Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Lennox Indus., Inc.
| Decision Date | 09 February 2016 |
| Docket Number | CAUSE NO. 3:14-CV-1731 |
| Parties | THE CINCINNATI INSURANCE COMPANY a/s/o JASON and MICHELLE HOWARD, Plaintiff, v. LENNOX INDUSTRIES, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
This case arises out of a fire that burned the home of Plaintiff's The Cincinnati Insurance Company ("CIC") insureds, Jason and Michelle Howard ("the Howards"), on June 22, 2012. The Howard's home was insured by CIC, which paid approximately $408,000 as a result of the fire. CIC has brought this suit against Defendant, Lennox Industries, Inc. ("Lennox"), alleging counts of negligence, strict liability, and warranty based upon an air condensing unit ("ACU") designed, manufactured, sold, and distributed by Lennox, that was mounted just outside and adjacent to the Howards' home. CIC argues that electrical arcing between the ACU's compressor and its power source ignited organic material inside the ACU and ultimately caused the fire. CIC claims that the ACU was manufactured, designed, and/or labeled in an unsafe, defective, and inherently dangerous condition. Lennox denies the allegations.
Lennox filed the instant motion for summary judgment on August 6, 2015 (DE #30). CIC filed a brief in opposition on September 22, 2015 (DE #35). Lennox also filed a motion to strike, requesting an order striking Larry Cooper's Investigative Report (DE #35-2) and Brad O'Neal's Engineering Report (DE #35-3) from Plaintiff's designated evidence in opposition to the motion for summaryjudgment. Lennox then filed a reply brief in support of its motion for summary judgment and motion to strike. (DE #37).1
A fire occurred on June 22, 2012, at the Howards' house located at 57711 El Dorado Drive, Goshen, Indiana. The house was built in 2007, and equipped with a Lennox 13ACD air condensing unit on its exterior. (Compl. ¶¶ 3, 5; Jason Howard Dep. pp. 11, 45-46.) The ACU was installed behind the Howards' home, adjacent to their patio, in an area surrounded by mulch and ornamental grasses. (Howard Dep., pp. 47.) Mr. Howard testified that other than spraying the outside of the ACU with a hose, neither he nor anyone else serviced the ACU. (Id., pp. 44-45.)
Before leaving the house on June 22, 2-12, the Howards set the thermostat in the house to 72 degrees Fahrenheit, and left their ACU running. Neither Jason Howard nor Michelle Howard was home at the time of the fire.
At approximately 3:11 p.m., the Jefferson Township Fire Department was alerted to the fire. (Larry D. Cooper, Jr. Dep., p. 78.) They arrived at the scene at 3:19 p.m., but the home was still heavily damaged.
CIC designated Larry Cooper, an Investigator with Unified Investigations & Sciences, Inc., as its Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B) witness to testify about the origin and cause of the subject fire. Cooper opined that the subject fire originated inside the ACU. (Ex. C to Lennox's Designation of Evidence in Support of Mot. For Summ. J., Larry D. Cooper, Jr. Dep. Defs.' Ex. 2 to Cooper Dep., p. 100.) Cooper's report states:
The fire originated at the condensing unit on the west exterior of the home. An electrical malfunction (see engineering report) ignited nearby combustibles including plant life and leaves in the area and inside of the air conditioning unit. The fire spread to nearby combustibles including dried grass and mulch before spreading to the west exposure of the home. The flames progressed upward along the west wall before propagating into the home through the overhang. The fire continued to burn in the attic area resulting in partial collapse of the roof.
(DE #35-2, Cooper's Report, p. 2.) Cooper also believes the fire was caused by "a high-resistant heating or arcing" which ignited "fuels" inside the ACU and then spread to nearby combustibles, including mulch and ornamentals, before spreading to the Howards' home. (Id., pp. 100, 105.) Cooper does not have any opinion regarding how the "high-resistant heating or arcing" occurred or whether the aforementioned electrical event resulted from an unsafe, defective, or inherently dangerous condition associated with the ACU. (Id., pp. 97-100.) Instead, he defers to the opinions and conclusion held by Brad O'Neal, CIC's Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B) witness on the topic of electricalengineering.
CIC designated Mr. Brad O'Neal, a Senior Forensic Engineer who is also employed by Unified, as its Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B) witness on the topic of electrical engineering. .) O'Neal and his colleagues at Unified examined and tested the ACU and its component parts on two occasions - September 13, 2012 and January 15, 2015. (Ex. D to Lennox's Designation of Evidence in Support of Mot. For Summ. J., pp. 49, 51.) Based upon the exams and testing, O'Neal opines that the fire originated inside the ACU at the compressor connection. (Id., pp. 52, 58, 72-74.) Specifically, O'Neal believes the electrical arcing between the ACU's compressor and its power was the fire's ignition source:
Therefore it is my opinion that the ignition source, based on electrical arc mapping, was not on the exterior of the condensing unit. Arc mapping placed the fire originating inside the condensing unit, which was also consistent with the fire investigator's area of origin. Further identifying the ignition source at the compressor power connections, which was the farthest failure downstream from an arc severed conductor provide the origin and ignition source for the fire.
(DE #35-3, O'Neal Report, pp. 7-8.)
However, O'Neal specifically testified during his deposition that he is not offering any opinion that the alleged electrical arcing resulted from a defective or unreasonably dangerous characteristic of the ACU:
(Brad O'Neal Dep., pp. 28-29; 140.)
Finally, Plaintiff's experts investigated other potential causes of the fire. Cooper states that "no evidence of carelessly discarded smoking material was found in this area." (DE #35-2, p. 4.) O'Neil opined that "[n]o other competent ignition sources were identified which would cause the damage observed; therefore, the arcing at the compressor was the fire's ignition source." (DE #35-3, p. 7.)
Summary judgment must be granted when "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute of material fact exists when "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Not every dispute between the parties makes summary judgment inappropriate; "[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect theoutcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Id. In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, the deciding court must construe all facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Ogden v. Atterholt, 606 F.3d 355, 358 (7th Cir. 2010). "However, our favor toward the nonmoving party does not extend to drawing inferences that are supported by only speculation or conjecture." Fitzgerald v. Santoro, 707 F.3d 725, 730 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Harper v. C.R. Eng., Inc., 687 F.3d 297, 306 (7th Cir. 2012)).
A party opposing a properly supported summary judgment motion may not rely on allegations or denials in her own pleading, but rather must "marshal and present the court with the evidence she contends will prove her case." Goodman...
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