.D.2005)(will contest); Matter of Estate of Dean, 967 S.W.2d 219, 222 (Mo.App. W.D.1998)(applying rules of deeds and wills to trusts). Once such a showing is made, the contestant must adduce substantial evidence that the settlor lacked mental capacity to execute the trust. Matter of Estate of Dean, 967 S.W.2d at 222.
Undue influence undermines a finding of mental capacity because it is “influence which by force, coercion, or overpersuasion destroys the free agency of the benefactor.” Tobias v. Korman, 141 S.W.3d 468, 475 (Mo.App. E.D.2004). The contestant bears the burden of proving undue influence. Kaiser v. Pearl, 670 S.W.2d 915, 918 (Mo.App. E.D.1984). In Missouri, a presumption of undue influence arises when the following elements are present: (1) the existence of a confidential or fiduciary relationship between the settlor and the beneficiary, (2) the beneficiary is given a substantial benefit, and (3) the beneficiary was active in procuring execution of the document conferring the benefit. Vancil v. Carpenter, 935 S.W.2d 42, 44 (Mo.App. W.D.1996).
Appellants argue they put forth sufficient evidence of these at trial to give rise to a presumption of undue influence, which the court failed to acknowledge or to require Respondents to rebut. In cases tried by juries, the presumption of undue influence operates to create a submissible question for the jurors, who, after hearing rebuttal evidence from the proponent of the document, would determine from all the evidence whether the settlor was actually unduly influenced when he or she executed the trust. Watermann, 369 S.W.3d at 75–76 (citing Duvall v. Brenizer, 818 S.W.2d 332, 335 (Mo.App. W.D.1991)). However, a court-tried case demands less concern for the question of a “prima facie case,” and in such cases the trial court, as factfinder, has considerable...
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