Cimino v. Dill

• Decision Date: 20 August 1982
• Docket Number: No. 81-2517,81-2517
• Citation: Cimino v. Dill, 439 N.E.2d 980, 108 Ill.App.3d 782, 64 Ill.Dec. 315 (Ill. App. 1982)
• Parties: , 64 Ill.Dec. 315 Joseph J. CIMINO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Conrad DILL, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 980

439 N.E.2d 980

108 Ill.App.3d 782, 64 Ill.Dec. 315

Joseph J. CIMINO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.Conrad DILL, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 81-2517.

Appellate Court of Illinois First District, Fifth Division.

Aug. 20, 1982.

James N. Vail, Chicago, for defendants-appellants.

William Biederman, Marks Katz Randall Weinberg & Blatt, Chicago, for plaintiff-appellee.

LORENZ, Justice:

PlaintiffJoseph Cimino filed an action seeking a declaration that various restrictive covenants did not preclude him from constructing and operating medical offices on property he purchased in an Elk Grove Villagesubdivision.On remand from a prior appeal (Cimino v. Dill(1980), 92 Ill.App.3d 345, 47 Ill.Dec. 959, 415 N.E.2d 1272("Cimino I")), the trial court construed the applicable covenant as permitting the proposed use, and defendantsBud Krueger and Charles Christian(the owners of single-family residences in the subdivision) appeal from a judgment entered in favor of plaintiff.We hold that the trial court properly construed the applicable covenant, and we affirm the judgment.The following facts are material to our decision.

The Catholic Bishop of Chicago, as a corporation sole, took conveyance of Lot 4675 in the subdivision subject to a recorded restrictive covenant (hereinafter referred to as the "original document") which provided that,

"All lots shall be used for single family residence purposes except * * * Lot 4675 * * * shall be designated as a Church Site * * *.It is understood that, with regard to Lot * * * 4675 * * * the owner or owners in fee simple of said lot, shall at the time of subdivision thereof, be the sole parties who shall have the right to determine whether * * * Lot 4675, as subdivided, shall be used for a church site * * *."

After Lot 4675 was conveyed to the Catholic Bishop, the developer recorded a second document which provided that Lot 4675 could only be used for single family residences if the Catholic Bishop decided not to use the entire lot for a church.Subsequently, the Catholic Bishop decided that the entire lot would not be needed for church purposes, and he conveyed a subdivided portion of the property to plaintiff.

In Cimino I we held that the second document was not binding on the Catholic Bishop because it had not been recorded before the property was conveyed to him.As we explained, "The second document was merely a unilateral after-the-fact declaration of [the developer's] intent in recording the original restrictions and to the extent that it expands or varies the earlier restrictions would not restrict the Catholic Bishop's use of the property."92 Ill.App.3d at 349, 47 Ill.Dec. 959, 415 N.E.2d 1272.

We further held that the original document is ambiguous (92 Ill.App.3d at 348, 47 Ill.Dec. 959, 415 N.E.2d 1272) because "From an examination of the original document, [the developer's] intent is unclear as to whether Lot 4675 was restricted to use for single-family residences unless the owner or owners determined to make use of its optional designation as a church site or whether the lot would be unrestricted in use should the owner determine not to use it as a church site."92 Ill.App.3d at 349, 47 Ill.Dec. 959, 415 N.E.2d 1272.

At an evidentiary hearing after remand from Cimino I, defendants presented evidence that the Catholic Bishop was notified of the second document after the property had been conveyed to him.In this appeal, defendants initially assert that the Catholic Bishop and his assigns are bound by the second document because he"took possession of the subject property with full knowledge of the restrictions contained in the two documents at issue and thereby acquiesced in their enforceability."

Defendants also assert that the trial court improperly "entered a judgment that went beyond the pleadings."The basis for this argument is the fact that the trial court construed the original document as permitting the proposed development, but plaintiff's amended complaint only prayed for a declaration that both documents are "inapplicable and unenforceable."

The initial argument overlooks the fact that, in the absence of a subsequent agreement between the Catholic Bishop and the developer concerning the second document, the Catholic Bishop was only bound by the restrictions which were in his deed, or in the record chain of title, when the property was conveyed to him.

"A covenant is an agreement between the parties to do or not to do a particular act."(Leverich v. Roy(1949), 402 Ill. 71, 73, 83 N.E.2d 335.)In other words, there must be a meeting of the minds between the covenanting parties.But, "A grantee who accepts a deed with a covenant imposing duties upon him is as much bound by such [a] covenant as though he had signed and sealed the deed."(Druecker v. McLaughlin(1908), 235 Ill. 367, 374, 85 N.E. 647.)The grantee in such a case is held to have impliedly assented to being bound by covenants which were in his deed, or in the record chain of title for the property, at the time of conveyance.Wiegman v. Kusel(1915), 270 Ill. 520, 523, 110 N.E. 884.

The second restrictive covenant in the present case had not been drafted or recorded when Lot 4675 was conveyed to the Catholic Bishop, and the Catholic Bishop did not enter into a subsequent contract or agreement which would have bound him or his assigns to the provisions of this document.The fact that the Bishop eventually became aware of the second document does not mean that there was a binding agreement (i.e., a meeting of the minds and a bargained for exchange of consideration) between the Catholic Bishop and the developer concerning the second document.

Although the developer may have subjectively intended to restrict...